
STATE OF MICHIGAN 

department of public SnsJtruction 

LANSING 



Democracy and the Great 

War 



AN OUTLINE OF THE FACTORS WHICH HAVE 

CULMINATED IN THE PRESENT 

WORLD STRUGGLE 




BULLETIN NO. 20 



Published by 

THE SUPERINTENDENT OP PUBLIC INSTRUCTION 

1918 



STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Brpartmrnt of JSubltr Snstrurtfon 

^ ' LANSI NG 



Democracy and the Great 

War 



AN OUTLINE OF THE FACTORS WHICH HAVE CULMI- 
NATED IN THE PRESENT WORLD STRUGGLE 



by 



GEORGE N. FULLER, Ph. D. 
Secretary Michigan Historical Commission 



BULLETIN No. 20 



Published by 
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC IN.3TRUCTI0N 

1918 



V 






^^-^X 



0." of »• 
AUS 19 1919 



STATE OF MICHIGAN 

SepartHtfnl of public Snstructioii 

LANSING 



What can teachers do to win the war? The most important 
thing they can do to sustain our country is to teach thorough- 
ly the causes of the war. People must know the principles 
that are at stake. If they are firmly grounded in this they 
will know that our cause is just. Their belief can never be 
shaken. They will be ready to make any sacrifice rather than 
yield. 

Teachers are everywhere anxious to do their part in this 
matter. However, they have not found any comprehensive 
treatment of the subject in convenient and teachable form. 
This bulletin, "Democracy and the Great War" is published 
to supply teachers with a reliable guide in teaching the issues 
of the present crisis. 

We are indebted to Dr. George N. Fuller, Secretary of the 
Michigan Historical Commission, for this treatment of De- 
mocracy and the Great War. In putting this material in 
accessible and teachable form Dr. Fuller has rendered a dis- 
tinct service to the teachers of our state and country. 

The bulletin is furnished to superintendents and commis- 
sioners of schools in quantities as requested. Always state 
the exact number desired. 

Very respectfully. 

Superintendent of Public Instruction. 
April 6, 1918. 




Acknowledgments 

In the preparation of these pages much use has been made 
<of the publications of the National Board for Historical Ser- 
vice, The United States Bureau of Education, the Committee 
on Public Information, the National Security League, the 
Carnegie Endownment for International Peace, the National 
Committee on Patriotic and Defense Societies, the World 
Peace Foundation, the American Association for International 
Conciliation, the American Society for Judicial Settlement 
of International Disputes, and the History Teacher's Maga- 
zine. The last has been especially useful for the very valuable 
suggestions contained in the issues of January, February and 
March, 1918. Use has been made also of a great number of 
standard works, mentioned specifically in the references. 
Knowlton and Howe's Essentials in Modern European His- 
tory, ^smd Robinson and Beard's The Development of Modern 
Europe have been helpful in selecting the references. Pro- 
fessor William A. Frayer of the University of Michigan has 
kindly read the manuscript, to whom grateful acknowledg- 
ment is made for helpful criticism. 



Preface 

The Great War may be studied from many angles. In 1915 
under the direction of President G. Stanley Hall, of Clark 
University, one of his students sent out a circular to cities 
in eight states to discover how many schools were teaching the 
war, and if so, why. Replies were received from eighty-seven 
cities, and these reasons President Hall has summed up 
roughly as follows : 

First. — It is a great vitalizer of geography. To bring and 
show maps of the positions of the armies and of the coun- 
tries involved, with places that come to a focus of interest 
from day to day, is capable of impressing a very wide vital 
interest in Geography. 

Second. — ^We have a chance to see history in the making. 
Historic tendencies from many centuries are focusing to, and 
will diverge from, this momentous epoch in which history is 
made day by day more rapidly than ever before. 

Third. — In the higher school grades innumerable questions 
of economic trade, markets, effects on various industries, social^ 
civic and political organization of the countries involved can 
be given a high degree of vitalization. 

Fourth. — It is the greatest opportunity ever afforded to 
impress upon the minds of young people the barbarity, de- 
structiveness and brutality of war and the blessings of peace. 

Fifth. — It gives a large surface of contact between the 
school and life, which tend so strongly to be isolated from 
each other. Considering the interest of every live boy in 
conflict the war is a dynamo of educational energy which 

(5) 



6 Democracy and the Great War 

should make the entire school system vastly more effective 
while it lasts and perhaps for some time after. 

Sixth. — It makes of young Americans citizens of the world, 
not only of the country, and teaches them the right apprecia- 
tion of the relations of other lands to theirs. 

Seventh. — It teaches the great lesson of Americanism and 
toleration. It teaches the young to agree to differ, and culti- 
vates a judicial as above a partisan attitude, which is per- 
haps the very palladium of the strength of this country in 
the world, because here citizenship means outgrowing and 
rising above the old world prejudices and racial animosities 
that have come down from centuries since the old religious 
wars and which have made nations suspect and hate their 
neighbors. It gives us a wholesome realization that we have 
none of these old dangerous European chimneys in our 
political structure liable at any moment to set fire to the 
whole. 

To these President Hall himself adds others, related princi- 
pally to the lines of study in which he has a special interest. 
This was before America entered the war. 

As the war progressed we began to see things from another 
angle. As a nation we had mourned for the victims of the 
Lusitania. We had heard with surprise and sorrow of the 
drowning of women and children of other neutral nations on 
the high seas, the bombing of hospitals and schoolhouses, the 
tearing of families apart and the scientific enslavement of men, 
women and children to work at forced labor against their 
kindred, and of the pursuit by Germany of a/general policy 
of "terrorism," both in the method of conducting military 
offensives and afterwards against the helpless inhabitants of 



Preface 7 

conquered lands. These things were more than a surprise, 
we were enlightened. 

When President Wilson declared that "the world must be 
made safe for domocracy/' we began to ask, Is the Imperial 
German Government the enemy of democracy, and, therefore, 
the enemy of America? 

We did not lose our poise as a judge, but we began to reach 
a judgment. We began to understand the character of the 
forces behind the Imperial German Government, and with 
this understanding there was added another reason for study- 
ing the Great War, namely, to find out why the great de- 
mocracies of the world were lining up against Germany, and 
why there were no democracies at all in alliance with Ger- 
many. We began to ask, Why do the German people, whose 
kindred among us are zealous lovers of liberty, tolerate such 
a government? Then we began to remember that from 1848 
onward many of these Germans came to America, as they 
said, to escape the yoke of "Prussian autocracy" and "Prus- 
sian militarism." 

We began, in fact, to see that there were two Germanics, — 
the Germany of other days, with its glorious musicians, its 
thinkers, its poets, its idealists, which w^e loved to recall, and 
the Germany of today, the Germany of sordid materialism, 
the cold hard nation of the mailed fist at the heart of which 
is Prussia. We saw in action the Prussian theory of war, 
that Might makes Eight, — that war, and not peace, is the 
natural relation between nations. We came to see that the 
triumph of that nation would mean that the world must be- 
come an armed camp, and live under the shadow of war. 
And as this conviction was borne in upon us the study of the 
War took on a new meaning. 



8 Democracy and the Great War 

To the boys and girls of Michigan for whom this little sketch 
is prepared let me commend these words written by an emi- 
nent countryman of one of our Allies but which apply as well 
to the boys and girls of America : 

"In all your study of the War, make this your first and 
foremost thought, that the War is for you. It is you who 
will enjoy the new order of things when the War is done. 
Your countrymen are giving their lives for their country; it 
is your country, and in it you will pass your life. Our dead 
have died for you. . . . It is you who will find this world 
better than they found it. You will live in peace, because 
they died in war; you will go safe and free, because they 
went under discipline and into danger up to the moment of 
their death. You will have a good time, because they suffered. 
To you, who gain by their loss, and whose life is made com- 
fortable by their lives laid down, comes the question, from 
countless little wooden crosses over graves in France and 
Belgium and Gallipoli, and from all the unmarked graves of 
the sea — Is it nothing to you? Why, the War is your War. 
You will enter into all that it achieves, and inherit all that 
it earns; and the miseries of it will be the making of your 
happiness. There are many good reasons why a man should 
fight for his country, but they come to this one reason, that 
he is fighting for the future of his country. And you are the 
future. We older people so soon will be gone; you will stay 
here, you for whom your countrymen today are in the toils 
of this War. You are the future, we are the past. We have 
lived in a world which you never saw, and you will live in 
a world which we shall never see." 

This little brochure is frankly a war appeal. It recognizes 
the character of the enemy at the outset. The enemy is 



Preface 9 

Autocracy, as embodied in the Imperial German Government. 
Its antagonist is Democracy. The Great War is a conflict 
of these principles. As between nations, it is a world crisis in 
morals. This is your war, and my war. We are fighting for 
all that America has stood for, all that our fathers have died 
for. We must grasp the significance of this. This war is 
a fight to a finish, for either Democracy must win, or it will 
perish from the. earth as a form of government. There is a 
duty for each of us. ''In union there is strength." A study 
of the Great War at this time should appeal not only to the 
intellect, but to the heart and the will. 

GEORGE N. FULLER. 
Lansing, April 6, 1918. 



J 



Contents 



I. Autocracy and Democracy 61 

II. Prussia and the Army 64 

III. German Militarism 71 

IV. Policy of Terrorism 74 

V. Democracy Against War • . . . . 79 

VI. Apologies for War Considered 87 

VII. America and the Great Democracies 92 

VIII. American Democracy for Sane Internationahsm 104 

IX. America for Humanity 113 

X. Democracy and the Industrial Revolution 119 

XI. Sociahsm and the War 123 

XII. The Prussianized Imperial German Government 130 

XIII. German Colonization and Imperiahsm 136 

XIV. The Kaiser and the Pan-Germanists 139 

XV. The Kaiser's Naval PoHcy 143 

XVI. Germany in the Far East 147 

XVII. Germany's Menace to America 150 

XVIII. "Mittel-Europa" 155 

XIX. The Triple AlHance 158 

XX. Germany in Southeastern Europe 160 

XXI. Germany in Western Asia 163 

XXII. Triple Entente 165 

. XXIII. Germany Tests the Triple Entente 168 

XXIV. The Slavs and the Turks 171 

XXV. Russo-Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin 174 

XXVI. "Drang Nach Osten" * 177 

XXVII. Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 179 

XXVIII. Serbia and the Balkan Wars 181 

XXIX. Germany's War Measures of 1913 183 

XXX. The Pretext for War 188 

XXXI. Germany Defeats Peace Efforts 191 

XXXII. The Crime Against Belgium 197 

XXXIII. England Forced into the War . , 200 

XXXIV. America Awakens 204 

XXXV. Germany Flouts America's Sovereignty 205 

XXXVI. America's Neutrality ^ 211 

XXXVII. German Intrigue Among the Neutrals 213 

XXXVIII. America Recognizes State of War 217 

XXXIX. Why America Must Fight to the End 218 

XL. What Germany Means by Peace 220 

XLI. Our German American Friends 228 

XLII. The People's War to End War 231 

XLIII. "Carry On!" 233 

(11) 



References 

I. Autocracy and Democracy 

Adams, E. D. Democracy versus" Autocracy (Liberty 
Loan General Executive Board, San Francisco. — 
Reviewed in Hist. Teach. Mag., 9: 207) 

Bourdon, G. The German enigma (Button — 1914, p. 
357. $1.25. — An inquiry among Germans as to what 
they think, what they want, what they can do) 

Dodd, W. F. Modern constitutions: a collection of the 
fundamental laws of thirty-two of the most impor- 
tant countries of the world, with historical and 
Ml)lio graphical notes (Univ. of Chicago Press — 1909, 
2 vol. $5.— Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 14: 828) 

Hovelaque, E. L. Deeper causes of the war (Button — 
1916, p. 158. $1.25) 

Laski, H. J. Studies in the pro'blem of sovereignty 
(Yale Univ. Press— 1917, p. 297. $2.50.— Reviewed 
in Amer. Hist. Rev., 22: 844) 

Lowe, S. (Ed.) The spirit of the allied nations 
(Macmillan— 1915, p. 214. $1.— King's College lec- 
tures in imperial studies) 

Mathews, Shailer. Why the United States is at war 
(National Security League) 

McCabe, J. The soul of Europe: a character study of 
the militant nations (Bodd, Mead — 1915, p. 407. 
$3) 

McClure, S. S. Obstacles to peace (Houghton — 1917, 
p. 487. $2.— Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 23: 214) 

McElroy, R. M. The ideals of our war (National Se- 
curity League) 

Opportunities for history teachers: the lessons of the 
Great War in the classroom (Bep't. of the Interior, 
Bureau of Education) 

Stoddard, T. L. Present day Europe: its national 
states of mind (Century — 1917, p. 322. $2) 

"Williams, T. How the German Empire has menaced 
democracy (National Security League) 

II. Prussia and the Army 

Brief Readings: 

Henderson, E. F. A short history of Germany (Mac- 
CIS) 



14 Democracy and the Great War 

Prussia and the Army — Continued 

millan, 2 vol., p. 517, 604. $4.— Revised edition, 1916, 
brings the narrative down to 1914) 
The Great Elector, II, 9-29 
Father of Frederick the Great, II, 87-111 
Frederick the Great, II, 149-218 
Bismarck and German unity, II, 348-410 
Franco-Prussian War, II, 411-450 
Phillips, W. A. Modern Europe, 1815-1899 (Macmillan 
—1905, p. 583. $1.60) 

Bismarck and the Rise of Prussia, 390-407 
Schleswig-Holstein question, 409 
Establishment of the Empire, 449-485 
Robinson and Beard. Readings in modern European 
history (Ginn— 1908-'09, 2 vol., p. 500 each, $1.40, 
$1.50) 
Frederick the Great on the duties of a King, I, 

202 
Frederick the Great's comments on sundry peti- 
tions, I, 205 
King William on the cause of the Austro-Prussian 

War, II, 144 
Bismarck and the Austro-Prussian War, II, 146 
Bismarck and the Franco-Prussian War, II, 158 
Proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles, 
II, 163 
Longer Readings: 
Ford, G. S. "Boyen's Military Law," in Amer. Hist, 
Rev., 20: 528 (Prussian army growth; good bibliog- 
raphy in note 2) 
Jordan, D. S. "Alsace-Lorraine: a study in conquest," 

in Atlantic Monthly, 113: 688 
Priest, G. M. Germany since 17^0 (Ginn — 1915, p. 199. 

$1.25) 
Smith, Munroe. Bismarck and German unity (Colum- 
bia Univ. Press. — Reviewed in Amer. His. Rev., 17: 
405) 
Maps: 

Dow, Atlas of European history (Holt — 1907. $1.25) 
Growth of Prussia, 22 
Germany in the 19th century, 22 
North German Confederation and German Empire, 
28 



References 15 

III. German Militarism 

Brief Readings: 
Archer, William. "Fighting a philosophy," in North 

American Review, 201: 30-44 
Kellogg, Vernon. "Headquarters' Nights," in Atlantic 
Monthly, 120: 145-155 
Longer Readings: 
Altschul, Charles. German militarism and its German 
critics (Contents: A careful study of German militar- 
ism before the war, especially as revealed in the 
Rosa Luxemburg Trial and the Zabern Incident. 
The evidence is drawn almost entirely from 
newspapers published in Germany: it reveals 
the brutality which prevailed in the German 
army in time of peace, and helps to explain the 
crimes and atrocities committed by Germany in 
the present war. 40 pages. Pub. by the C. P. I.) 
Archer, William. Gems (?) of German thought 

(Doubleday— 1917, p. 264. $1.25) 
Bang, J. P. Hurrah and Hallelujah (Doran — 1917, p. 
234. $1.— The teachings of Germany's poets, proph- 
ets, professors and preachers) 
Bernhardi, Friedrich von (tr. by W. H. Powles). 
Germany and the next war (Longmans — 1913, p. 
228. $3) 
Santayana, George. Egotism in German philosophy 

(Scribner— 1916. $1.50) 
Smith, Prof. Munroe. Militarism and statecraft (Put- 
nam) 
Thayer, W. R. Germany versus civilization (Hough- 
ton— 1916, p. 238. $1) 

, — . — . (Ed.) Out of their mouths (Ap- 

pleton. — A collection of extracts from official Ger- 
man sources) 
Walcott, F. C. The Prussian system (C. P. I.) 

IV. Policy of Terrorism 

Adams, E. D. German ruthlessness an inculcated 
dardarism (Liberty Loan General Executive Board, 
San Francisco. — Reviewed in Hist. Teach Mag., 9: 
207) 

Bland, J. O. P. (Trans.) Germany's violations of the 
law of war, 1914-15 (Putnams, $2, — Compiled under 
the auspices of the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs) 



16 Democracy and the Great War 

Policy of Terrorism — Continued 

Chambry, R6n«^. The truth alout Louvain (Doran — 
1915, p. 95. $.25) 

Chesterton, G. K. The MrMrism of Berlin 

Garner and Scott. The German war code (Com. on 
Pub. Information. — Contains tbe German doctrine of 
war as embodied in the official war manual, con- 
trasted with the war manuals of the United States, 
Great Britain, and France) 

Johnson, R. The clash of nations 

Maccas, Leon. German dar'barism (A picture of Ger- 
man atrocities, based entirely on documentary evi- 
dence.— Doran— 1916, p. 228. $1) 

Mokveld, L. The German fury in Belgium (Doran — 
1917, p. 247. $1) 

Morgan, J. H. Gernfian atrocities: an official investiga- 
tion (Dutton, 1916, p. 162, $1) 

Munro, D. C, et al. German war practices (Com. on 
Pub. Information. — Methods of the German military 
machine in Belgium and northern France; facts 
calmly stated on the basis of American and Ger- 
man evidence only. Prussifinism in all its horror 
is exposed by documentary proof of deliberate 
brutalities perpetuated upon civilian populations as 
a part of the program of "efficiency." This book 
shows how the Government taught the soldiers the 
"art" of terrorism, often forced them to commit 
crimes against civilization, and punished those who 
betrayed symptoms of mercy. A most powerful ex- 
pose of the German government's methods) 

Reports on the violation of the rights of nations and 
of the laws and customs of war in Belgium, "by a 
Commission appointed ly the Belgian government 

Somville, M. Gustave. The road to Liege. The work 
of the German "destruction squads'' (Doran — 1916, 
p. 296. $1) 

Their crimes (Cassell. — Translation from the French 
of the Prefect of Meurthe-et-Moselle and the Mayors 
of Nancy and Luneville) 

Toynbee, A. J. The German terror in Belgium (Doran 
—1917, p. 160. $1) 

, — . — . The German terror in France 

(Doran— 1917, p. 220. $1) 

' , — . — . The destruction of Poland (Doran. 



$1) 



References 17 

Policy of Terrorism — Continued 

Turczynowicz, Laura de. When the Prussians came to 
Poland (Putnam— 1916, p. 281. $1.25.— An experi- 
ence of an American woman during the German 
invasion) 

Verhaeren, Emile. Belgiuw/s agony (Houghton — 1915, 
p. 131. $1.25) 

Waxweiler, Emile. Belgium, neutral and loyal (Put- 
nam— 1915, p. 324. $1.25) 
V. Democracy against War 
Brief Readings: 

Baker, N. D. The War and the colleges (American 
Association for International Conciliation. — Address 
to representatives of colleges and universities, de- 
livered at Continental Hall, Washington, D. C, May 
5, 1917, by Hon. Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War) 

Channing, W. E. Discourses on war (World Peace 
Foundation. $.60) 

Elliott and McKenzie, Spirit of militarism and non- 
military preparation for defense (A. A. for I. C, 
June, 1915) 

Fontaine, Henri la. The great solution, Magnissima 
Charta (W. P. F. $1.25. — Essay on evolutionary and 
constructive pacifism) 

Eraser, Leon. Educational factors toward peace (A. 
A. for L C, April, 1915) 

Fried, Alfred H. (Mez, John, Trans.) A dozen truths 
al)out pacifism (A. A. for I. C, March, 1915) 

Hale, (E. E.) and Brewer, (D. J.). Mohonh addresses 
(W. P. F. $.50) 

Hull, W. I. Islew peace movement (W. P. F. $1) 

Mead, E. D. Washington, Jefferson and Franklin on 
war (W. P. F.) 

, — . — . Woman and war (W. P. F.) 

Robinson and Beard, Readings in European history 
(Ginn, II, 415, "The work of the missionaries") 

Student conference on international relations at Cor- 
nell Univ., June 15-30, 1915 (W. P. F. $1.75) 

Sumner, Charles. Addresses on war (W. P. F. $.60) 

Weston, S. F. Prize orations of the intercollegiate 
peace association (W. P. F. $.75) 
Longer Readings: 

Barker, Granville. The Red Cross in France (Doran — 
1916, p. 168. $1) 



18 Democracy and the Great War 

Democracy Against War — Continued 

Beck, J. M. The war and humanity (Putnam — 1917, p. 

397. $1.50) 
Bergson, H. L. The meaning of the war (Macmillan. 

$.40) 
Myers, P. V. N. History as past ethics (Ginn. $1.50) 
Powers, H. H. Things men fight for (Macmillan — 1916, 

p. 382. $1.50) 
The war of democracy (Doubleday — 1917, p. 441. $2. — 

Chapters on the fundamental significance of the 

struggle for a new Europe, prepared by Rt. Hon. 

Viscount Bryce and others) 
Seton-Watson, R. W., et al. The war and democracy 

(Macmillan— 1915, p. 390. $.80.— One of the best 

discussions of the subject) 
VI. Apologies for War Considered 
Brief Readings: 
Allen, Arthur. Brain of armaments (W. P. F.) 
Beau, B. A defense of cannibalism (A. A. for I. C, 

May, 1914) 

Bourne, R. S. The tradition of war (A. A. for I. C, 
June, 1914) 

Bryce, James. War and human progress (A. A. for 
I. C, Nov., 1916) 

Cleveland, Dr. Frederick A. The War— Its practical 
lessons to democracy (Address at National Munici- 
pal League, Nov. 22, 1917.— Industrial Service and 
Equipment Company, Boston) 

Dillon, E. J. "Cost of armed peace," in Contemporary 
Review, 105: 413-421 

Dodge, D. L, War inconsistent with the religion of 
Jesus Christ (W. P. F. $.60) 

Eckhardt, C. C. "War and peace in the light of his- 
tory," in History Teacher's Magazine, VIII, 43 

Foster, Hon. J. W. War not inevitable (W. P. F.) 

Giddings, F. H. The dases of an enduring peace (A. 
A. for I. C, April, 1917) 

Hu, Suh. 75 there a substitute for force in interna- 
tional relations? (A. A. for I. C— Prize essay, In» 
ternational Polity Club competition, awarded in 
June, 1916) 



Keferences 19 

Apologies for War Considered — Continued' 

Haldane, Lord. Higher nationality: a study in law and 

ethics (A. A. for I. C, Nov., 1913) 
Johnson, A. S. Commerce and war (A. A. for I. C, 

April, 1914) 
Lansing, I. J. Why Christianity did not stop the war 

(The "Carry-On" League, Chicago) 
McMaster, J. B. "Old standards of public morals," in 

Amer. Hist. Rev., 11: 515-528 
Mussey, H. R. I9 commerce war? (A. A. for I. C, 

Jan., 1916) 
Ralston, J. H. Some supposed just causes of war (W. 

P. F.) 
Randall, J. G. "Democracy and war," in History 

Teacher's Magazine, VIII, 329 
Reinsch, P. S. PuMic international unions (W. P. F. 

$1.65) 
Stratton, G. M. The control of the fighting instinct 

(A. A. for I. C, Dec, 1913) 
Wallace, A. R. "The theory of evolution," in Progress 

of the century (Harper— 1901. $2.50) p. 3-29. 
Warner, H. E. Ethics of force (W. P. F. $.55) 
Longer Readings: 

Bloch, Jean de. Future of war (W. P. F. $.65) 
James, William. The moral equivalent of war (A. A. 

for I. C, 1910, p. 24) 
Osborne, C. E. Religion in Europe and the world 

crisis (Dodd, Mead— 1916, p. 414. $2.50) 
Phillipson, Colman, Philosophy and war (Dutton — 

1916. $1.75) 
Robertson, J. M. War and civilization (Dutton — 1916, 

p. 159. $1. — An open letter to a Swedish professor) 
The effect of a large military establishment on our 

domestic institutions and policy," in PuT). of the 

Amer. Acad, of Pol. and 8oc. Science, Vol. 66) 
Trotter, W. Instincts of the herd in peace and war 

(Macmillan— 1916, p. 213. $1.25) 
VII. America and the Great Democracies 
England 
An outline sketch of English constitutional history: 

Geo. B. Adams (Yale University Press) 
Origin of the English constitution: G. B. Adams, in 

Amer. Hist. Review, 13: 229-245, 713-724 
Parliament at the opening of the nineteenth century: 



20 Democracy and the Great War 

America and the Great Dem-ocracies — Continued 

C. A. Beard, Introduction to the English historians 
(Macmillan— 1906. $1.80) 538-548 

"English history," 1815-1914: W. J. Chase, in History 
Teacher's Magazine, 9: 138 

Reform Bill of 1832: Lee, Source dooh of English his- 
tory (Holt— 1900. $2), 519-529 

Reform Bill of 1867: Beard, Introduction to the Eng- 
lish historians, 566-581 

Enfranchisement of the agricultural laborer: lUd, 
582-593 

The cabinet system and parliament: A. L. Cross, A 
history of England and Greater Britain (Macmillan 
—1914, p. 1165. $2.50) 614-617, 1078-1080 

"English history, 1815-1915": W. J. Chase in H. T. M., 
9: 138 

"The study of English history": R. L, Schuyler in 
H. T. M., 9: 90 

"The Irish question and England": E. R. Turner, in 
H. T. M., 9: 196 

The Government of England, national, local and im- 
perial: David Duncan Wallace (Putnam — 1917) 
Longer accounts of the constitution and government: 

Masterman, J. H. B. A history of the British consti- 
tution (Macmillan— 1912, p. 291, $.80.— Reviewed in 
Amer. Hist. Rev., 17: 867) 

Moran, T. F. Theory and practice of the English gov- 
ernment (Longmans — 1903, p. 379. $1.20, — Much 
more concise than Lowell) 

Rose, J. H. Rise of democracy in England (Stone, 
$1.25) 

Russell, G. W, E. The spirit of England (Dutton — 
1915, p. 304. $1.75) 

The Irish question: L. P. Dubois, Contemporary Ire- 
land 

British colonial policy: G. E. Howard, Preliminaries 
of the American Revolution (Harpers-American Na- 
tion Series), 22-67, 174-192 

English self-governing colonies: Cross, op. cit., 1063- 
1069 

Canada under British rule: Woodward, The expan- 
sion of the British Empire (Macmillan. $1), 249- 
261; J. D. Sears, How Canada organized Tier man 
power (Columbia War Papers, Series I, No. 14, Pub. 



Ebferbnces 21 

America and the Great Democracies — Continued. 

by Columbia Univ., Div. of Intelligence and Public- 
ity) 

British in South Africa: Woodward, op. cit., 280-295 

Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth: Beard, 
op. cit., 645-662 

Britain in Egypt: Robinson and Beard, Readings in 
modern European history, II, 454-458 
United States 

America and Europe: I. J. Cox, "European back- 
ground of American history," in History Teacher's 
Magazine, VII, 163; E. B. Greene, "Relation of 
American to European history," in IHd, VIII, 218; 
Sir George Otto Trevelyan, The American Revolu- 
tion (Longmans — 1912, new edition, 4 vol. $2 each. 
— Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 13: 874) ; C. H. Van 
Tyne, The American Revolution (Harper — ^Ameri- 
can Nation Series) ; A. L. Cross, A history of Eng- 
land and Greater Britain, 738-781; Van Tyne, 
"Sovereignty in the American Revolution," in 

"Amer. Hist. Review, 12: 529-545; Trevelyan, George 
III and Charles Fox: the concluding part of the 
American Revolution (Longmans — 1912, 2 vol. $2 
each. — Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 17: 827; E. 
B. Greene, "American Revolution and the British 
Empire," in History Teacher's Magazine, VIII, 292; 
W. T. Root, "American colonies and the British 
Empire," lUd, VI, 281 

Monroe Doctrine: A. B. Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, 

an interpretation, (Little — 1916, p. 445. $1.75) ; H. 

W. V. Temperley, "The later American policy of 

George Canning," in Amer. Hist. Rev., 11: 779-797 

General Works on Amorican democracy 

Beard, C. A. American government and politics (Mac- 
millan— 1915, p. 788. $2.25) 

, — . — . Contemporary American history 

(Macmillan— 1915, p. 397. $1.60) 

, — . — . The supreme court and the consti- 



tution (Macmillan— 1912. $1. — See Amer. Hist. Re- 

vieiv, 18: 380) 
Bestor, A. E. Ame^Hca and the Great War (National 

Security League) 
Croly, H. Promise of American life (Macmillan — 

1912, p. 468. $2) - 



22 Democracy and the Great War 

America and the Great Democracies — Continued 

Hart, A. B. National ideals historically traced, 1607- 

1907 (Harper — American Nation Series — 1907, vol. 26. 

$2) 
Haworth, P. L. America in ferment (Bobbs-Merrill — 

1915, p. 477. $1.50) 
Hill, D. J. Americanism: what it is (Appleton — 1916, 

p. 280. $1.35. — Attempts to set forth what is most 

original and distinctive in American political con- 
ceptions, and most characteristic of the American 

spirit) 
McLaughlin, A. C. "American history and American 

democracy," in Amer. Hist. Rev., 20: 255-276 
Simons, A. M. Social forces in American history 

(Macmillan— 1911, p. 325. $1.50) 
Sioussat, St. G. L. "English foundations of American 

institutional life," in History Teacher's Magazine, 

Vin, 260 
France 
Montesquieu's theory of the state: Robinson and 

Beard Readings in modern European history, I, 191- 

192 
Voltaire: Lowell, The eve of the French Revolution 

(Houghton. $2). 51-69 
Rousseau: IMd, 274-321 
France and America: E. S. Corwin, French policy and 

the American Alliance of 1778 (Princeton Univ. 

Press— 1916, p. 430. ^2.— Reviewed in Amer. Hist. 

Rev., 22: 393) 
Opening of the National Assembly: Mathews, The 

French Revolution (Longmans — 1901. $1.25), 111- 

124 
Abolition of the old regime: IMd, 138-165 
Declaration of the Rights of Man: Robinson and 

Beard, op. cit., 260 
Establishment of the Republic: Mathews, op. cit., 

207-224 
Influence on England: W. T. Laprade, England and 

the French revolution (John Hopkins Univ. Press — 

1909, p. 232. $1.— Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 15: 

915) 
Influence on Europe: H. E. Bourne, The revolution- 
ary period in Europe, 1763-1915 (Century — 1914, p. 

494. $2.75. — Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Review, 2 : 

848) 



Ebferences 23 

America and the Great Democracies — Continued 

The revolution as v iwed today: J. H. Robinson, 
"Recent tendencies in the study of the French 
Revolution," i Amer. Hist. Review, 11: 529-547. 

Revolution of 1830: Andrews, Historical development 
of modern Europe from Congress of Vienna to the 
present time (Putnam— '9 6-'00, 2 vol. $3.50) I, 157- 
179 

Revolution of 1848: IMd, I, 336-345 

The Third Republic; Robinson and Beard, op. cit., 
II, 151-179 

French government: M. Poincarg, How France is gov- 
erned (McBride— 1914, p. 376. $2.25) 

France of today: R. L. Hartt, Understanding the 
French (McBride— 1914, p. 289. $1.50) 
Democracy in Germany 

Prussian reforms after Napoleon: Robinson and 
Beard, Readings, I, 361-365 

Prussia and the revolution of 1848: Andrews, His- 
torical developmen" of modern Europe, I, 379-384 

The Frankfort Assembly and German Unity, IMd, I, 
418-448 
Russia 

Graham, Stephen. Russia in 1916 (Macmillan — 1917, 
p. 191. $1.25) 

Levine, I. D. The Russian revolution (Harper — 1917, 
p. 279. $1) 

Milyoukow, Paul. Russia and its crisis (Univ. of 
Chicago Press — 1906, p. 589. — ^Attempts to explain 
the permanent elements in the political, social and 
religious life of Russia. See Amer. Hist. Rev., 11: 
678) 

Olgin, M. J. The soul of the Russian revolution (Holt 
—1917, p. 423. $2.50) 

Simpson, J. Y. Self-discovery of Russia (Doran — 
1916, p. 227. $2. — Russia as seen in the summer of 
1915) 

Stephens, W. (Ed.) The soul of Russia (Macmillan. 
$3.50) 

Wiener, Leo. An interpretation of the Russian people 
(McBride— 1915, p. 248. $1.25) 

Vinogradoff, Paul. Self-government in Russia (Dutton 
—1916, p. 118. $1.25) 



24 Democracy and the Great War 

VIII. American Democracy for Sane Internationalism 
Brief Readings: 

Altschul, Charles. The American revolution in our 
school textbooks (Doran — 1917, p. 168. $1. — Re- 
viewed by C. H. Van Tyne in Amer. Hist. Rev., 
XXIII, p. 403. H. T. M. 9: 190) 

Alvarez, Alejandro. The Monroe Doctrine from the 
Latin-American point of view (St. Louis Law Re- 
view, November, 1917) 

Becker, C. "The Monroe Doctrine and the war," in 
Hist. Teacher's Magazine 9: 87 

Bramhall, Frederick D. Democracy the basis for 
world-order, in University of Chicago papers. — Re- 
viewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 23: 742 

Eckhardt, C. C. "The bases of permanent peace," in 
History Teacher's Magazine, 9: 124 

Greene, E. B. "Interaction of Euporean and American 
politics, 1823-1861," in History Teacher's Magazine, 
9: 138 

"Historical light on the League to Enforce Peace," in 
History Teacher's Magazine, 8: 150 

Huidekoper. "The armies of Europe," in World's 
Work (September, 1914) 

Mathews, Shailer. Democracy and world politics (Na- 
tional Security League) 

Persinger, C. E. "American revolutionary history in 
high school," in History Teacher's Magazine, Jan., 
1916, p. 11 ff. 

Rives, George L. "Mexican diplomacy on the eve of 
war with the United States," in American Historical 
Revieiu, 18: 275-294 

Robertson, W. S. "The Holy Alliance," in History 
Teacher's Magazine, 8: 337 

Scott, A. P. "The passing of splendid isolation," in 
History Teacher's Magazine, 8: 192 
Publications of the World Peace Foundation 

Ashbee, C. R. The American League to Enforce Peace 

Bridgman, Raymond L. World organization 

Carnegie, Andrew. A league of peace 

Dickinson, G. Lowes. Foundations of a League of 
Peace 

Dole, Charles F. Right and wrong of the Monroe 
Doctrine 

Ginn, Edwin. Organizing the peace work 



References 25 

American Democracy for Sane Internationalism — Continued 

Goldsmith, Robert. A league to enforce peace 

Hay, (John) and Root (Elihu). Instructions to the 

American delegates to the Hague conferences, 1899 

and 1907 
Historical light on the League to Enforce Peace 
Hobson, John A. Towards international government 
Hugo, Victor. United States of Europe 
Hull, William I. Two Hague conferences ($1.65) 
Jordan (David Starr) and Krehbiel (Edward B). 

Syllabus of lectures on international conciliation 
Levermore, Charles H. Anglo-American Agreement of 

1817 
, — . — . Suggestions for lectures on inter- 
national relations. 
Lowell, A. Lawrence. A league to enforce peace 
Ralston, Jackson H. International arbitral law and 

procedure ($2.20) 
Root, Hon. Elihu. The outlook for international law 

with letter commending the League to Enforce Peace 
Scott, James Brown. American addresses at the 

Second Hague Conference ($1.50) 
, — . — . Texts of the peace conference at 

The Hague, 1899 and 1907 ($1.65) 
Sumner, Charles. True grandeur of nations 
, — . — . War system of the commonwealth 

of nations 
Tolstoi, Leo. Bethink yourselves! 
The Central American league of nations 
The conciliation plan of the League to Enforce Peace, 

with American treaties in force 
White, Andrew D. First Hague conference ($.55) 
Wilson, George Grafton. The Monroe Doctrine and the 

program of the League to Enforce Peace 
World Peace Foundation: work in 1914 
Publications of the American Association of Interna- 
tional Conciliation 

Blakeslee, George H. Our relations with South Amer- 
ica and how to improve them (March, 1914) 
Bourne, Randolph S. Arbitration and international 

politics (Sept., 1913) 
Butler, Nicholas Murray. The Carnegie endownment 

for international peace (Feb., 1914) 
, — . — . The Great War an<^, i/* lessons 



26 Democracy and the Great War 

American Democracy for Sane Internationalism — Continued 

Clark, John Bates. Existing alliances and a league of 
peace (July, 1915) 

Documents regarding the European war 

Guerard, Albert Leon. The land where hatred expires 
(Jan., 1916) 

Hicks, Frederick C. Internationalism. A list of cur- 
rent periodicals selected and annotated (May, 1915) 

Lima, Manoel de Oliveira. The relations of Brazil 
with the United States (August, 1913) 

Matthews, Brander. Do we want half the hemisphere? 
(Oct., 1916) 

Mez, John. Sylladus of lectures on the war and peace 
problem for the study of international polity (Feb., 
1915) 

, — . The war and peace problem: material 

for the study of international polity (Feb., 1915) 

Moore, John Bassett. International cooperation 
(March, 1916) 

Neilson, W. A. Inter Arma Veritas 

Reinsch, Paul S. American love of peace, and Euro- 
pean skepticism (July, 1913) 

Root, Elihu. The effect of democracy on international 
law (August, 1917) 

, — . The outlook for international law 

(March, 1916) 

Sherrill, Charles Hitchcock. The South American point 
of view (Jan., 1914) 
Longer readings: 

An international court. (Vol. 61, Puh. of the Amer. 
Acad, of Pol. and Soc. Science) 

Angell, Norman. America and the new world-state: 
a plea for American leadership in international or- 
ganization (Putnam — 1915, p. 305. $1.25) 

, — . The world's highway: some notes on 

America's relation to sea power and non-military 
sanctions for the law of nations (Doran — 1915, p. 
361. $1.50) 

Bigelow, John. Breaches of Anglo-American treaties: 
a study in history and diplomacy (Sturgis — 1917, p. 
248. $1.50.— Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 23: 194) 

Blakeslee, G. H. Problems and lessons of the war 
(Putnam— 1916, p. 381. $2) 

Brown, P. M. International realities (Scribner — 1917, 
p. 233. $2) 



References 27 

American Democracy for Sane Internationalism — Continued 

Coolidge, A. C. The United States as a world power 
(Macmillan— 1908, p. 385. $2.— Reviewed in Amer. 
Hist. Rev., 14: 372) 

Delaisi, F. The inevitable war (Small) 

Fish, C. R. American diplomacy (Holt — 1917, p. 541. 
$2.75. — Review of the history of American diplomacy 
up to 1915) 

Fortescue, J. W. A history of the British army (Mac- 
millan — 6 vol. 1, 3, 5 and 6. $6 each. Vol. 4, 2 
parts. $13.50. — Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 16: 
816) 

Foster, John W. Arbitration and the Hague Court 
(Houghton— 1904. $1) 

Goebel, Julius, Jr. The recognition policy of the 
United States (Longmans — 1915, p. 228. $2.50. — 
Reviewed in American Hist. Rev., 21: 859) 

Goldsmith, Robert. A League to Enforce Peace (Mac- 
millan— 1917, p. 331. $1.50) 

Grant, A. J., and others. International relations (Mac- 
millan— 1916, p. 207. $.75) 

Hart, A. B. The Monroe Doctrine: an interpretation 
(Little— 1916, p. 445. $.75.— Reviewed in Amer. 
Hist. Rev., 21: 827) 

Hill, D. J. World organization as affected dy the na- 
ture of the modern state (Columbia University Press 
—1911, p. 214. $1.50.— Reviewed in Amer. Hist. 
Rev., 17: 357) 

, — . — . A history of diplomacy in the in- 
ternational development of Etirope (Longmans — 3 
vol. $5, $5, $6) 

, — . — . The Europe that is to te rebuilt 



(Century) 
, — . — . The rebuilding of Europe (Cent- 



tury— 1917, p. 289. $1.50) 
Hazen, C. D., et al. Three peace congresses of the 

nineteenth centtcry (Harvard Univ. Press — 1917, p. 

93. $.75. — Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 23: 155) 
Hugins, R. The possible, peace (Century — 1916, p. 

189. $1.25) 
Hull, William I. The two Hague conferences and 

their contributions to international law (Ginn — 

1908, p. 576. $1.65 —Reviewed t>. Amer. Hist. Rev., 

14: 384) 



28 Democracy and the Great War ' I 

American Democracy for Sane Internationalism — Continued 

Johnson, W. F. America's foreign relations (Cen- 
tury— 1916, 2 vol. p. 551, 485. $6.— History to 1914) 

LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines: 
a history of the conquest and first years of occupa- 
tion, with an introductory account of the Spanish 
rule (Houghton— 1914, 2. vol., p. 424, 250.— Reviewed 
in Amer. Hist. Rev., 20: 181) 

Lippman, Walter. The stakes of diplomacy (Holt — 
1915, p. 235. $1.25) 

Mahan, A. T. Interest of America in sea power, pres- 
ent, and future (Little — 1910, p. 212. $1.50) 

McClure, S. S. Obstacles to peace (Houghton — 1917, 
p. 487. $2. — Reviewed in American Hist. Rev., 23: 
214) 

Moore, John Bassett. The principles of American di- 
plomacy (Harper — 1918, p. 476. $2) 

Owen, Charles H. The justice of the Mexican War: 
a review of the causes and results of the war, ivith 
a view of distinguishing evidence from opinion and 
inference (Putnam — 1908, p. 291. $1.25. — American 
Hist. Rev., 14: 390) 

Phillipson, Colman. International law and the great 
war (Button— 1916, p. 407. $6) 

, — . Termination of war and treaties of 

peace (Button- 1916, p. 486. $7) 

Plum, Harry G. The Monroe Doctrine and the war 
(Issued as the University of Iowa Extension Bulle- 
tin, No. 31) 

Problems of readjustment after the war (Appleton. — 
Articles by several leading American scholars) 

Rives, George L. The United States and Mexico, 1821- 
1848 (Scribner— 1913, 2 vol., p. 720, 726. $8.— Re- 
viewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 19: 659) 

Scott, James Brown. The Hague Peace Conferences of 
1899 and 1907: a series of lectures delivered before 
the Johns Hopkins University in the year 1908 (Johns 
Hopkins Press— 2 vol., p. 887, 548. $5.— Reviewed 
in Amer. Hist. Rev., 15: 151) 

, — . — . Texts of the peace conferences at 

The Hague, 1899 to 1907 (Ginn— 1908, p. 447. $2.20. 
— Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 14: 615) 

, — . — . The American addresses at the 



Eeferences 29 

American Democracy for Sane Internationalism — Continued 

second Hague peace conj'erence (Ginn — 1910, p. 217. 
$1.65. — Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 15: 669) 

The hasis of a durahle peace (Vol. 66, Pud. of the 
Amer. Acad, of Pol. and Soc. Science) 

Weyl, W. E. American world policies (Macmillan — 
1917, p. 307. $2.25) 

Williams, Mary W. Anglo-American isthmian di- 
plomacy, 1815-1915 {Amer. Hist. Assoc. — 1916, p. 
392. $1.50. — Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 22: 
185) 

Veblen, T. B. An inquiry into the nature of peace and 
the terms of its perpetuation (Macmillan — 1917, p. 
367. $2) 

Willoughby, W. W. Problems of readjustment after 

- the war hy nine eminent specialist authors (Apple- 
ton— 1915, p. 185. $1.10) 
IX. America for Humanity 
Brief Readings: 

American interest in popular government abroad 

^ (Contents: A clear, historical account, with quota- 
tions from Washington, Monroe, Webster, Lincoln 
and other public men showing America's continuous 
recognition of her vital interest in the cause of 
liberalism throughout the world. Unpublished ma- 
terial from the government archives throws an in- 
teresting light on our policy during the great German 
democratic revolution of 1848. This pamphlet will 
prove an inspiration in showing that this country 
is but living true to its destiny by helping to make 
the world safe for democracy. Published by the 
Com. on Pub. Information) 

Boas, Franz. Race and nationality (A. A. for I. C, 
Jan., 1915) 

Butler, Nicholas Murry. Nationality and beyond (A. 
A. for I. C, Oct., 19116) 

Ruyssen, Theodore. (Mez, John, Trans.) The principle 
of nationality (A. A. for I. C, Dec, 1916) 

, . ( , , .) What is a 

nationality?. (A. A. for I. C, March, 1917) 

, . ( , , .) The prob- 
lems of nationality (A. A. for I. C, Sept., 1917) 

Spiller, G. Inter-racial problems (World Peace 
Foundation. — Papers communicated to the first uni- 



30 Democracy and the Great War 

America for Humanity — Continued 

versal races congress, London, July 26-29, 1911. 
$2.40) 

Stephens, H. Morse. "Nationality and history," in 
Amer. Hist. Rev., 21: 225-236 
Longer Readings: 

Brandes, G. The world at war (Macmillan — 1917, p. 
272. $2) 

Courtney, L. H. (Ed.) Nationalism and war in the 
Near East (Oxford— 1916, p. 428, $4.15) 

Dominian, Leon. The frontiers of language and na- 
tionality in Europe (Holt — 1917, p. 375. $3. — Re- 
viewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 13: 171) 

Eversley, Lord, The partitions of Poland (Dodd — 
1915, p. 328. $2.50.— Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 
21: 590) 

Hull, W, I. Monroe Doctrine: national or interna- 
tional? The problem and its solution (Putnam — 

1915, p. 136. $.75) 

Krehbiel, Edward. Nationalism, war and society: a 
study of nationalism and its concomitant, war, in 
their relation to civilization; and of the fundament- 
als and the progress of the opposition to war (Mac- 
millan— 1916, p. 276. $1.50.— Reviewed in Amer. 
Hist. Rev., 22: 365) 

Lord, Robert Howard. The second partition of Poland: 
a study of diplomatic history (Harvard University 
Press — 1915, p. 586. $2.25. — Reviewed in Amer. 
Hist. Rev., 21: 590) 

Low, Sidney. Italy and the war (Longmans — 1916, p. 
316. $1.75) 

Morfill, W. R. Story of Poland (Putnam. $1,50) 

Phillips, W. A. Poland (Holt— 1916, p, 256. $.50.— 
Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 22: 198) 

Mu-* ', Ramsey, Nationalism and internationalism 
(Houghton— 1917, p. 229. $1.25) 

Rose, J. NdtionaVty in modern history (Macmillan — 

1916, p. 202. $1.25.— Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 
22: 439) 

Toynbee, A, J. Nationality and the war (Button — 

1915, p. 522, $2.50) 
Van Norman, L. E. Poland, the knight among nations 

(Revell— 1907. $1.50) 



Eeferences 31 

X. Democracy and the Industrial Revolution 

Readings: 

Eve of the industrial revolution: Toynbee, The in- 
dustrial revolution (Longmans — 1908. $1), 38-72. 

Robert Owen and the humanitarian movement: Chey- 
ney, Introduction to the industrial and social his- 
tory of England (Macmillan. $1.60), 244-260 

Organization of industry before machinery: Hobson, 
Evolution of modern capitalism; study of machine 
'production (Scribner, $1.50), Ch. II. 

Factory legislation: Kendall, Source hook of English 
history (Macmillan— 1900. $1), 406-413 

Employment of women in industry: Hobson, op. cit„ 
Ch. XII 

Development of the industrial town: IMd, Ch. XIII. 

Industrial revolution in Germany: Amer. Hist. Rev., 
21: 801 

The Zollverein: Andrews, Historical development of 
modern Europe (Putnam) I, 252-257 

Industrial revolution in Russia; Skrine, Expansion of 
Russia (Macmillan— 1903, p. 386. $1.50), 313-321 

"War and the interests of labor," by A. S. Johnson, 
pamphlet published by the A. A. for I. C, July, 1914 
Maps: 

Industrial England since 1750: Sheperd, Historical 
atlas (Holt— 1911. $2.50), 162 

Industries of the British Isles : Gardiner, Atlas of Eng- 
lish history (Longmans. $1.50), 64 

England before the industrial revolution: Muir, 
s School atlas of modern history (Holt. $1.25), 36 

England after the industrial revolution: IMd, 36 

Rise of the German customs union: Shepherd, op. cit., 
160 

XI. Socialism and the War 

Brief Readings: 

Socialism in Germany: Macdonald, The Socialist 
movement (Holt. $.60), 205-217 

Karl Marx and Socialism: Spargo, Socialism (Mac- 
millan. $1.50), 46-81 

Bismarck and social reform: Dawson, Bismarck and 
state socialism (Scribner), 23-36 

Conflict with the socialists: Dawson, German social- 
ism and Ferdinand Lasalle (Scribner), 247-278 

Leo xni on socialism and labor reforms: Robinson 



32 Democracy and the Great War 

Socialism and the War — Continued 

and Beard, Readings in modern European history 
(Ginn), II, 500-505 

Recent progress of socialism: Kirkup, History of so- 
cialism (Macmillan— 1909. $2.25), 311-349 

"The History of German socialism reconsidered," by 
C. J. H. Hayes, in Amer. Hist. Rev., 23: 62 
Longer Readings: 

Boudin, L. B. Socialism and the war (New Review 
Pub.) 

Commons, John R. History of la'bor in the United 
States (Macmillan— 1917, 2 vol. $6) 

Howe, F. C. Socialized Germany (Scribner. $1.50) 

Hughes, T. J. State socialism after the war: an ex- 
position of complete state socialism, what it is; 
how it would loorh (Jacobs — 1916, p. 351. $1.50) 

Ogg, P. A. Social progress in contemporary Europe 
(Macmillan— 1912, p. 384. $1.50) 

Walling, W. E. Socialists and the war (Holt — 1915, p. 
512. $1.50) 
XII. The Prussianized Imperial German Government 
Brief Readings: 

Gooch, G. P. "The German theories of the state," in 
Contemporary Review, 107: 743-753 

Hayes, C. J. H. Political and social history of modern 
Europe, II, 397-426, 490-539, 679-719 (Macmillan— 
1916, vol. 1, p. 582. $2. Vol. 2, p. 726. $2.25) 

Hazen, C. D. The government of Germany (Com. on 
Public Information) 

Lowell, Governments and parties in continental coun- 
tries, II, 1-8 

Ogg, The governments of Europe (Macmillan — 1913, 
p. 668. $3), 202-225, 251-281 

Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, 176 

Adams, E. D. The Germans as a chosen people (Li- 
berty Loan General Executive Board, San Francisco) 

Willoughby, W. W. "The Prussian theory of 
monarchy," in American Political Science Review, 
Nov., 1917 
Longer Readings: 

Baldwin, J. M. Super-state and the eternal values 
(Oxford— 1916, p. 38. $.60) 

Dewey, John. German philosophy and politics (Holt 
—1915, p. 134. $1.25) 



References 33 

The Prussianized Imperial German Government — Continued 

Fife, Robert H. Jr. The German Empire between tioo 
wars: a study of the political and social develop- 
ment of the nation between 1871 and 1914 (Mac- 
millan — 1916, p. 400. $1.50. — Reviewed in Amer. 
Hist. Rev., 22: 157) 

Guilland, Antoine. Modern Germany and her histor- 
ians (McBride— 1915, p. 360. $2.25.— Reviewed in 
Amer. Hist. Review, 22: 151) 

Howard, B. E. German Empire (Macmillan — 1906, p. 
449. $2) 

Paterson, W. P. German culture (Scribner. $1.25) 

Sclievill, Ferdinand. The making of modern Germany 
(McClurg— 1916, p. 259. $1.25.— Reviewed in Amer. 
Hist. Rev., 23: 145) 

Swope, H. B. Inside the German Empire (Century — 
1917, p. 366. $2) 
XIII. German Colonization and Imperialism 
Brief Readings: 
Beginnings of colonization: Cheyney, European hack- 
ground of American history (Harper. $2), 147-167 

Colonial policies: Seeley, The expansion of England 
(Little— 1883, p. 359. $1.75), 56-76 

How Europe began to extend its commerce over the 
world: Robinson and Beard, Readings, I, 90-95 

The partition of Africa: Johnston, The opening tip of 
Africa (Holt— 1911, p. 255. $.60), 101-252 

The expansion of Europe into Asia: Rose, Develop- 
ment of the European nations, 1870-1914 (Putnam — 
1914, 2 vol., p. 376, 410. $2.75), II, 44-91, 299-319 

Present extent of European colonies: Robinson and 
Beard, Readings, II, 413-415 

Commercial basis of imperialism: Reinsch, World 
politics at the end of the nineteenth century as in- 
fluenced 'by the Oriental situation in 1900 (Macmil- 
lan— 1900. $1.25), 3-80 
Longer Readings: 

Barker, J. E. Modern Germany, her political and eco- 
nomic problems, her foreign and domestic policy, her 
ambitions, and the causes of her successes and 
failures (Button — 1915, p. 852. $3) 

Clapp, E. J. The economic aspects of the war (Yale 
Univ. Press— 1915, p. 340. $1.50) 

Harris, N. D. Intervention and colonization in Africa 



34 Democracy and the Great War 

German Colonization and Imperialism — Continued 

(Houghton— 1914, p. 384. $2.— Reviewed in Amer. 
Hist. Rev., 20: 663) 

Gibbons, H. A. The new map of Africa (1900-1916) : a 
history of European colonial expansion and colonial 
diplomacy (Century — 1916, p. 503. $2. — Reviewed in 
Amer. Hist. Rev., 23: 873) 

Howard, E. D, Cause and extent of the recent in- 
dustrial progress of Germany (Houghton. $1) 

Johnston, Sir Harry. A history of the colonization of 
Africa ly alien races (Macmillan— 1899. $1.50) 

Keller, A. G. Colonization: a study of the founding of 
new societies (Ginn — 1908, p. 632. $3. — Reviewed 
in Amer. Hist. Rev., 14: 861) 

Reinsch, Colonial administration (Macmillan — 1905, 
$1.25) 

McClellan, G. B. European economic policy (Prince- 
ton Univ. Press— 1916, p. 59) 

Ogg, F. A. Economic development of modern Europe 
(Macmillan — 1917, p. 657. $2.50. — Discusses indus- 
tries, commercial expansion, labor, socialism, etc., 
in leading European countries) 

Pratt, Edwin A. The rise of rail-power in war and 
conquest, 1833-1914 (Lippincott— 1916, p. 405. $2.50. 
— Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 23: 160) 

Schmitt, B. E. England and Germany, 17^0-1914 
(Princeton Univ. Press— 1916, p. 524. $2.— Review- 
ed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 22: 146) 

Veblen, T. B. Imperial Germany and the industrial 
revolution (Macmillan — 1915, p. 324. $1.50. — Re- 
viewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 21: 801) 

Maps: 

The expansion of Europe — the great discoveries: Dow, 

Atlas of European history (Holt), 16 
Europe in the Americas: IMd, 31 
The partition of Africa: Shepherd. Historical atlas 
(Holt), 174 
Australiasia: Muir, School atlas of modern history 
(Holt), 48 
British possessions in 1907: Gardiner, Atlas of Eng- 
lish history (Longmans), 65 



Eeferbnces 35 

• 
XIV. The Kaiser and the Pau-Germanists 
Brief Readings: 

Conquest and Kultur (Com. on Pub. Information — 
Contents: A brief introduction outlining German' 
war aims and showing how the proofs were gather- 
ed; followed by quotations from German writers 
revealing the plans and purposes of Pan-Germany, 
one chapter being devoted entirely to the German 
attitude toward America. The quotations are 
printed with little or no comment, the evidence 
piling up page after page, chapter after chapter) 

How Germany wanted the world to looTc (Natural Se- 
curity League. — A graphic explanation of why there 
is a war. With map) 

Judson, Harry P. The threat of German world-politics 
(Univ. of Chicago Papers) 

Adams, E. D. The material aims of Germany (Liberty 
Loan General Executive Board, San Francisco) 

Germany's war plans (American Defense Society) 
Longer Readings: 

Barron, C. W. The audacious war (Houghton — 1915, 
p. 192. $1) 

Andre-Cheradame. The Pan-German plot unmasked 
(Scribner— 1917, p. 235. $1.25.— Complete revela- 
tion of Prussian conspiracy for world domination) 

Millioud, Maurice. The ruling class and frenzied 
trade in Germany (Houghton — 1916, p. 159. $1. — 
Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 23: 168) 

Perris, H. Germany and the German Emperor (Holt — 
1914, p. 520. $3) 

Rohrbach, Paul (tr. by Ed. von Mach). German world 
politics (Macmillan — 1915, p. 243. $1.25) 

Usher, R. G. Pan-Germanism (Houghton — 1914, p. 
422. $1.75) 
Maps: 

Germany's war plans (American Defense Society: — 
Three maps: 1. Middle-Europe Empire controlled 
hy Prussia, July, 1917, with Africa as it was lefore 
the war. 2. The Pan-German plan of 1911. 3. The 
Pan-German plan of 1915. 
XV. The Kaiser's Naval Policy 
Brief Readings: 

William II: Seignobos, Political history of Europe 
since I8I4 (Holt. $3) 502-510; Andrews, Historical 



36 Democracy and the Great War 

The Kaiser's Naval Policy — Continued 

development of modern Europe (Putnam), II, 383- 
390 
Longer Readings: 

Hurd, A., and H. Castle. German sea power, its rise, 
progress, and economic dasis (Scribner — 1913, p. 388. 
$3.25) 

Hausrath, Adolf. Treitschke: Ms doctrine of German 
destiny and of international relations: together with 
a study of his life and work (Putnam — 1914, p. 332. 
$1.50. — Reviewed iu Amer. Hist. Rev., 20: 883) 

Prothero, G. W. German policy "before the war (But- 
ton— 1916, p. 111. $1) 

McCabe, J. Treitschke and the Great War (Stokes. 
$1) 
XVI. Germany in the Far East 
Brief Readings: 

The opening of China: Reinsch, World politics at the 
end of the nineteenth century as influenced by 
oriental situation (Macmillan — 1900. $1.25), 85-195 

The Boxer movement in China: Douglas, Europe and 
the Far East (Putnam— 1913, p. 487. $2. New edi- 
tion $2.25), 323-360 

"Japanese characteristics," by C. W. Eliot (A. A. for 
I. C, Oct., 1913) 

Hershey, A. S. "A turning point in far-eastern di- 
plomacy" in History Teacher's Magazine, 9: 91 
Longer Readings: 

Hornbeck, Stanley K. Contemporary politics in the 
Far East (Appleton— 1916, p. 466. $3.— Reviewed in 
Amer. Hist. Rev., 22: 654) 

Kawakami, K. K. Japan in world politics (Macmillan 
—1917, p. 230. $1.50) 

Parker, E. H. China (Button— 1917. $2.50) 

Ku'suh, Kung Yuan. The Judgment of the Orient 
(Button. $.60) 

Lawton, L. Empires of the Far East: a study of 
Japan and of her colonial possessions, of China and 
Manchuria and of the political question of eastern 
Asia and the Pacific (Small — 2 vol. $10) 
Map: 

The growth of European and Japanese dominions in 
Asia, 1801-1910: Shepherd, Historical atlas (Holt), 
170 



Keferences 



37 



XVII. Germany's Menace to America 

Chapman, J. J. DeutscJiland ueter alles. Germany 
speaks (Putnam— 1914, p. 102. $.75) 

Chesterton, G. K. The appetite of tyra^iny, including 
letters to an old Garidaldian (Dodd, Mead — 1915, p. 
122. $1) 

Gerard. My four years in Germany (Doran — 1917, p. 
448. $2) 

Rogers, Lindsay. America's case against Germany 
(Button. $1.50. — Strong argument based on his- 
torical facts) 
XVIII. "Mittel-Europa" 

Allen, George H. et al. The Great War (Barrie — 1915- 
16, vol. 1, 3, p. 377, 494, 500. $5 each.— Reviewed 
in Amer. Hist. Rev., 22: 864) 

Headlam, J. W. The issue (Houghton— 1917, p. 159. 
$1. — The issue of the war — the predominance of 
Germany in Europe) 

Naumann, F. (D. M. Meredith, Trans.) Central Europe 
(Knopf^l917, p. 351. $3. — Germany's political and 
economic aims in Central Europe expounded by 
w^ell-known member of the Reichstag) 

Reventlow, Graf E. C. (G. Chatterton-Hill, Trans.) 
The vampire of the continent (Jackson Press — 1916, 
p. 225. $1.25) 
XIX. The Triple Alliance 

Coolidge, A. D. The origins of the triple alliance 
(Scribner— 1917, p. 236. $1.25) 

Low, S. J. M. Italy in the war (Longmans — 1916, p. 
316. $1.75) 

Dillon, E. J. From the triple to the quadruple alli- 
ance: why Italy went to war (Doran — 1915, p. 242. 
$1.50) 
XX. Germany in Southeastern Europe 

Seton-Watson, R. W. German, Slav and Magyar: a 
study in the origins of the great War (London, Wil- 
liams & Norgate— 1916, p. 198.— The best brief study 
of the subject) 

Chirol, Sir V. "Turkey in the grip of Germany," in 
Quarterly Review, 222: 231-251 

Marriott, J. A. R. "Factors in the problem of the 
Near East," in Fortnightly Review, 99: 943-953 
XXI. Germany in Western Asia 

"The Bagdad railway negotiations," in the Quarterly 
Review, Oct., 1917 



38 Democracy and the Great War 

Germany in Western Asia — Continued 

"The Bagdad railway," in Fortnightly Review, 95: 
201-216 

Johnston, H. H. "Africa and the eastern railway 
schemes," in Nineteenth Century, 72: 558-569 
XXII. (and XXIII). Triple Entente 
Brief Readings: 

Baldwin, J. Mark. France and the war (Appleton. 
$.60) 

Barker, J. E. "The armament race and its latest de- 
velopment," in Fortnightly Review, 93: 654-668 

"The New Balance of Power," in North American Re- 
view, 191: 18-28 

Cramb, J. A. Germany and England (Button — 1914, p. 
152. $1) 

Hovelaque, E. The deeper causes of the war (Button 
—1916, p. 158. $1.25.— French view of Germany 
and its relations with England) 

Sumner, Charles. Duel between France and Germany 
(W. P. F.) 
Longer Readings: 

Barclay, T. Thirty years: Anglo-French reminiscences, 
1876-1906 (Houghton— 1914, p. 389. $3.50.— The 
author was instrumental in promoting the Anglo- 
French entente) 

Billon, E. J. England and Germany (Brentano — 1915, 
p. 312. $3) 

Guyot, Y. (F. A. Holt, Trans.) The causes and con- 
sequences of the war (Brentano — 1916, p. 359. $3. — 
Excellent, comprehensive statement by great French 
economist) 

Slater, G. Making of modern England (Houghton. 
$2. — Emphasizes economic hsitory of England during 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries) 

Tardieu, A. France and the alliances: the struggle 
for the "balance of power (Macmillan — 1908, p. 314. 
$1.50) 
XXIV. The Slavs and the Turks 
Russia 

Alexinsky, G. (B. Miall, Trans.) Russia and the 
Great War (Scribner. $1.75) 

Hazen, Europe since 1815 (Holt. $3), 706-718 

Kerner, R. J. "Historic role of the Slavs," in History 
Teacher's Magazine, 8: 294 



Eeferences 39 

The Slavs and the Turks — Continued 

Skrine, Expansion of Russia (Macmillan) 

Robinson and Beard, Readings, 371-381 
The Balkans 

Courtney, Lord (Ed.). Nationalism and war in the 
Near East (Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace) 

Miller, William. The Balkan states: Roumania, Bul- 
garia, Servia and Montenegro (Putnam. $1.50) 

Murray, W. S. The making of the Balkan states 
(Longmans — 1910, p. 199. $1.50. — Reviewed in Amer. 
Hist. Rev., 16: 390) 

Seignobos, Political his.tory of Europe since 1814 
(Holt. $3), 640-648, 657-669 

Sloane, William M. The Balkans: 'a laboratory of his- 
tory (Methodist Book Concern— 1914, p. 322. $1.50. 
— Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 20: 410) 
Ottoman Empire 

Arpee, Leon. The Armenian awakening: a history of 
the Armenian Church, 1820-1860 (Univ. of Chicago 
Press— 1909, p. 236. $1.25. — Reviewed in Amer. 
Hist. Rev., 15: 415) 

Bryce, J. Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire (Putnam— 1917, p. 726. $1) 

Lybeyer. Ottoman Empire (Harvard University Press 
—1913, p. 349. $2.— Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 
19: 141) 

Seibnobos, Political history of Europe since 1814 
(Holt), 616-619 

Toynbee, A. J. The murderous tyranny of the Turks 
(Doran — Paper 5c) 
Maps: 

The growth of Russia in Europe: Shepherd, Histor- 
ical atlas (Holt), 138, 139 

Distribution of races in the Balkan peninsula and Asia 
Minor: Ihid, 165 

Ottoman Empire from 1729-1878: Dow, Atlas of 
European history (Holt. $1.25), 29 

European Turkey from the treaty of Berlin to the 
Balkan wars: IMd, 29 
XXV. Russo-Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin 
Brief Readings: 

The disruption of the Ottoman Empire and the rise 
of the Balkan states: Schurman, The Balkan loars 
(Princeton Press— 1914, p. 140. $1), 3-131 



40 Democracy and the Great War 

Russo-Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin — Continued 

Treaty of Berlin: Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, 

396-398 
"The Greater Servia idea," in World's Work, Sept., 

1914, 129-131 
Longer Readings: 

Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich, Prince. The Servian 

people: their past glory and their destiny (Scrib- 

ner — 1910, 2 vol., p. 742. $5. — Reviewed in Amer. 

Hist. Rev., 16: 599) 
Mijatovich, C. Servia of the Servians (Scribner) 
Temperley, H. W. V. History of Serbia (Macmillan — 

1917, p. 354. $4.— Review in Amer. Hist. Rev., 23: 

135) 
XXVI. "Drang Nach Osten" 
Brief Readings: 
Formation of Austria-Hungary: Leger, History of 

Austria-Hungary (Putnam), 572-588 
Political development of Austria-Hungary: Ibid, 589- 

637 
Kossuth's address to the people of the United States: 

Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, 103 
Austria-Hungary since 1866: Ibid, 165-175 
Government of Austria-Hungary: Lowell, Govern- 
ments and parties in continental Europe (Hough- 
ton, 2 vol. $5), II, 70-179 
Joseph II and Austria: Hassall, Balance of power 

(Macmillan. $1.90), 357-366 
Joseph II's ideas of government: Robinson and 

Beard, Readings, I, 213-217 
Basis of the constitution of Austria-Hungary: Ibid, 

II, 165 
The undemocratic government of Hungary, Ibid, II, 

174 
The Austrian election of 1906: Ibid, 171 
Map: 

Distribution of races in Austria-Hungary: Shepherd, 

Historical atlas (Holt), 168 
XXVII. Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

Robinson and Beard, Readings, II. 401-403 
XXVIII. Serbia and the Balkan Wars 
Brief Readings: 

"The war in the Balkans," in Fortnightly Review, 92: 

813-825 



References 41 

Serbia and the Balkan Wars — Continued 

"The Balkan League — history of its formation," in 
Fortnightly Review, 93: 430-439 

"The Balkan war," in North American Review, 
196: 721-730 

Trevelyan, G. M. "Serbia and southeastern Europe," 
in Atlantic Monthly, 116: 119-127 

Fried, Alfred H. A few lessons taught hy the Balkan 
war (A. A. for I. C, Jan., 1914) 
Longer Readings: 

Report of the International Commission to inquire in- 
to the causes and conduct of the Balkan wars 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington, D, C, 1914. — Reviewed in Amer. Hist. 
Rev., 20: 638) 

Schurman, J. G. The Balkan toars (Princeton Press — 
1914, p. 140. $1) 
XXIX. Germany's War Measures of 1913 

History Teacher's Magazine, 9: 35 
XXX. The Pretext for War 

Allen^ G. H. et al. The Great War (Barrie), Ch. 6 

"Austria — disturber of the peace," in Fortnightly 
Review, 93: 249-264, 598-602 

Documents regarding the European war, series VIII. 
Italy's Green Book; translation approved by Royal 
Italian Embassy, Washington, D. C. (Published 
by A. A. for I. C, Aug., 1915) 
XXXI. Germany Defeats Peace Efforts 
Brief Readings: 

Chirol, Sir V. "The origins of the present war," in 
Quarterly Review, Oct., 1914 

Dillon, E. J. "Causes of the European war," in Con- 
temporary Review, Sept., 1914 

Gibbons, H. A. The new map of Europe (Century — 
1914, p. 412. $2), Ch. XX 

Hill, D. J. "Germany's self-revelation of guilt," in 
Century Magazine, July, 1917 

"Politicus." "The causes of the Great War," in 
Fortnightly Review, Sept., 1914 

Turner, E. J. "Causes of the Great War," in Amer- 
ican Political Science Review, Feb., 1915 
Longer Readings: 

A German. I accuse! (Doran — 1915, p. 445. $1.50) 

Analysis of Diplomatic Papers (Stechert) 

Archer, W. A. Thirteen days: July 2Z-Aug. 4, 1914. 



42 Democracy and the Great War 

Germany Defeats Peace Efforts — Continued 

A chronicle interpretation (Oxford, p. 224. $1.40) 

British Foreign office: collected diplomatic documents 
relating to outbreak of the European war (Doran. 
$1) 

Bullard, A. Diplomacy of the great war (Macmillan — 
1916, p. 344. $1.50.— International relations 1878- 
1914, new elements of diplomacy, and the United 
States foreign policy. — Reviewed in Amer. Hist. 
Rev., 22: 159) 

Collected diplomatic documents relating to the out- 
break of the European war (Doran. $1) 

Documents regarding the European war, series V. 
The French Yellow Book; translated and prepared 
for parliament by the British Government (A. A. 
for I. C, Feb., 1915) 

Documents regarding the European war, series VI. 
The Austrian Red Book; official translation prepared 
by the Austrian Government. (A. A. for I. C, 
April, 1915) 

Documents regarding the European war, series VII. 
The Serbian Blue Book (A. A. for I. C, May, 1915) 

Europe and International Politics (Pub. by Library 
of Congress. — Deals with preliminaries leading up 
to the war and with various international questions 
incident to it) 

Headlam, J. W. The history of twelve days: July 24 

to August 4, 1914: being an account of the negotia- 

I tions preceding the outbreak of war, based on the 

official publications (Scribner — 1915, p. 412. $3. — 

Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 21: 596) 

Official Documents bearing upon the European war, 
series I (A. A. for I. C, Oct., 1914) 
The Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia 
The Serbian reply 
The British White Paper 
The German White Book. 

Additional official documents bearing upon the 
European war, series II (A. A. for I. C, Nov., 1914) 
Speech of the imperial chancellor to richstag, Aug. 4, 

1914 
Speech of the prime minister to house of commons, 

Aug. 6, 1914 
The Russian Orange Book 



Keferences 43 

Germany Defeats Peace Efforts — Continued 

The original texts of the Austrian note of July 23, 
and the SerMan reply of July 25, 1914, with annota- 
tions 
Price, M. P. The diplomatic history of the war 

(Scribner) 
Scott, James Brown. (Ed.) Diplomatic documents re- 
lating to the outdreak of the European war (Car- 
negie Endowment for International Peace, Division 
of International Law) (Oxford Press — 1916, 2 vol., 
p. 81, 92. $5) 
Seymour, Charles. The diplomatic background of the 
war, 1870-1914 (Yale Univ. Press— 1916, p. 311. $2. 
— Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 21: 808) 
Stowell, E. C. The diplomacy of the war of 1914: the 
teginnings of the war (Houghton — 1915, p. 728. 
$5. — Reviewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 21: 594) 
Beck, J. M. The evidence in the case in the supreme 
court of civilization as to the moral responsibilities 
for the war (Putnam — 1914, p. 200. $1) 
XXXII. The Crime against Belgium 
Brief Readings: 

Beck, J. M. The evidence in the case, Ch. VIII 
Davis, M. O. The Great War, Chs. VIII, IX (Oxford 

Press— 1915, p. 110. $.40) 
DeVisscher, C. Belgium's case, Chs. I, VI (Doran — 

1916, p. 164. $1) 
Dillon, E. J. The scrap of paper, Chs. IX, XI (Doran 

—1914, p. 220. $.50) 
Gibhons, H. A. The new map of Europe, Ch. XXI 
Sarolea, C. How Belgium saved Europe, Chs. I, 
VII (Lippincott— 1915, p. 227. $1) 
1 Stowell, E. C. The diplomacy of the war of 1914, Chs. 

VIII, IX 
Waxweiler, E. Belgium, neutral and loyal, Chs. I, 
IV 
Longer Readings: 
! Documents regarding the European war, series No. 

IIL (A. A. for I. C, Dec, 1914) 
The neutrality of Belgium and Luxendurg 
Address of the President of the Council to the 

French Senate, August 4, 1914 
Official Japanese documents 
Addresses to the people ly the Emperor of Germany 



44 Democracy and the Great War 

The Crime Against Belgium — Continued 

Documents regarding the European war, series IV. 
(A. A. for I. C, Jan., 1915) 
Turkish official documents (Nov., 1914) 
Speech of the imperial chancellor to the reichstag, 

Dec. 2, 1914 
The Belgian Gray BooJc 

Fuehr, Alexander. The neutrality of Belgium (Funk 
—1915, p. 248. $1.50) 

GrifRs, W. E. Belgium, the land of art, its history, 
legends, industry and modern expansion (Hough- 
ton— 1912, p. 310. $1.25) 

Lahberton, J. H. (W. E. Leonard, Trans.) Belgium 
and Germany (Open Court — 1916, p. 153. $1) 

Maeterlinck, M. The wrack of the storm (Dodd, Mead. 
$1.50) 

Essen, Leon van der. A short history of Belgium 
(Univ. of Chicago Press— 1916, p. 168. $1.— Re- 
viewed in Amer. Hist. Rev., 21: 847) 

Waxweiler, Emile. Belgium and the great powers 
(Putnam— 1916, p. 186. $1) 

XXXIII. England Forced into the War 

Cravath, P. D. Great Britain's part (Appleton — 1917, 

p. 127. $1) 
Lloyd George, D. Through terror to triumph: 

speeches and pronouncements since the beginning 

of the war (Doran— 1915, p. 187. $1) 
Meyer, E. England, and the war against Germany 

(Ritter and Co.— 1916, p. 328. $1.50) 
Murray, Gilbert. The foreign policy of Sir Edward 

Grey (Oxford— 1915, p. 128. $.50) 
Oliver, F. S. Ordeal dy hattle (Macmillan — 1915, p. 

437. $1.75) 
Why we are at war: Great Britain's case (Oxford. $.85) 
Atlas of the world war (Rand, McNally & Co., 1917. — 

Detailed maps of all the nations eng-aged in the 

conflict) 

XXXIV. America Awakens 

Beck, J. M. The toar and humanity, Chs. II, VI 

(Putnam— 1916, p. 322. $1.50) 
Berstein, Edward. (Mez, John, Trans.). America's 

opinion of the world war (A. A. for I. C, Feb., 1916) 
Jefferson, Charles E. Preparedness as the cartoonists 

see it (A. A. for I. C, May, 1915) 



. References 45 

America Awakens — Continued 

Johnson, W. P. America and the Great War 
(Winston. $1.50) 

Preparedness and America's International Program 
(Amer. Acad, of Pol. and Soc. Science, Publications, 
vol. 66) 

Roosevelt, Theodore. America and the world war 
(Scribner— 1915, p. 277. $.75) 

Wilson, Woodrow. Address to congress, April 2, 1917 
(Grosset and Dunlap) 

, — . Why toe are at ivar (Harper — 1917. 

$.50) 
XXXV. Germany Flouts America's Sovereignty 
Brief Readings: 

"Concerning prisoners of war," in American Journal 
of International Law, July, 1916 

Gerard, J. W. My four years in Germany, Chs. XVIII, 

Hoio the ivar came to America. (Contents: A brief 
introduction reviewing the policy of the United 
States with reference to the Monroe Doctrine, free- 
dom of the seas, and international arbitration, de- 
velopments of our policy reviewed and explained, 
from August, 1914, to April, 1917; appendix: the 
President's address to the senate January 22, 1917; 
his war message to congress April 2, 1917; his 
Flag Day address at Washington, June 14, 1917, 32 
pages. Translations: German, Polish, Bohemian, 
Italian, Spanish, Swedish, Portuguese. 48 pages. 
Pub. by the A. A. for I. C.) 

Hume,-Williams, W. E. International law and the 
'blockade (Causton — 1916, p. 8) 

"Immunity of private property from capture at sea," 
in American Journal of International Law, January, 
1917 

Jordan, David Starr. Concerning sea power (W. P. 
F.) 

Johnson, Douglas W. Plain words from America. A 
letter to a German professor (Doran) 

McLaughlin, A. C. "The Great War: from spectator 
to participant," in History Teacher's Magazine, 
VIII, 183 (Published also as a pamphlet, by the 
Com. on Public Information) 

"Naval warfare: law and license," in American Jour- 
nal of International Law, January, 1916 



46 Democracy and the Great War ' 

Germany Flouts America's Sovereignty — Continued 

Noyes, A. What is England doing? (Burrup — 1916, p. 
30) 

"Right of prize and neutral attitude toward admission 
of prizes," in America7i Journal of International 
Law, Jan., 1916 

"Rights of the civil population in territory occupied 
by a belligerent," in American Journal of Interna- 
tional Law, Jan., 1917 

Risley, A. W. "International law and the present 
European war," in Journal of the New York State 
Teachers' Association, Oct., 1917. 

Rogers, L. America's case against Germany (Button. 
$1.50) 

"Safe conduct for enemy diplomatic agents," in Amer- 
ican Journal of International Law, January, 1917 

Sixty American opinions on the war (London, Unwin, 
1915. — Collection of expressions by leading Amer- 
icans) 

Smith, P. E. International law (Little — 1911, p. 391. 
$2.50) 

Smith, Monroe. "American diplomacy in the European 
war," in Political Science Quarterly, Dec, 1917 

The nation in arms (Contents: Two addresses by 
Secretaries Lane and Baker showing why we are 
at war. These are two of the most forceful and 
widely quoted speeches the war has produced. 16 
pages. — Published by the Com. on Pub. Information) 

The war message and the facts "behind it.. (Contents: 
The President's message, with notes explaining in 
further detail the event to which he refers; also 
including historical data and setting forth in clear, 
simple language, the fundamentals underlying the 
President's fundamentally important message. A 
careful reading of this brief pamphlet is earnestly 
recommended to all those who wish bed rock facts 
and reasons. 32 pages. — Pub. by the Com. on Pub. 
Information) (Published by Department of Public 
Instruction of Michigan) 

War of self-defense. (Contents: Addresses by Secre- 
tary of State Lansing and Assistant Secretary of 
Labor Post, showing how war was forced upon us. 
These two eloquent speeches give a lucid review of 
recent events. 22 pages. Pub. by the Com. on 
Public Information) 



Keferences 47 

Germany Flouts America's Sovereignty — Continued 
Longer Readings: 

Adams, E. D. Why we are at war with Germany (Lfi- 
berty Loan General Executive Board, San Francisco) 
Brewer, D. G. Rights and duties of neutrals: a dis- 
cussion of principles and practices (Putnam — 1916, 
p. 260. $1.25) 
Coolidge, A. C. United States as a world power (Mac- 

millan— 1908, p. 385. $2) 
Davis, G. B. Elements of international law, with an 
account of its origin, sources and historical develop- 
ment (Harper — 1917, p. 673, new edition. $3) 
Documents concerning neutral and belligerent rights 
issued since August 4, 1914. (Published by the W. 
P. F.) 
Neutrality proclaimed and explained: Appendix, the 

declaration of London 
War zones 
War zone, interference with American trade with 

neutrals 
Foodstuffs cargo of the "Wilhelmina'' in British 
prize court, German and Austrian attitude toward 
American trade, sinking of the "William P. Frye." 
Sinking of the "Lusitania," and attacks on the 
"Falaha/' "Gulf-light," "Gushing,'" and "NeJ)ras- 
kan" 
Documents regarding European war, series IX. (Pub- 
lished by the A. A. for I. C.) 

Official correspondence between the United States 
and Germany 
. Declaration of London, Aug. 6, 1914-Ocit. 24, 1915 
Contrahrand of war, Sept. 4, 1914-ApnZ 26, 1915 
Restraints of Commerce, Fed. 6, 1915-Sept. 7, 1915 
Case of the "William P. Frye," March 31, 1915-July 
30, 1915 
Documents regarding European war, series X (Pub. 
by the A. A. for I. C., Oct., 1915) 
Official correspondence between the United States 

and Germany 
Declaration of London 
Contraband of war 
Restraints of commerce 
Case of the "Wilhelmina" 
Documents regarding the European war, series XI 
(Pub. by the A. A. for I. C., Nov., 1915) 



48 Democracy and the Great War 

Germany Flouts America's Sovereignty — Continued 

Secretary Bryan's letter to Senator Stone regarding 
charges of partiality shown to Great Britain, Jan. 
20, 1915 
The Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs 

to Ambassador Penfield, June 29, 1915 
The Secretary of State to Ambassador Penfield, Aug. 
12, 1915 
Documents regarding the European war, series XII 
(Published by the A. A. for I. C.) 
Statement of measures adopted to intercept the sea- 
dome commerce of Germany. Presented to hoth 
houses of parliament dy command of his Majesty 
Great Britain's measures against German trade. A 
speech delivered hy the Rt. Hon. Sir E. Grey, Sec- 
retary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the house of 
commons on the 2Qth of Jan., 1916 
Documents regarding the European war, series XIII 
(Pub. by A. A. for I. C, June, 1916) 
German White Book on armed merchantmen 
Documents regarding the European war, series XV 
(Pub. by A. A. for I. C, May, 1917) 
The entry of the United States 
Documents looking toward peace, series I (Pub. by 

the A. A. for I. C, Jan., 1917) 
Documents looking toward peace, series II (Pub. by 

A. A. for I. C, Feb., 1917) 
Documents looking toward peace, series III (Pub. by 

A. A. for I. C, Oct., 1917) 
Fulton, T. W. The sovereignty of the sea (Blackwood 

—1911, p. 799) 
Hershey, A. S. Essentials of international pudlic law 

(Macmillan— 1912, p. 558. $3) 
Choate, Joseph H. Immunity of private property at 

sea (W. P. F.) 
Quigley, H. S. The American attitude toward capture 
at sea (American Journal of International Law, Oct., 
1917) 
Root, E. Addresses on international subjects (Harvard 

University Press— 1916, p. 463. $2.50) 
Stockton, C. H. Outlines of international law (Scrib- 

ner— 1914, p. 616. $2.50) 
Tatlock, John S. P. Why America fights Germany. 
(Contents: A brief statement of why the United 
States entered the war: concrete yet comprehensive. 



Keferencbs 



49 



Germany Flouts America's Sovereignty — Continued 

Deals witli the offenses of Germany against America 
and against the world. States the case tersely and 
forcibly for everybody. 13 pages. Pub. by the C. 
P. I.) 
XXXVI. America's Neutrality 

American neutrality and the European war (Amer- 
ican Academy of Political and Social Science, Pub- 
lications, vol. 60) 

Burgess, J. W. America's relations to the Great War 
(McClurg— 1916, p. 216. $1) 

Fees, S. D. The problems of neutrality when the 
loorld is at loar (64 cong., doc. no. 2111) 

Gerard, J. W. My four years in Germany (Doran — 
1917, $2) 

United States Department of State. Diplomatic corres- 
pondence relating to neutral rights and commerce 
(2 vol: vol. 1, $.50; vol. II, $.75) 
XXXVII. German Intrigue among the Neutrals 

President's Flag Day speech with evidence of Ger- 
many's plans. (Contents: The President's speech 
with the facts to which he alludes explained by 
carefully selected notes giving the proofs of German 
purposes and intrigues. These notes present an 
overwhelming arsenal of facts, all gathered from 
original sources. 32 pages. Pub. by the Com. on 
Pub. Information) 

Taft, William Howard. The treaty rights of aliens 
(A. A. for I. C, July, 1917) 

Reid, Gilbert. The causes 'behind Mexico's revolution 
(A. A. for I. C, June, 1914) 

Roosevelt, Theodore. The foes of our own household 
(Doran— 1917, p. 437. $1.50.— A textbook for every 
American) 
XXXVIII. America Recognizes State of War 

First session of the war congress (Contents: A com- 
plete summary of all legislation passed by the first 
session of the 65th congress with necessary dates, 
notes and brief excerpts from the debates. 48 
pages. Pub. by the Com. on Pub. Information) 

Root, Elihu. Address dy Elihu Root, honorary presi- 
dent of the National Security League, at Chicago, 
Sept. 14, 1917 (N. S. L.) 



50 Democracy and the Great War 

XXXIX. Wliy America Must Fight to the End 
Brief Readings: 

Adams, E. D. We fight for good faith (Liberty Loan 
General Executive Board, San Francisco) 

• , — . — . We fight for peace and for self- 
respect (Liberty Loan General Executive Board, 
San Francisco) 

Call, Arthur D. The war for peace. (Contents: 
A compilation of the official statements and other 
utterances of the leading peace organizations and 
leaders showing how the present war is viewed by 
American friends of peace. Pub. by the C. P. I.) 

Cassidy, Rt. Rev. Mgr. What fight ye for? (N. S. L.) 

Goddard, Harold C. Super-resistance (A. A. for I. C, 
May, .1916) 

Hobbs, William H. The outlook for democracy (N. 
S. L.) 

Hueffer, Ford Madox. When 'blood is their argument 
(Doran. $1) 

Lansing, Isaac J. What we are fighting — and what for 
(The "Carry-On" League, Chicago) 

Lewis, W. M. The Declaration of Independence and, 
the World War (National Committee of Patriotic 
and Defense Societies) 

McLaughlin, Andrew C. Sixteen causes of the war 
(University of Chicago Papers. — Reviewed in Amer- 
ican Historical Review, XXIII, p. 742) 

Sherman, Stuart P. American and allied ideals. (Con- 
tents: Addressed to those who are "neither hot nor 
cold" in the war, it presents in a most convincing 
way the reasons why all who believe in the princi- 
ples of freedom, right, and justice, which are the 
ideals of America and of the Allies, should aid 
their cause. 24 pages. Pub. by the C. P. I.) 

Small, Albion W. Americans and the world-crisis 
(Univ. of Chicago Papers) 

The changing attitude toward war as reflected in the 
American Press (A. A. for I. C, Sept., 1914) 

What really matters. By a well-known newspaper 
writer (Pub. by the C. P. I.) 

Wickersham, George W. Fourth of July oration (N. 

S. L.) 
Wilson, Woodrow. War message and the facts J)ehind 



Keferencbs 51 

Why America Must Fight to the End — Continued 

it (Com. on Pub. Information. — President's war mes- 
sage of April 2, 1917, annotated. Published also by 
the Michigan State Department of Public Instruc- 
tion) 

, . Why we are at loar (Harper) 

Longer Readings: 

America's interests after the war (Amer. Acad of Pol. 
and Soc. Science, Pul)Ucatio7is, vol. 61) 

Angell, Norman. America and the European war (W. 
P. P.) 

Beck, J. M. The war and humanity, a further discus- 
cussion of the ethics of the World War and the at- 
titude and duty of the United States (Putnam. $1.30) 

Beveridge, Albert J. What is dack of the war? 
(Bobbs, Merrill— 1915, p. 430. $2) 

Blakeslee, G. H. (Ed.) The proMems and lessons of 
the war (Clark University addresses, Dec. 16, 17, and 
18, 1915.— Putnam. $2) 

"Cosmos." The 'basis of a durable peace (Written at 
the invitation of the New York Times. — Scribner — 
1917, p. 144. $.30) 

Dickinson, G. L. European anarchy (Macmillan — • 
—1916, p. 144. $1) 

Fayle, C. E. The great settlement (Duffield — 1915, p. 
309. $1.75) 

Herrick, Robert. The world decision (Houghton — ■ 
1916, p. 253. $1.25) 

Herron, G. D. Woodrow Wilson and the ivorld's peace 
(Kennerley— 1917, p. 133. $1.25) 

LeBon, G. Psychology of the Great War (Macmillan. 
$3) 

Leeper, D. R. The American idea (Rand, McNally, p. 
205. $1.50) 

McClure, S. S. Obstacles to peace (Houghton — 1917, p. 
487. $2) 

Osborne, W. F. America at war (Doran — 1917, p. 196. 
$1) 

Roosevelt, T. America and the world war (Scribner. 
$.75) 

Villard, O. G. Germany embattled (Scribner — 1915, 
p. 181. $1) 

Zangwill, Israel. The war for the ivorld (Macmillan. 
$1.50) 



52 Democracy and the Great War 

XL. What Germany means by peace 

Angell, Norman. "The paradox of Prussian peace," in 
The Independent, Oct. 6, 1917 

Chapman, J. J. Deutschland ueber alles, or Germany 
speaks (Putnam — 1914, p. 102. $.75. — German opin- 
ions; allies' viewpoint) 

Gardiner, W. H. Our peril from Germany's aggressive 
growth and why she wants peace now (N. S. L.) 

Henshaw, P. W. The cause and meaning of this war 
(The Argonaut Press) 

Lansing, Isaac J. The dangers of a premature peace 
(The "Carry-On" League, Chicago) 

Magan, P. T. The Vatican and the war (Southern 
Publishing Co.) 

Taft, William Howard. The menace of a premature 
peace (League to Enforce Peace) 
XLI. Our German-American Friends 
Brief Readings: 

Adams, E. D. Traitors to our democracy (Liberty 
Loan General Executive Board, San Francisco. — 
Reviewed in History Teacher's Magazine 9: 207) 

American loyalty (Contents: Expressions by American 
citizens of German descent who have found in 
America their highest ideal of political liberty and 
feel that America is now fighting the battle of 
liberalism in Germany as well as in the rest of the 
world. 24 pages. German translation also. Pub. 
by the Com. on Public Information) 

Buffington, Joseph. Friendly words to the foreign 
lorn (C. P. L) 

Davison, Charles Stewart. Treason (Popular misap- 
prehensions of the scope of the law. Pub. by Amer- 
ican Defense Society) 

Eltzbacher, O. "The Anti-British movement in Ger- 
many," in Nineteenth Century, 52: 190-210 

Fried, Alfred H. (Mez, John, Trans.) A "brief outline 
of the nature and aims of pacifism (Amer. Assoc, 
for International Conciliation, April, 1915) 

, — . — . The fundamental causes of the 

world war (A. A. for I. C, June, 1915) 

"The German state of mind," in The Atlantic, Nov., 
1917 

Kahn, Otto H. Prussianized Germany (The "Carry- 
On" League, Chicago) 



Eeferences 53 

Our German-American Friends — Continued 

Kant, Immanuel Eternal peace and other interna- 
tional essays (W. P. F. $.75) 

Orth, Samuel P. "Kaiser and volk: an autocratic 
partnership," in the Century Magazine, Nov., 1917 

Schurz, Carl. American leadership for peace and 
arbitration (W. P. F.) 
Longer Readings: 

A German. J' Accuse (I Accuse) (Doran — 1915, p. 
445. $1.50. — Vigorous arraignment of the ideas of 
the Pan-Germans and acts of the German Govern- 
ment, as responsible for the war) 

— . . Das Verdrechen (The Crime) (By- 
author of j: Accuse — Doran — 1917, 2 vol. $2) 

Fernan, Hermann. Because I am a German (Button. 
$1. — A German's case against Prussianism) 

Francke, Kune. A German-American's confession of 
faith (Huebsch. $.50) 

Fried, A. H. The restoration of Europe (Macmillan— 
1916, p. 157. $1) 

Huegel, F. The German soul (Button. $1) 

Muenterberg, Hugo. Peace and America (Appl on— 
1915, p. 276. $1) 

, — . The War and America (Appleton — 

1914, p. 210. $1) 

Ohlinger, G. Their true faith and allegiance (Mac- 
millan. $.50) 

Paterson, W. P. (Ed.) German Culture: the contri- 
bution of the Germans to knowledge, literature, art 
and life (Scribner. $1.25. — Collection of essays by 
nine British writers, university specialists) 

Schmitt, B. E. England and Germany, 1740-1914 
(Princeton Univ. Press— 1916, p. 524. $2) 

Toynbee, A. J. New Europe (Button. $1) 

Wellman, Walter. The German republic (Button. $1) 
XLII. The People's War to End War 
Brief Readings: 

Adams, E. B. This war is one of self-preservation 
(Liberty Loan General Executive Board, San Fran- 
cisco) 

Brewer, Bavid J. Mission of the United States in the 
cause of peace (W. P. F.) 

Bole, Charles F. The coming people (W. P. F.) 



54 Democracy and the Great War 

The People's War to End War — Continued 

Ellis, Havelock. Forces warring against vmr (W. P. 

P.) 
Gompers, Samuel. Address (N. S. L.) 
Grey, Rt. Hon. Viscount. The conflict for human 

Uhei'ty (Doran) 
Jordan, David Starr. Blood of the nation (W. P. F.) 
, . What shall we say? (W. 

P. F.) 
Mead, Lucia Ames. Patriotism and the new interna- 
tionalism (W. P. P.) 
Root, Elihu. Plain issues of the war (C. P. I.) 
Seddon, J. A. Why British laT)or supports the war 

(N. C. L.) 
Wilson, Woodrow. Lahor and the war. President 

Wilson's address to the American Federation of 

Labor (C. P. I.) 
, . A war message to the farmer 

(C. P. I.) 
, . War, labor, and peace: some 



recent addresses and writings of the President. (Con- 
tents: The American reply to the Pope (Aug. 27, 
1917); address to the American Federation of Labor 
(Nov. 12, 1917); annual message to congress (Dec. 
4, 1917) ; program of the world's peace (Jan. 8, 
1918) ; reply to Chancellor von Hertling and Count 
Czernin (Feb. 11, 1918). 39 pages. Translations 
into the principal foreign languages are in prepara- 
tion. Pub. by the C. P. I.) 
Longer Readings: 

Babson, R. W. Future of world peace (Babson — 1915, 
p. 142. $1) 

Bourne, R. S. Toioards an enduring peace (A. A. for 
L C.) 

Bryce, Rt. Hon. Viscount et al. The war of democracy: 
the Allies' statement (Doubleday — 1917, p. 441. $2. 
— Chapters on the fundamental significance of the 
struggle for a new Europe. — Reviewed in Amer. Hist. 
Rev., 23: 170) 

"Cosmos." The basis of a durable peace (Scribner — 
1917, p. 144) 

Cromer, Evelyn et al. After war problems (Macmillan 
—1918, p. 366. $2.50) 



References §5 

The People's War to End War — Continued 

Eliot, C. W. Road toward peace (Houghton. $.50) 
Herron, G. D. Woodrow Wilsoii and the world's peace 

(Kennerley— 1917, p. 133. $1.25) 
Jordan, D. S. Ways to lasting peace (Bobbs, Merrill. 

$1) 

McClure, S. S. Obstacle to peace (Houghton — 1917, p. 
487. $2) 

Royce, Josiah. War and insurance (Maemillan. $1) 

, . The hope of the great commun- 
ity (Maemillan. $1) 

Russell, Bertrand. Why men fight (Century — 1917, p. 
272. $1.50) 

Wells, H. G. What is coming (Maemillan. $1.50) 

■ ■ — — , — . — . The war that will end war (Duf- 

field— 1914, p. 106. $.75) 
XLUI. "Carry-On!" 

General Readings: 

Adams, E. D. Dollars or Boys (The Liberty Loan 
General Executive Board, San Francisco) 

, — . — . The nation and moral ditties (The 

Liberty Loan General Executive Board, San Fran- 
cisco) 

"Bobbie and the War, by Bobbie's Father," in Hist. 
Teacher's Magazine, 8: 177 

Burton, Pomeroy. Hurry up, America! (N. S. L.) 

Contemporary war poems (A. A. for I. C, Dec, 1914) 

Butcher, G. M. "War supplement — a selected critical 
bibliography of the war," in H. T. M., 9: 155) 

Ely, Richard T. Suggestions for speakers on the 
United States and the world ivar (N. S. L.) 

Harding, Samuel B. The study of the great war. (Con- 
tents: A topical outline, with extensive extracts 
from the sources, and reading references; intended 
for college and high school classes, clubs, and others. 
Pub. by the C. P. I.) 

Hart, A. B. et al. Hand-dook for public speakers (N. 
S. L.) 

Home reading course for citizen soldiers (Prepared by 
War Department. Contents: This course of 30 
daily lessons is offered to the men selected for ser- 
vice in the national army as a practical help in get- 
ting started in the right way. It is informal in 



56 Democracy and the Great War 

"Carry-On!" — Continued 

tone and does not attempt to give binding rules and 
directions. These -are contained in the various 
manuals and regulations of the United States army, 
to which this course is merely introductory. 62 
pages. Pub. by the Com. on Pub. Information) 

National service Jiandhook (A reference work tot li- 
braries, schools, clubs, and other organizations. 
Contents: Description of all civic and military or- 
ganizations directly or indirectly connected with war 
work, pointing out how and where every individual 
can help. Maps, army and navy insignia, diagrams. 
246 pages. Pub. by the Com. on Public Information) 

The dattle line of democracy (Contents: The best col- 
lection of patriotic prose and poetry. Authors and 
statesmen of America and all the countries now as- 
sociated with us in the war have expressed the 
highest aspirations of their people. 134 pages. 
Pub. by the Com. on Pub. Information) 

Ways to serve the nation. A proclamation by the 
President, April 16, 1917 (C. P. I.) 

The work of the National Security League (N. S. L.) 

Paxson, Frederic L. et al. War cyclopedia: a hand- 
look for ready references in the great war (Con- 
tents: Over 1,000 articles covering all phases of 
the war with special reference to America's policy, 
interests, and activities. Suitable for speakers, edi- 
tors, and all persons seeking information on the 
war. 320 pages. Pub. by the Com. on Public In- 
formation) 

Why we are at war. Why you must help. What you 
can do (N. S. L.) 
Universal Military Service: 

Why should we have universal military service? (Co- 
lumbia War Papers, series I, No. 13. Pub. by Colum- 
bia University, Division of Intelligence and Public- 
ity, New York City. Pamphlet compiled from various 
writers on the subject) 

Hetherington, C. "W. Shall military training te given 
to our youth? (Sen. doc. No. 22, 65th cong., 1st 
sess. — Can be obtained from members of congress. — 
Argument pro. — Mr. Hetherington is Prof, of Phys., 
Educ. and Recreation, University of Wisconsin) 



Keferbnces 57 

'Carry-On! "—Continued 

Howell, W. Stoiss army (Leavenworth Press, Kansas 
—1916, p. 34) 

Moss, J. A. et al. Military training for hoys: intended 
to develop hody, character and patriotism (Banta 
Pub. Co.— 1917, p. 241. $.50) 

Perry, Ralph Barton. The free man and the soldier 
(Scribner— 1916, p. 237. $1.40) 

Smith, M. et al. Why should we have universal mili- 
tary service? (Columbia War Papers, series I, No. 
13) 

Van Valkenburgh, A. (Comp.) Selected articles on 
military training in schools and colleges, including 
military camps (Wilson) 

Wood, L. Military obligation of citizenship (Prince- 
ton University Press— 1915, p. 76. $.75) 



58 Democracy and the Great War 



List of Publishers 

American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 36 Woodlaiid 
Avenue, Philadelphia 

American Association for International Conciliation, 407 W. 117th St., 
New York City 

American Historical Review, Macmillan Co., 66 Fifth Ave., New YorJi 
City 

American Journal of International Law, New York City 

American Political Science Review, Madison, Wisconsin 

American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, 
Baltimore, Maryland 

Appleton & Company, 533 S. Wabash Ave., Chicago 

Atlantic Monthly Company, 3 Park St., Boston 

Banta Pub. Co., Menasha, Wisconsin 

George Barrie's Sons, Philadelphia 

Blackwood, Edinburgh, Scotland 

Bobbs, Merrill Co., University Square, Indianapolis, Ind, 

Brentano, Fifth Ave. and 27th St., New York City 

Carnegie Endownment for International Peace, 2 Jackson Place, Wash- 
ington, D, C. 

Century Co., 353 Fourth Avenue, New York City 

Columbia University Press, 30-32 W. 27th St., New York City 

Committee on Patriotism through Education of the National Security 
League, 19' W. 44th St., New York City 

Committee on Public Information, Division of Educational Coopera- 
tion, 10 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C. 

Contemporary Review, Leonard Scott Pub. Co., 249 W. 13th St., New 
York City 

Dodd, Mead & Co., 4th Ave. and 30th Sts., New York City 

G. H. Doran & Co., 244 Madison Ave., New York City 

Doubleday, Page & Co., Garden City, New York 

Duffield & Co., 211 W. 33d St., New York City 

E. P. Dutton & Co., 681 Fifth Ave., New York City 

Eaton & Mains. — See Methodist Book Concern 

Fortnightly Review, Leonard Scott Publishing Co., 249 W. 13th St., 
New York City 

Funk & Wagnalls Co., 354-360 Fourth Ave., New York City 

Ginn & Co., 2301-2311 Prairie Ave., Chicago 

Grosset & Dunlap, 1140 Broadway, New York City 



List of Publishers 59 

Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square, New York 

Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 

History Teacher's Magazine, McKinley Pub. Co., Philadelphia 

Henry Holt & Co., 19 W. 44th St., New Yory City 

Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 2451-2459 Prairie Ave., Chicago 

B. W. Huebsch, 225 Fifth Ave., New York City 

The Independent, 119 W. 40th St., New York City 

Jackson Press, 1123 Broadway, New York City 

G. W. Jacobs & Co., 1628 Chestnut St., Philadelphia 

Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md. 

Mitchell Kennerley, Park Ave. and 59th St., New York City 

Alfred A. Knopf, 220 W. 42d St., New York City 

Leavenworth Press, Leavenworth, Kansas 

Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. 

Little, Brown & Co., 34 Beacon St., Boston 

Longmans, Green & Co., 443-449 Fourth Ave., Cor. 30th St., New York 

City 
Robert M. McBride, 31 Union Square, N., New York City 
A. C. McClurg & Co., 330-352 E. Ohio St., Chicago 
The Macmillan Co., 66 Fifth Ave., New York City 
Methodist Book Concern, 734-740 Rush St., Chicago 
The National Board for Historical Service, 1133 Woodward Building, 

Washington, D. C. 
The National Committee on Patriotic and Defense Societies, Southern 

Building, Washington, D. C. 
National Security League, 19 West 44th St., N. Y. City. 
Nineteenth Century and After, Leonard Scott Pub. Co., 249 W. 13th 

St., New York City 
North American Review, 171 Madison Ave, New York City 
Open Court Pub. Co., 122 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago 
Oxford University Press (American Branch) 35 W. 32d St., New York 

City 
Political Science Quarterly, Columbia University, New York City 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2-6 W. 45th St., New York City 
Quarterly Review, Leonard Scott Pub. Co., 249 W. 13th St., New York 

City 
Rand-McNally & Co., Chicago 

Fleming H. Revell & Co., 17 N. Wabash Ave., Chicago 
Ritter & Co., 120 Boylston St., Boston 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 608 S. Dearborn St., Chicago 
Small, Maynard & Co., 15 Beacon St., Boston 
Southern Pub. Assn., 2123 24th Ave. N., Nashville, Tenn. 



60 Democracy and the Great War j 

F. C. Stechert Co., 29-35 W. 32d St., New York City 
F. A. Stokes Co., 443-449 Fourth Ave., New York City 
Arthur F. Stone, St. Johnsburg, Vt. 
Sturgis & Walton, 31-33 E. 27th St., New York City 
United States Bureau of Education, Division of Civic Education, Wash- 
ington, D. C. 
University of Chicago Press, 86th St. and Ellis Ave., Chicago 
University of Iowa, Iowa, City, la. 
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 
T. Fisher Unwin, 1 Adelphi Terrace, London, England 
Williams & Norgate, London, England 

H. W. Wilson Co., 958-964 University Ave., New York City 
John C. Winston Co., 1006-1016 Arch Street, Philadelphia 
The World Peace Foundation, 40 Mount Vernon St., Boston 
World's Work, Doubleday, Page & Co., Garden City, New York 
Yale University Press, 209 Elm St., New Haven, Conn. 



DEMOCRACY AND THE 
GREAT WAR 



I 

Autocracy and Democracy 

In all the great wars of history the fundamental causes 
have lain deep under the surface. For many years the out- 
ward calm of Europe has concealed deep-seated antagonisms 
which needed but a slight incentive to burst forth with fury. 
It is needful to understand something of the nature of these 
underlying causes before it is comprehensible how the murder 
of an archduke in an obscure corner of the continent of Europe 
could precipitate a struggle of such vast dimensions as to reach 
over the Atlantic and draw into its vortex one of the most 
peace-loving of the great nations. 

If any one cause can be said to be preeminently fundamental 
in the Great War, it is doubtless to be found in the conflict 
between the ideals of Autocracy and Democracy. The strong- 
est champion of autocratic government in Europe since 1870 
has been the German Empire, at the heart of which is Prussia, 
whose weapon of offense and defense is found in militarism. 
Autocracy holds that the state is all important; that the 
people exist for the state, not the state for the people. 
Sovereignty in Germany exists not in the people, but in the 
state, whose head — today the Kaiser, William II, King of 
Prussia and , German Emperor-^*-claims to rule by Di- 

(61) 



62 Democracy and the Great War 

vine right, and to be responsible not to the people, 
but to God alone for bis acts of sovereign will. In interna- 
tional affairs this German autocracy holds that the natural 
relation between nations is not peace, but war. This doctrine 
it claims to have learned from Nature, '^red in tooth and 
claw," — the law of the "survival of the fittest." German 
autocracy has no place for "weak" nations. It does not 
recognize ethical relations of the Christian type as existing 
between strong and weak nations. Might makes right. The 
strong destroy the weak. Justice and mercy stop with the 
frontier. Not only do international agreements cease to be 
held binding when they become inconvenient, but all laws 
of man or of God, of justice and mercy, are as naught when 
they are in the way of the self-interest of the state. This 
doctrine is not only promulgated by eminent thinkers, teach- 
ers, and writers of Germany, but actually practiced by the 
Imperial German Government in the Great War. It was the 
practice of this theory, as affecting our own international 
relations, that brought the United States into the war. It is 
now seen that only by absolutely destroying the power of the 
Government which acts upon this theory, can the world be 
made safe not only for the United States, but for democratic 
Governments everywhere. 

Democracy, exemplified by the United States, Eng- 
land, France, and most of the enlightened nations, holds 
to the contrary of all these things. Its motive is to secure 
the highest well-being and the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number. Its weapon is the moral power of reasoned 
public opinion. In Lincoln's immortal phrase, democracy 
holds that government "of the people, by the people, and for 
the people" is the best government; according to which the 



Autocracy and Democracy 63 

state is a means to an end, not an end in itself; it exists for 
th^ people, not the people for the state. Sovereignty resides 
not in any special, hereditary, "divine right" institution, per- 
son or class, but in the governed, who for practical purposes 
in the administration of government submit to the will of the 
majority as restrained by recognized fundamental limitations 
embodied in a "constitution." In relations between nations 
it recognizes no code of morals distinct from that which gov- 
erns the relations of individuals as citizens of the state or as 
neighbors in a social community. Its international code is 
essentially Christian, for it recognizes all nations as equal in 
their sovereign capacity, protects the weak nation against the 
strong, and tempers justice with mercy in dealing with the 
less fortunate peoples. It stands for law and order in the 
relations of nations, and for the inviolability of international 
contracts and agreements. It stands, not for the mailed fist, 
but for reason, as the means of settling international disputes. 
If this principle of government is not to perish from the 
earth, then it must be vindicated in the war that is now being 
waged on the battle fields of Europe, for even a compromised 
victory by autocracy would mean that the democratic nations 
of the earth must resume indefinitely the financial burdens 
of great armaments, with all the dangers to free government 
which are involved in militarism. 



II 

Prussia and the Army 

The determining factor in the German Empire today is 
Prussia, whose King is by virtue of his kingship, German 
Emperor. To understand the essential features in the history 
of modern Germany one must know at least the chief steps 
in the rise and growth of Prussia, for the Germany of today 
is but a Greater Prussia. The central facts in her history 
are the Prussian army and the House of Hohenzollern. Prus- 
sia was born in war, and under the leadership of the princes 
of this House she has by successful war so increased her terri- 
tory and strengthened her army that today she presents the 
most powerful military organization known in history. The 
steady beating of this ^'hammer of Thor" has welded into a 
unity the German states of the present Empire. It is in keep- 
ing with this warlike spirit of Prussia that the German Empire 
should have been founded in the very midst of a successful 
war deliberately provoked for the purpose of national aggrand- 
izement. As was said by Mirabeau over a century ago, war 
may properly be called "the national industry" of Prussia. 
The success of this "industry'' has been chiefly due to the con- 
structive power, the consecutive policy, and in recent times the 
national support, which has followed the House of Hohen- 
zollern. 

For purpose of illustration we need not go further back 
than the Great Elector, who came to his inheritance in 1640. 
His lands were scattered in patches from the Baltic to the 
Ehine. By the power of his army he welded these pieces into 

(64) 



Prussia and the Army 65 

a powerful state. Coarse in nature, merciless to his opponents, 
treacherous in negotiation, he swept away the local assemblies 
of his provinces, concentrated the government in his own 
hands and built up an army out of all proportion to the size 
and wealth of his lands. Under his son those lands were 
organized into the kingdom of Prussia. Under his son's suc- 
cessor, the father of Frederick the Great, the army was still 
further built up, and the power of Prussia began to be known 
and feared. 

Frederick's father was a coarse and brutal man whose sole 
interest was in his army. From childhood he had loved the 
life of the soldier. He ruled his family as he did his country 
with an iron hand. "Salvation belongs to the Lord, — every- 
thing else is my business," was the motto that he lived as 
well as preached. As leader of his army he took a special pride 
in gathering from all parts of Europe and often at much ex- 
pense soldiers of unusual height and physical strength. By 
the end of his reign he had doubled the strength of his army, 
which he handed on to his son, together with an ample sur- 
plus of gold in the treasury. 

Frederick the Great thus had ready to hand when he came 
to the throne in 1740 a weapon with which he was destined 
to stir Europe to its depths. Frederick was not a boor like 
his father, but he proved to be a genius in the art of war. In 
the face of a large part of the military power of Europe he 
widened his lands and strengthened the power of his army. 
The conquest of Silesia and the division of Poland made 
Prussia one of the great powers of Europe, but the process 
by which this was done was militaristic robbery, as repre- 
hensible from the standpoint of democracy as the act of the 
skillful burglar who breaks, enters and steals. Whatever 
9 



66 Democracy and the Great War 

Frederick's "enlightened" political theory, or however much 
he had at heart the real welfare of his subjects, his methods 
in relation to other states would have done credit to Machia- 
velli. In the War of the Austrian Succession he threw 
his army into a defenseless province of a sister state without 
a declaration of war, and during the war twice abandoned his 
allies for his own advantage without hesitation. The series 
of wars he thus started lasted nearly a quarter of a century 
almost without interruption, involving all Europe and alter- 
ing fundamentally the map of the world. In him is revealed 
the typical HohenzoUern when he said that he was engaged 
in "the finest game in the world." 

Before his death Frederick joined hands with Kussia in a 
crowning robbery, the first partition of Poland. This act is 
characteristic of the Prussian policy of aggrandizement by war. 
Poland was weak. Austria and Russia and Prussia had long 
shamelessly opposed reforms in the Polish constitution in 
order that they might keep it so and profit by the feudal 
anarchy which the polish nobility had taken pains to per- 
petuate for their own selfish advantage. Polish lands were 
tempting. The central portions of Frederick's kingdom were 
separated from the eastern portion by the Polish lands now 
known as West Prussia, and to fill this gap Frederick took, 
as any robber might, from the weaker state what she was not 
able to defend. Under his successors, in the partitions of 
1793 and 1795, the ancient Kingdom of Poland, once one of 
the most important in Europe, was blotted from the map. 
These acts constitute a series of depredations as scandalous 
and violent as history can show. Even at that time the con- 
science of Europe was shocked. The Austrian Queen is said 
to have wept at the first partition as she received her share 



Prussia and the Army 67 

of the plunder, which in a real sense was forced upon her. 
In the history of the destruction of Poland we touch upon 
two facts, both deeply significant for the Great War, namely, 
the violation of race nationalism and the struggle for the bal- 
ance of power. 

Europe now began to recognize in Prussia a second great 
German power, a rival to Austria. Frederick's reign was a 
considerable step on the way to that military predominance 
of Prussia which was destined first to exclude Austria from 
power in the affairs of the German states, and in our own 
day to make her the tool along with other states in her 
stupendous plot for economic and political control of the 
world. A tremendous impulse was given to her growth by 
the reforms following the downfall of Napoleon, especially 
the nationalizing of the Prussian army under the military 
genius of Scharnhorst. His aim was to enlist every man's 
interest by giving him a share in the defense of the state. 
By constantly recruiting the army with new men and retiring 
as reserves those who should have received the proper train- 
ing in the ranks, he created a large body of trained men ready 
to fight when the opportunity should come. This was a 
momentous step for all Europe. It not only laid more firmly 
the foundations of militarism in Prussia, but was a first step 
in that system of universal military training which is the 
basis of the great European armies of today. 

This system was further developed under William I and 
Bismarck, though in the face of violent popular opposition. 
Three years of active military service were required from all 
healthy male citizens, and two years in the reserve. William 
wished to increase the term in the reserve to four years. 
Popular opposition induced William to appoint Bismarck his 



68 Democracy and the Great War 

chief minister (1862), and the proverbial "blood and iron" 
policy of that minister overcame all obstacles. His methods 
were practically those of an absolute despot. He nullified 
whatever control the people were supposed to have over the 
granting of taxes, going ahead with his plans for increasing 
the army in express opposition to the will of the people. "The 
great questions of the time are to be decided not by speeches 
and votes of majorities, but by blood and iron," he said. 

It was from the fertile brain of Bismarck that emanated 
the scheme for exalting Prussia over Austria and incidentally 
gaining both new prestige for the Prussian army and new 
territory for the Kingdom. The opportunity came in arrang- 
ing relations with the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. 
Prussia and Austria were the leading members in the German 
Confederation formed in the reconstruction of Europe after 
Napoleon; when in 1863 Denmark practically annexed Schles- 
wig against the will of the Confederation, Bismarck contrived 
that Austria should be obliged to share with Prussia a military 
invasion of Denmark, which was of course successful, wrest- 
ing from Denmark both Schleswig and Holstein. Bismarck 
thereupon tricked Austria into his hands by planning deliber- 
ately a situation respecting the administration of the two 
provinces which would not only afford occasion for a break 
with Austria but make the latter seem the aggressor. The 
crisis was precipitated in 1866. The injustice of Prussia's 
cause is shown by the fact that she had to face not only 
Austria but almost all of the other German states. Under 
the guidance of the strategist Von Moltke, Prussia concluded 
the war in seven weeks. As a result she not only humbled 
Austria and gained supreme leadership among the German 
states, but added to her own territory Schleswig, Holstein, 



Prussia and the Army 69 

Hanover, Hesse-Homburg, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Frank- 
fort. The remaining states of north Germany were incorpo- 
rated with her in the North German Confederation, from 
which Austria was excluded. 

Bismarck gave attention next to the South German states — 
Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt. By a 
clause in the constitution of the Confederation it was provided 
that when they should be ready to come in, the constitution 
would be adjusted to meet their needs. In the meantime 
Bismarck entered into a military alliance with them. The 
success of the Prussian army was a cogent argument with 
these states, and Bismarck knew that to strengthen this 
alliance and even to bring them into the Confederation only 
a successful war was needed which should involve their com- 
mon action. This he soon brought about, and in the char- 
acteristic Prussian way, by which the antagonist is made to 
appear the aggressor. He determined upon a war with 
France. By editing a press notice, the famous "Ems despatch," 
in such a way as to inflame the militaristic parties of both 
France and Prussia, France was led to declare war in 1870. 
The story is that when General Von Moltke heard the news 
he drew from his desk a series of documents containing every 
step for the invasion of France carefully worked out which 
the Prussian staff followed in detail. Whether or not true, 
within a few months the Prussian army was in Paris. France 
was forced to yield Alsace and Lorraine — an area of over 5,000 
square miles with a population of a million and a half people 
— to pay an indemnity amounting to a billion of dollars, and 
to grant to Germany in commerce the treatment of the most 
favored nations. 

A tide of patriotism swept through the South German 



70 Democracy and the Great War 

states and cemented their union with the North. I'o 
crown the edifice, on January 18, 1871, in French Versailles, 
William I of Prussia was proclaimed femperor of the German 
Empire. By its success the "blood and iron" policy of Bis- 
marck was now justified in the minds of the German people 
and the way was prepared for that national egotism and 
assertiveness which has supported the House of Hohenzollern 
in its attempt to gain world domination. 

This brief outline of the war policy of Prussia to the found- 
ing of the Empire is not meant to minimize the achievements 
of the German people in science, literature and the arts. It 
should however help to make clear the fact that from her 
earliest history Prussia has regarded war, and not peace, as 
the necessary condition to her expansion and growth, and that 
in the minds of the German people her army through its per- 
sistent attacks upon neighboring nations and upon the German 
states themselves has been glorified by its success. In their 
minds Prussia owes her greatness to the army. In the words 
of one of her leaders: ''The Great Elector laid the founda- 
tions of Prussia's power by successful and deliberately in- 
curred war. Frederick the Great followed in the footsteps of 
his glorious ancestor. . . . None of the wars which he 
fought had been forced upoji him; none of them did he 
postpone as long as possible. The lessons of history thus 
confirm the view that wars which have been deliberately pro- 
voked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest results." 



Ill 

German Militarism 

This state of mind which exalts the army to the chief place 
in the state, even above civil authority, and which looks to 
its power as the arbiter in every dispute and the chief means 
of national aggrandizement is characteristic of militarism. 
It regards war not only as inevitable but as desirable and 
beneficial. In reference to the present war Prof. Karl Rathgen 
of Hamburg said recently, ''War is glorious ; even if we perish, 
war is still glorious; but if we win, war is unspeakably 
glorious !" 

Not only the wars of Germany are pointed out, but the 
great wars of history, from which the champions of this 
doctrine see great benefits resulting for humanity. War, 
they allege, has moral values not otherwise to be acMeved. 
As one of them writes : "Because only in war all the virtues 
which militarism regards highly are given a chance to unfold, 
because only in war the truly heroic comes into play, for the 
realization of which on earth militarism is above all con- 
cerned; therefore it seems to us who are filled with the spirit 
of militarism that war is a holy thing, the holiest thing on 
earth; and this high estimate of war in its turn makes an 
essential ingredient of the military spirit. There is nothing 
that tradespeople complain of so much as that we regard it 
as holy." Ernest Hasse wrote in 1908: "If we were not 
beset with the danger of war, it would be necessary to create 
it artificially, in order to strengthen our softened and weaken- 
ed Germanism, to make bones and sinews." In a widely 

(71) 



72 Democracy and the Great War 

distributed German periodical (1913) we read: "War is the 
noblest and holiest expression of human activity. For us, 
too, the glad, great hour of battle will strike. Still and deep 
in the German heart must live the joy of battle and the longing 
for it. Let us ridicule to the utmost the old women in breeches 
who fear war and. deplore it as cruel and revolting. No ; war 
is beautiful. Its august sublimity elevates the human heart 
beyond the earthly and the common." That the old spirit of 
Bismarck still guides the German state is seen in these words 
of the Kaiser, spoken before the war; "It is the soldier and 
the army, not parliamentary majorities and votes, that have 
welded the German Empire together. My confidence rests 
with the army!" 

In the background of this exaltation of the army there lies 
an argument which the Germans claim to have found in 
nature. "War is a biological necessity of the first importance," 
says Bernhardi, "a regulative element in the life of mankind 
which can not be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy 
development will follow, which excludes every advancement of 
the race, and therefore all real civilization. . . . The law 
of the stronger holds good everywhere. Those forms survive 
which are able to procure themselves the most favorable condi- 
tions of life, and to assert themselves in the universal economy 
of nature. . . . Might gives the right to occupy or to 
conquer. Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute 
as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. . 
. The efforts directed toward the abolition of war must 
not only be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral. . . 
It is proposed to obviate the great quarrels between nations 
and sta'tes by Courts of Arbitration — that is, by arrangements. 
A one-sided restricted formal law is to be established in the 



German Militarism 73 

place of the decisions of history. The weak nation is to have 
the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nation. 
The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment on 
the natural laws of development, which can only lead to the 
most disastrous consequences for humanity generally." 

In the domain of German philosophy this doctrine is ex- 
emplified in the teachings of Nietzsche: Man must follow 
nature; the struggle for existence applies as well to human 
beings as to the lower animals ; the strong must use the weak 
for their own good. Nurture and care of the weak is a crime 
against humanity; ''the hope of the future lies in perfecting 
the strong, not in strengthening the weak." Nature produced 
man by a process in which the higher forms of life have preyed 
upon the lower; and only by the continuance of this process 
can the "Superman/' the highest possible type of mankind 
be developed. ''The weak and ill-constituted shall perish. 
. . Nothing is more injurious and criminal than this practi- 
cal sympathy for the ill-constituted and weak which we know 
as Christianity." 

It was nothing to Nietzsche that this teaching would tend 
to harden the heart against all human sympathy and to blunt 
all finer sensibilities. It could not have escaped him that 
such a doctrine is essentially antisocial. He was too intelli- 
gent not to know that it would justify any selfish assertiveness, 
individual or national. Indeed it is the negation of any true 
international morality. It is precisely this doctrine that has 
been used by German imperialism to justify the entire course 
which the Imperial German Government has pursued in its 
plot to dominate the world. 



IV 

Policy of Terrorism 

A natural corrollary of the German theory of war is the 
German theory and practice of "Frightfulness." A good 
example is the German use of the submarine. On the arrival 
of a convenient moment for the ruthless employment of this 
weapon, the German Chancellor announced to the Reichstag 
(January 31, 1917) : ^'When the most ruthless methods are 
considered the best calculated to lead us to victory and to a 
swift victory . . . they must be employed . . . The 
moment has now arrived." Germany had allowed the Ameri- 
can Government to believe that in response to its protest she 
had laid aside such ruthless methods. Now it appeared by her 
own confession that it was only because the moment had 
not come when Germany could undertake this enterprise 
successfully. When the time came she undertook it without 
scruples. On February 1, 1917 began the systematic and 
merciless destruction of innocent lives — men, women and 
children, citizens of the United States, bound on peaceful mis- 
sions upon the seas. Instructions were given to sink even 
hospital ships. President Wilson reported to Congress: 
"The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels 
of every kind whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, 
their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to 
the bottom without warning and without thought of help or 
mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along 
with those of belligerents." At the time of the declaration of 

(74) 



Policy of Terrorism 75 

a state of war by the United States some 250 American 
citizens had been killed by Germany upon the high seas. 

Curiously enough, the doctrine of "frightfulness" is advo- 
cated by Germany as really humane because a means of short- 
ening war. In the official German War Book we read : "Since 
the tendency of thought in the last century was dominated 
essentially by humanitarian considerations, which not infre- 
quently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emotion, 
there have not been wanting attempts to influence the develop- 
ment of the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental 
contradiction with the nature of war and its objects. At- 
tempts of this kind will also not be wanting in the future, 
the more so as these agitations have found a kind of moral 
recognition in some provisions of the Geneva Convention and 
the Brussels and Hague Conferences . . . The danger 
that in this way he [the officer] will arrive at false views 
about the essential character of war must not be lost sight 
of . . . By steeping himself in military history an officer 
will be able to guard himself against excessive humanitarian 
notions; it will teach him that certain severities are indis- 
pensable to war, nay more, that the only true humanity very 
often lies in a ruthless application of them. . . . Every 
means of war without which the objects of the war can not 
be obtained is permissible. ... It follows from these uni- 
versally valid principles that wide limits are set to the sub- 
jective freedom and arbitrary judgment of the commanding 
officer." General von Hartmann writes, in a German periodi- 
cal widely read: "War in the present day will have to be 
conducted more recklessly, less scrupulously, more violently, 
more ruthlessly, than ever in the past. . . . Distress and 



76 Democracy and the Great War 

damage to the enemy are the conditions necessary to bend and 
break his will." 

That this is not mere theory but is actually and most 
thoroughly practiced by the German army is abundantly 
illustrated. We see it in the recent treatment of Belgium, 
northern France, Russian Poland, Serbia, and other occupied 
territories. The evidence is indisputable from letters and 
diaries taken from captured German soldiers, from proclama- 
tions of German commanders, and from testimony of victims 
and witnesses. In the campaign of 1914 large numbers of 
civilians in conquered districts were deliberately and sys- 
tematically massacred, women abused and children brutally 
slain. Tens of thousands of Belgian and French civilians 
were later deported to Germany and forced into German in- 
dustries. Belgium was very largely denuded of its industrial 
and agricultural machinery, its food stuffs, and even its raw 
materials, either appropriated by the German army or sent 
back of the lines to Germany. This was not done merely in 
passion or the spirit of vandalism, but in accord with a plan 
scientifically elaborated. It is known as the "Rathenau plan" 
from Dr. Rathenau who worked out a scheme "for the syste- 
matic exploitation of all the economic resources of occupied 
countries in favor of the military organization of the Empire." 

"Frightfulness" went further. Houses and property were 
systematically pillaged and destroyed. In Hindenburg's 
"strategic retreat" through a part of northern France 
in March, 1917, the country was devastated even to 
the complete destruction of whole villages and the 
systematic demolition of every growing thing of value. 
A Berlin newspaper of the time says: "No village or farm 



Policy oe- Terrorism 77 

was left standing on this glacis, no road was left passable, no 
railway track or enbankment was left in being. Where once 
were woods there are gaunt rows of stumps; the wells have 
been blown up; wires, cables, and pipelines destroyed. In 
front of our new positions runs, like a gigantic ribbon, an 
empire of death." 

Action to this extent was not needed to hamper the opera- 
tions of the Allied armies. It seems adequately accounted for 
only as a deliberate measure to ruin one of the most fertile 
regions of France, to weaken for many years to come the 
power of an industrious rival. In a nameless category must 
be placed the wanton destruction of historic works of art, 
the library of Louvain, the priceless cathedrals of Rheims, 
Soissons, Ypres, Arras, St. Quentin, the castle of Ooucy, and 
the ancient townhalls of the Belgian cities. 

Germany's violations of international law are too numerous 
to mention in detail. The use of poison gas and liquid fire, 
the poisoning of wells, disseminating of disease germs, the 
bombing of hospitals and school buildings, the use of civilians 
including women and children as screens in advancing against 
the enemy, the killing without quarter of wounded and pris- 
oners on the battlefield, and the inhuman treatment of 
captives in German prison camps, — these things seemed at 
first unbelievable, but they have been investigated author- 
itatively and fully substantiated, and are in keeping with the 
German theory of war. The atrocities of the Turks among 
the Christian Armenians, amounting practically to their ex- 
termination, have been countenanced by the Kaiser upon the 
plea th<it he "can not interfere with the internal affairs of 
one of his allies.'^ The well authenticated stories as told by 



78 Democracy and the Great War 

a German eye-witness of the savage outrages committed 
against the women and children of this innocent and Christian 
people are too horrible to relate here; enough has been told 
for an understanding of the German theory and practice of 
war. 



V 

Democracy Against War 

From earliest times there have been people to protest against 
war. Poets, philosophers and statesmen have opposed war and 
espoused peace. Practical programs have been formulated 
to make war less probable, but especially in the last century 
has the growth of the spirit of "peace on earth, good will 
towards men" been noteworthy. This movement has owed 
no small debt to the great founder of Christian civilization 
who taught the doctrine of the brotherhood of man. "Love 
one another as I have loved you" is the great commandment 
that missionaries of the Cross have carried to foreign lands, 
whither they have almost invariably preceded the explorer, 
the trader and the settler. The influence of Christianity in 
the last century is reflected in the diplomacy of all the great 
democracies of the world. Upon these governments it has 
brought to bear the influence of the unbounded tenderness and 
love and self -forgetting service of the great Nazarene. Christian 
fellowship is the highest ethical ideal the world has experi- 
enced. In the words of the English historian Lecky: "It 
was reserved for Christianity to present to the world an ideal 
character, which through all the changes of eighteen centuries 
has inspired the hearts of men with an impassioned love; has 
shown itself capable of acting on all ages, nations, tempera- 
ments, and conditions; has been not only the highest pattern 
of virtue but the strongest incentive to its practice; and has 
exercised so deep an influence that it may be truly said that 
the simple record of three short years of active life has done 

(79) 



80 Democracy and the Great War 

more to regenerate and to soften mankind than all the dis- 
quisitions of philosophers and the exhortations of moralists." 
Christianity is at the foundation of democracy, and hence 
democracy is fundamentally hostile to war. Autocracy is 
anti-Christian, and always pro-war. The cause of democracy 
against autocracy is but a new form of the age-old cause of 
Christianity against Paganism. The German state is not 
Christian but Eoman, based consciously upon the ideals of 
Rome, which sought peace through world conquest and the 
universality of the Roman Empire. Its methods were the 
methods of autocracy. Every man's hand was against every 
other man's except within the bounds of the conquering state. 
Politically the German Empire like the Roman Empire, is the 
negation of Christianity. As put by the German leader 
Friedrich Naumann, in his book printed before the war en- 
titled ^'Letters on Religion" : "The more exclusively Jesus 
is preached, the less does he help to form states; and where 
Christianity attempted to come forward as a constructive 
force, that is, to form states, to dominate civilization, there 
it was furthest away from the Gospel of Jesus. Now this 
means, for our practical life, that we construct our house 
of the state, not with the cedars of Lebanon, but with the 
building stones from the Roman Capitol. . . . Hence 
we do not consult Jesus when Ave are concerned with things 
which belong to the domain of the construction of the state 
and of Political Economy." 

The natural corrollary of the brotherhood of man is the 
brotherhood of nations. It was to avoid the charge of warlike 
motives that France left unfortified her Belgian frontier; 
Germany with coldly calculated strategy planned to strike 
her there. It was fear of Germany that inspired France to 



Democracy Against War 81 

keep a large standing army. A democracy can never be 
safe from the designs of a neighboring and powerful autocracy, 
which can plan secretly, since it does not have to go to the 
people for money and thus advertise its needs, and which 
can strike suddenly because needing to consult only its own will 
to declare war. England, protected by her island position and 
her navy, kept only a small army. Even the size of her navy 
she was willing to reduce, — in fact led the movement at the 
Hague conferences to find a common plan of disarmament 
upon which the nations could agree. The United States 
Government, isolated from Europe, and responsible to the 
American people has consistently refused to maintain a large 
army and navy. American generals — like Washington, Grant, 
Lee, McClellan, Sherman — have all been civilians, who loved 
the home and fireside better than the camp, and returned to 
civil life after their wars. What democracy fears the voice 
of the people in its affairs of war? The voice of the people 
is the voice of peace. There is nothing that Germany fears 
more. The peace conferences of the world have been led by 
the great democracies inspired with the spirit of international 
brotherhood. The world's pacifist movement has for its in- 
dwelling spirit the motive of brotherly kindness, and the same 
spirit has animated all movements for the amelioration of the 
hardships of war. It was the violation of the international 
conscience of the world by the German war practices, more 
than any other one thing, that aroused and centered the 
world's thought upon the real meaning of German autocracy. 
There are many outgrowths of the Christian spirit of 
brotherhood as a force making against autocracy and war. 
One of the most important is the progress of popular educa- 
tion. This progress in the last century has been a world 
11 



82 Democracy and the Great War 

movement from which scarcely any country has escaped. The 
state has taken a noteworthy part. In early Europe the 
beginnings of education were fostered by the church, and 
church schools still continue. Parochial schools and denomi- 
national colleges are familiar features of education in America 
today. The religious schools as a whole have done a great 
service in fostering the Christian qualities of democracy. 
But since about the middle of the century the state has taken 
over from the church more and more the duties of public 
instruction. In Germany this movement has contained the 
elements of grave danger. It has made possible the absolute 
control of public opinion and hence of the public will, by 
the German Government. It has worked differently in the 
great democracies. Indeed it has worked quite as was 
prophesied by those who at first opposed state control of 
education. It has created social unrest and led people to 
question the rights of privilege and the sources of authority. 
It has enabled the people to read misleading and vicious 
literature on government. On the other hand it has opened 
to them the appeal of a free press; and this along with the 
right of holding public meetings and freely criticizing the 
policy of governments has helped to lay firm and sure the 
foundations of democracy in the world. The reaction of 
popular education upon the moral sense of the proper rela- 
tions of nations is not the least of its blessings, and this 
sense is keenest in the great democracies where all avenues 
of knowledge have been most freely open. In America this 
spiritual outlook has been one of the principal agents in 
destroying narrowness and prejudice. It has prepared the 
minds of her citizens for that vision of the freedom of the 
world which has appealed so powerfully to America and which 



Democracy Against War 83 

is so largely the moral sanction of her entrance into the 
Great War. 

The logic of democracy has included woman in the general 
program of emancipation. This is highly significant in its 
bearing upon popular opposition to war. Woman does not 
want war. The burdens of war, which always fall ultimately 
upon the people, fall with keen distress upon women. The 
justice of equal education for the sexes is today so much 
taken for granted in America that scarcely anyone thinks 
of arguing its merits. Woman has demonstrated her ability 
to serve equally well with man in almost every activity open 
to both. She has entered many of the professions and is 
taking an increasingly larger place as a leader of thought. 
In some of the states of the American Union she has been 
entrusted with the ballot and given political office. We may 
well believe that when equal suffrage shall have become a 
universal fact as a feature of the extension of a more complete 
democracy in the world, the probability of wars among 
nations will be indeed remote. 

Significant of the influence of Christianity upon war is the 
humanitarianism fostered by democracies. Here again the 
state has assumed functions which before were left mainly 
in other hands. Formerly it was the church which built the 
hospitals, asylums and poorhouses and cared in general for 
the weaker members of society; that the state should under- 
take these things seems to indicate that with the coming of 
the people to power they have put into the Government the 
spirit fostered in them by Christianity, and to this extent we 
may say that the state has become inspired with the ideals 
of Christianity. There are other reasons for this action, but 
the spirit of Christianity has been there as the animating 



84 Democracy and the Great War 

spirit. Recently we have lieard the well-known "Onward 
Christian Soldiers'' proposed as the national hymn of America, 
as expressing vigorously the militant Christian character of 
American democracy aroused. It is not remarkable that the 
autocracies of Europe can not grasp the idea of a nation 
going to war for abstract altruistic motives. But well 
America knows that only with the world safe for democracy 
can it be safe for the great humanitarian ideals which are 
the bone and sinew of her national life; and among these 
ideals none is greater than freedom from the burdens and 
ravages of war. 

The German theory of war, as well as the German theory 
of the state, is a strange misreading of nature and of human 
history. To say that competition, conflict, mutual effort to 
destroy, is the law of the animal world, is to overlook the 
supreme fact of motherhood. If there is anything in nature 
divine, it is motherhood, involving the very highest expression 
of self-sacrifice. Not competition, but cooperation, is the con- 
trolling factor in evolution. If this were not so, then animals 
of solitary habits would outnumber those of social habits; 
but the contrary is true; animals that live by preying upon 
one another are becoming extinct. The same is true of man- 
kind. Those tribes and races which have most persistently 
practiced mutual aid are most numerous and have attained 
to the highest development. Cooperation, self-devotion to the 
welfare of the community, rather than egotism, self-assertion, 
and war, are the motives which are basic and fundamental 
in nature. How else, indeed, could have been produced such 
a being as man, the most altruistic of the animals? It is 
the altruistic instinct in man which leads him to care for the 
poor, the defective and the criminal classes instead of destroy- 



Democracy Against War 85 

ing tliem. In his normal expression, man prefers good to 
evil, reveres truth, and loves mercy and justice; he holds 
self-sacrifice nobler than selfishness; no higher expression of 
unselfishness could be found than his acceptance of Christian- 
ity as the basis of civilization; no nobler application of 
Christianity is possible than that implied in democracy. The 
sincerity of man's determination to save Christianity and 
democracy is attested by the well-nigh world-wide protest in 
arms against an interpretation of nature and history which 
might well make us despair of a moral order in the universe. 
The hope for the ultimate abolition of war is strengthened 
by the evident truth that war cannot be permanent in a 
Christian civilization. One or the other, war or Christianity, 
must go. It may help, no doubt, to prove to Germany, and 
to all warlike nations, that war is unprofitable; the economic 
motive in all civilization is powerful; but it must be proven 
to Germany that the dominant motive in a Christian civiliza- 
tion is moral. It was the dawning Christian conscience of 
pagan Rome that abolished the combats of the arena; it 
was the conscience of America that destroyed slavery; con- 
science has put an end to duelling, except in militaristic 
groups; it has humanized war among civilized peoples. And 
conscience will abolish war when men no longer can fight 
with a good conscience. When war is held to be criminal 
it will be punished as crime. And war is criminal, from the 
viewpoint of private Christian ethics. It involves the sus- 
pension of all the Commandments. It is a survival from 
savagery; the very basis of war is the rule of primitive ages 
that the injured is both judge and avenger. As long as men 
employ violence to obtain justice, they will seek justice through 
violence. In the long run, if our civilization is to remain 



86 Democracy and the Great War 

Christian, the conscience of the world will brand war as 
murder, and the nation that makes war will be treated by 
Christian nations as a murderer and a common enemy of 
mankind. 



VI 

Apologies for War Considered 

It is true that militarism in Europe lias not been confined 
to Germany. Russia for example, under czarism, was notorious- 
ly militaristic in spirit. England has had her preachers 
of militarism. Even the gentle Kuskin says: "All the pure 
and noble arts of peace are founded on war. . . . There 
is no great art possible to a nation but that which is based 
on battle. . . . All great nations learned their truth of 
word and strength of thought in war; they were nourished 
in war and wasted in peace; trained by war and betrayed 
by peace." In France the Dreyfus case laid bare in its worst 
features the spirit of militarism in the French army, in which 
it took ten years for the cause of justice to triumph over 
the forces of prejudice, partisanship, and irrationality. Even 
America has had her militarists. But the significant feature 
is that the militarists in England, France, and America 
have not converted either the people or the governments of 
those nations, while the German militarists have long held 
sway over the German mind ; since the founding of the Empire 
it has seldom refused the demands of the German General 
Staff. Militarism in Russia and England and France and in 
all the nations as well as in Germany must share responsi- 
bility for the Great War, yet we remember it was Prussia 
that originated and first adopted universal compulsory mili- 
tary service which laid the foundations of militarism in 
Europe. In the war of 1870-71 Prussia as leader of Germany 
planted in France the seeds of deep-seated hatred by wresting 

(87) 



88 Democracy and the Great War 

from her Alsace-Lorraine, and through the subsequent increase 
in her army, inspired by fear for the stolen goods, forced upon 
France the nationalization of the French army. Immediately 
after the recent Balkan wars Germany made another enormous 
i crease in her standing army, the significance of which we 
now understand. Germany within very recent times forced 
upon a reluctant England a staggering race in naval arma- 
ment. German militarism, as the efficient cause of the sur- 
vival of militarism in Europe into the twentieth century, 
must be held a very real cause of the Great War. 

It is true that Germany is not the only nation that has 
increased its lands by war. All of the great powers of Europe 
have done so. The wars of Louis XIV, the wars between 
France and England in America, England's wars on the 
Continent and in India and South Africa, all resulted in ma- 
terial advantage for the conqueror. Our own Mexican War 
was not without profit in lands. We remember that America 
once went to war with England to resist alleged violation of 
American rights upon the high seas, and that envious eyes 
were cast upon Canada. Of all these wars at least two things 
may be observed. In none of them was there the faithless 
abandonment of treaty obligations that has characterized 
Germany's action in the present war, and in none of them 
was resort made to war practices that shocked the conscience 
of the world. No sound argument can be drawn from these 
wars, nor from any wars, in favor of the militaristic regime 
of Germany. History knows other constructive forces than 
war. Canada, Australia, South Africa, are not the products 
of war, and they are not inferior to Prussia. The Federal 
Union of the United States, a union of free states, does not 
admit of comparison with the union of paternal despotisms 



Apologies for War Considered 89 

wliicli we know as the German Empire. A just appraisal 
of warlike qualities in nations show that these qualities have 
not tended uniformly to well-being; on the contrary, in many 
nations, as with the Indian, the wolf, and the pirate, they 
have tended to extinction. It is the fittest, not the fiercest, 
that survive. Germany is not yet through with war. 

It may readily be admitted that conditions beneficial for 
the race have resulted from war. It is true for example that 
the Greek wars against the Persians made it possible for the 
superior civilization of the Greeks to continue its develop- 
ment; that the wars of Rome paved the way for the introduc- 
tion of her superior political and legal institutions among 
the peoples of the Mediterranean and for the spread of 
Christianity; that in the French wars after the Revolution 
there was developed the French national spirit. Our own 
Revolutionary War gave birth to a nation, and the Civil 
War preserved it and rid it of slavery. The Spanish-Ameri- 
oan War freed Cuba and the Philippines from oppression. 
But is the fact that good came of these wars conclusive evi- 
dence that the wars were the cause of the good? Does it 
show necessarily that war is the way to ascertain what is 
right? By the Revolutionary War, it is true, democratic gov- 
ernment was achieved for America, yet the same or a greater 
degree of democracy has been achieved peacefully for those 
who stayed in England by a series of Reform Bills in Parlia- 
ment. Human slavery was neither more right nor more 
wrong as a result of the Civil War. The doctrine that issues 
of moral conscience are made right or wrong by physical 
force can not be admitted in a Christian civilization. "Come, 
let us reason together," is the spirit of the Great Teacher. 
Reason and justice are even by Germans acknowledged to be 



90 Democracy and the Great War 

the foundation of civil relations within the state, then why 
not between states? As to wars in the past, is it not well to 
remember that these wars were in the past; the question really 
is, what are we going to do in the present? Is it not the 
part of wisdom to put away the crude methods of ages that 
are gone, and recognize that right and justice between civil- 
ized nations are to be determined, as they are between citizens 
of peaceful communities, by the methods of Christian civil- 
ization ? 

It is sometimes pointed out as an argument for war that 
the sanction of force is in reality back of our courts. Doubt- 
less, as long as man retains his pugnaciousness and other 
brutish inheritances, force in some form will be necessary to 
restrain law-breakers; it is now being used to restrain Ger- 
many. The league of the Allies, embracing practically the 
civilized world outside of Germany, is a league to enforce 
peace and to punish the crimes Germany has committed. It 
it doubtless true that just as we have to have physical power 
back of our courts of justice there will always need to be an 
international police force, — "the organized major force of 
mankind," as President Wilson puts it, — to curb national law- 
breakers and to enforce the judgments of such international 
tribunals as may be established. 

Strangely enough the German argument for the moral 
values of war seems to have had weight even in America, and 
with minds of intellectual power. They have argued that war 
fosters physical strength, courage, self-sacrifice, efficiency, 
devotion to an ideal, consideration for others, willingness to 
dispense with ease and luxury, etc., all of which at first hear- 
ing sounds well. It may even be admitted that war, like 
any national calamity, may enhance noble qualities called upon 



Apologies for War Considered 91 

by great stress and strain. On the other hand, this can scarce- 
ly offset for the rank and file the growth of hate and evil 
that has always followed the unloosing in war of the worst 
passions in human nature. War is a doubtful moral agent, 
if we accept the statistics of crime in war times, especially 
among youth released from the restraints of the home. There 
are moral equivalents for war. If civic education through 
the home, the schools and the colleges, the press, the pulpit 
and the platform, and the manifold exigencies of practical 
life are not conducive to the growth of these qualities, we 
may well despair and, as someone has said, it were well that 
the human race be destroyed and that the Almighty should 
begin over again. 



VII 
America and the Great Democracies 

The growth of the people's influence in government has 
been opposed by the privileged classes in all periods of history. 
The clash of these two forces in some countries has brought 
results by force of arms, as in the American Revolution; in 
others, results have come through violent social upheaval, 
amounting almost to civil war, as in France and more recently 
in Russia. As a result of one form or another of effective 
protest against absolutist government, democracy made rapid 
strides during the last century. The advance was especially 
marked in England, the United States and France. Indeed, 
throughout the world, never since people came to live to- 
gether under political institutions have the masses of people 
enjoyed so large a share in their government as in the years 
immediately preceding the present war. 

England may indeed be called the mother of democracies, 
qualified by a history of protest against absolutism extending 
over a thousand years. For the people of the United States 
the achievements of our great Ally in democracy are absolute- 
ly fundamental; the very roots of American institutional and 
constitutional life are embedded deep in English foundations. 
While England's government retains forms of monarchy, it 
is in spirit and practice essentially democratic. Her parlia- 
ment was the mother of our colonial assemblies, and out of 
the elements of these was fashioned the American Congress. 
American colonial life reproduced almost completely English 
local government in its counties, townships, hundreds, manors, 

(92) 



America and the Great Democracies 93 

and parishes, which have been passed on in one form or an- 
other from the Atlantic seaboard to our western States. Our 
legal and political ideas are essentially English. The English 
common law is the foundation of American jurisprudence. 
The practice of our courts is English. In political ideas it 
was the Englishman John Locke who in his Treatise on Gov- 
ernment furnished the groundwork for patriot philosophizing 
in 1776. It is needful that Americans understand clearly this 
English heritage in America's life in order that Americans 
and Englishmen may in all sincerity emphasize before the 
world our common aim in fighting for those principles which 
we would make the foundation of a future brotherhood of 
nations. 

A great harm has been done to the cause of democracy by 
the foolish and stupid, albeit well-intentioned and "patriotic," 
account which the older textbooks of American history were 
wont to give of the causes of the American Kevolution. As 
someone has truly said, if England had been as democratic 
in 1775 as she was some years later, undoubtedly we would 
still be living, as Canada now is, as a part of the British 
Empire. Many conditions favored separation. The social 
and political tendencies under which the American colonies 
were founded, their remoteness from the seat of imperial au- 
thority, the environment of the wilderness, and the greater or 
less need of self-dependence in local arrangements to meet 
emergencies, had led in America to more rapid development 
along lines of popular rule than had been possible in England. 
England naturally desired to maintain the unity of the Empire, 
economically as well as politically, but was not wise in her 
methods. She was hampered by the reactionary theory and 
practice of the German King of England, George III, of the 



94 Democracy and the Great War 

House of Hanover, wliose governmental vision was essentially 
anti-English and opposed to the whole trend of English con- 
stitutional development. The Declaration of Independence is 
not anti-English. Its summary of grievances is not against 
England but against the King; it demands "the rights of 
Englishmen" as against the usurpation of those rights by the 
King and the Court party. Americans will do well to remem- 
ber that when the break became imminent the great English 
statesmen Pitt, Fox and Burke definitely took sides with the 
colonies and championed their cause in Parliament. 

The British Empire today is an imperial commonwealth of 
democracies. It is to the credit of England that she was 
among the first of the great nations to abandon the idea that 
colonies exist primarily for exploitation by the mother country. 
Since the middle of the last century England has introduced 
self-government into every one of her colonies that was ready 
for it, and under the stress and strain of the Great War they 
have rallied loyally to her support upon the battlefields in 
France. No other nation in history has accomplished such 
a feat in government and such an achievement would not be 
possible to a nation bent upon a policy of selfish aggrandize- 
ment. Canada today is almost as independent of England 
as the United States and hardly less democratic, yet from her 
handful of people since the beginning of the war some 500,000 
volunteers have gone over-sea to fight for England; and now 
Canada has adopted conscription. In point of loyalty what 
is true of Canada is true of Australia, New Zealand, and 
South Africa. In the latter colony after the Boer war, with 
a people mainly Dutch, England not only restored self-gov- 
ernment but allowed the people to elect as administrative offi- 
cers the Dutch generals that had fought against her. The 



America and the Great Democracies 95 

world furnishes no political spectacle of similar nature except 
in the history of democracies. In India and Egypt, England 
has achieved much for the cause of democracy. Reluctantly 
she has extended her dominion in India. Repeatedly she re- 
fused to take possession of Egypt, until in 1882 she was forced 
to do so, and declared formally her protectorate only in 1914. 
In both countries the native people are permitted to share in 
the government. Ireland presents political problems of 
gravest nature, but even Ireland's friends admit that the 
obstacles to their happy solution are not so much a matter of 
the Government as of Ireland's inability to unite upon what 
it will have. The best justification of England's colonial 
policy is the loyalty with which her colonies have responded 
to her needs in the present' great crisis of her national life. 

Vital to the existence of this great bulwark of democracy 
is the supremacy of the British navy, a power England has 
never abused. England's enemies claim that she has contem- 
plated world conquest, and that her great navy is a menace 
to the freedom of the world. It is a menace to the world 
ambitions of Germany, but not to the legitimate ambitions 
of any free people. Naval power is not a weapon of offense, 
but of defense. By her naval power England is prepared to 
defend her island from invasion and to protect her colonies; 
but no naval power, however great, would enable her to take 
the offensive and conquer a defended country. Many features 
of England's life have made her naval power imperative, — 
her island position, her dependence on importations for food, 
and her vast manufactures for export. If England dreamed 
of world conquest she would be found with a great army and 
a compulsory military system, like Germany's, — whereas her 
army until recently was small and her soldiers were volun- 



96 Democracy and the Great War 

teers. England's lack of a nationalized army speaks louder 
for her peaceful intentions than even her traditional policy 
of aloofness from European alliances or her leadership in the 
world's peace movements for disarmament. 

The disposition of England for peace is not difficult to un- 
derstand, except by persons afflicted with Anglophobia. It 
is not a question of what England has been, nor yet is it a 
question of a few mistaken dreamers of "Pan-Angloism" or of 
gossip and personalities. It is the larger question of the power 
the English people have acquired through England's great 
transformation in terms of democracy during the latter part 
of the nineteenth century. Americans to whom the names 
of Cobden, Bright and Gladstone do not bring a realization 
of this change have something significant to learn about the 
history of their own country. England's economists and 
statesmen of the last century have been the teachers of 
America, and America has been the teacher of England. It 
was from America that the lessons were learned which 
brought to the English people the great reform bills of 1867 
and 1885. It has been the voice of the English people through 
Parliament, as it has been the voice of the American people 
through Congress, that liberty has spoken with determination 
against a policy of militarism as a support for imperialism; 
and this is the essential point to remember in any talk about 
"British imperialism." 

America, the daughter of England, has been faithful to her 
inheritance. By the American Kevolution, liberalism was pro- 
moted not only in America but throughout the world. Ex- 
cepting in Switzerland, no nation in the world in 1789 had 
a written constitution; in that year the United States of 
America wrote into the great charter of this nation's liberties 



America and the Great Democracies 97 

a conception of citizenship whicli constitutes her chief con- 
tribution to popular government, the doctrine that the state 
consists essentially of its citizens. This new departure was 
involved in the theory that the government derives its just 
powers from the consent of the governed. Sovereignty in 
America lies in the people; the state exists for the people, 
the exact opposite of the German theory, that the people 
exist for the state. Further than this, America, through her 
naturalization laws, has offered this citizenship to the people 
of all nations, opening thus the way for the oppressed of the 
world to become a part of the American state ; and the wisdom 
of her course has been justified by the loyalty with which her 
foreign-born citizens, recognizing the righteousness of her 
cause, are standing by the flag. 

The influence of England and America upon France, and in 
turn of these three great democracies upon the development 
of democratic institutions in Europe, has been incalculable. 
A hundred years before the French Revolution, the Puritan 
Revolution in England under Cromwell had established the 
principle, that when a conflict arises between the crown and 
the representative body, the crown must give way. On the 
Continent at that time despotic government was at its height ; 
but the example of England was not forgotton. The example 
of the execution of Charles I ^served the people of France in 
dealing with Louis XVI. The philosophers Hobbes and 
Locke, who developed in England the political ideas of this 
time, had a large influence upon the thinking of Voltaire 
Montesquieu and Rousseau; and these thinkers in turn fur- 
nished directly the intellectual stimulus of the French Revolu- 
tion. The "divine right" of Kings was dealt its final blow in 
England in the Revolution of 1688. Locke furnished the 
13 



98 Democracy and the Great War 

philosophical justification. Government, he says, was origi- 
nally formed by a contract among the citizens constituting a 
nation, who covenanted together for their common advantage, 
from which it follows that absolute monarchy is a usurpation 
of power by a single citizen; only when a government is con- 
trolled by the people as originally intended can there be en- 
joyed the maximum amount of personal liberty for all citizens. 
Both Voltaire and Montesquieu visited England and lived 
there for a time. Especially Montesquieu became a great ad- 
mirer of the English system of government, which he described 
for Frenchmen in his Spirit of the Laivs. Later Kousseau, 
under the same influence, embodied in story form in Emile 
much that was vital in English education. In the writings of 
all these men there appear clearly outlined the revolutionary 
principles of natural rights, the contract theory of government, 
the sovereignty of the people, and the right of resistance to 
tyranny even to the extent of tyrannicide and political separa- 
tion by force. 

All of these ideas had their influence upon the American 
colonies, and the minds of Frenchmen were deeply stirred with 
the fact of the success of the American Revolution. Many 
Frenchmen, with Lafayette and Rochambeau, had fought in 
America. In American success they saw the possibility of 
establishing in France a state based upon a free citizenship 
electing its own rulers. Such was our gift to France, in 
return for the assistance she had sent to us, and out of it 
emerged the French Revolution. The French "Declaration of 
the rights of Man" was taken almost directly from the old 
Bills of Rights which the American colonies had shaped be- 
fore the Revolution, which are filled with the spirit of the 
citizen-state. The French people, out of the struggles of many 



America and the Great Democracies 99 

years across the Napoleonic era and the restorations and re- 
actions of the various privileged classes, erected finally the 
great French Republic, which since the downfall of Napoleon 
III has been the open and sincere friend of the United States. 

The continental influence of the French Revolution was in 
keeping with the appeal which the history of France has al- 
ways made to the nations of Europe. A true sentiment was 
voiced by Benjamin Franklin when he said that every man 
has two countries, his own and France. French thought and 
French history have so dominated the thinking of Europe 
that an understanding of France is indispensable for an un- 
derstanding of the rest of Europe, Especially is this true of 
the influence of the French Revolution. Only gradually at 
first, however, could the conception of a state based upon the 
rights of man, with a government responsible to the people, 
spread in face of the repressive measures of absolutism. With 
the February Revolution of 1848 in Paris it received new 
impetus. The principles of the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man were then adopted by the liberal parties in every nation 
of Europe, and a new era dawned for popular government, for 
a free press, and for equality of all men before the law. 

The French Revolution was not lost on Germany. The new 
spirit took hold in the shape of rebellion against the autocracy 
of Napoleon. An expression of this spirit is contained in the 
patriotic poems of Arndt and the formation of patriotic so- 
cieties, like the Burschenshaft, formed mainly by students in 
the universities. It took the form of an intense nationality. 
The Rhine provinces in the south were thoroughly imbued with 
the principles of "liberty, equality and fraternity," and re- 
ceived constitutions more or less popular. In Prussia itself 
the discontent with the old absolute monarchy grew along 



100 Democracy and the Great War 

with the budding desire for popular participation in the 
government on the basis of a written constitution. The King 
of Prussia had promised such a constitution to his people, 
but delayed. In 1817 occurred a student demonstration and 
at about the same time the murder of a journalist named 
Kotzebue by a fanatical student, which formed the pretext 
for violent reaction against liberalism under the leadership 
of Metternich. For the time being the liberal elements, ex- 
cept in the south, were forced to yield; but they bided their 
opportunity. 

From France again came the impulse to liberalism, in 1848. 
On May 18 an assembly of some four hundred representatives 
of the German people met at Frankfort in south Germany 
and began deliberations looking to a new constitution that 
should satisfy the nationalistic aspirations and longings for 
popular government surging in the breasts of the German 
people. A constitution was finally devised, providing for 
various popular organs and an hereditary emperor at the 
head of a united Germany. The imperial dignity was offered 
to the King of Prussia. But the King was alienated from the 
whole movement, by the conduct of the revolutionists in 
Berlin. He was by nature timid and conservative. The re- 
actionists had profited by the dilatoriness of the Assembly, 
which instead of bringing things quickly to a head, had spent 
months theorizing about the ^'rights of the German citizen"; 
when finally the Assembly was ready, the autocrats were more 
than ready. They had mustered all the forces of reaction, and 
met the new movement so effectively that for immediate re- 
sults it came to naught. 

Of special importance as an expression of hope for democ- 
racy was the phase of this revolution in Prussia. A popular 



America and the Great Democracies 101 

assembly had met in Prussia in the same month as the general 
assembly at Frankfort. It proposed to abolish the nobility 
and to strike from the royal title the phrase "King by the Grace 
of God." In June a mob stormed the arsenal. The King 
was frightened, withdrew from Berlin, and ordered the as- 
sembly to disperse; which, with many protests, they did. 
The next year the King, as a measure of safety, submitted to 
an assembly selected from his subjects with scrupulous care 
a constitution drawn by himself. This constitution was de- 
clared in 1850, and with a few changes it is the constitution 
of Prussia today. How far it went in the direction of de- 
mocracy may be judged from the fact that a single man of 
wealth in an electoral district, if he paid a third of the taxes, 
had as much influence in the elections as all of the working 
people together. It was a great disappointment to the 
Liberals, many of whom replied by emigrating to the United 
States, and the immigrations then begun were only the first 
of a steady tide which has since flowed from German lands 
to America. 

On the whole during the last century the vested interests of 
Europe forced compromises from the rebellious champions of 
democracy. In all countries excepting France, Switzerland, 
and Portugal, the forms of limited monarchies have been re- 
gained. But democracy is dynamic. It continually demands 
greater sacrifices from the few fortunates for the many poor. 
In the light of the rapid advance of popular government in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the twentieth it seems doubtful that such compromises can be 
permanent. 

The more recent democratic movements seem to afford new 
hope that the future belongs to democracy. The Kussian 



102 Democracy and the Great War 

Revolution is to many one of the great surprises of history, 
but not so to those who have known the Russian people, whose 
instincts and local institutions have always been fundament- 
ally democratic. The world's attention, in so far as it has 
concerned Russia at all, has been confined chiefly to the Gov- 
ernment, a superimposed autocratic regime whose chief am- 
bition was expressed in a mass of secret treaties exposed by the 
Revolution, looking to the absorption of neighboring peoples. 
The deposed dynasty of the Romanoffs began in an election 
among the nobles dating before the time of Peter the Great, 
making a long line of despotic rulers who have modelled their 
governmental machinery very largely by imitating and adapt- 
ing features of the Prussian system. The Czar and the Kaiser 
stood for much the same thing. In the Russian Revolution 
of 1905-6 the German Government did its best to help the 
Gzar repress his subjects, arresting revolutionary exiles at- 
tempting to cross into Germany, and keeping all comers from 
Russia under the watchful eyes of the German secret service. 
Previous to the outbreak of the present war, as shown by 
documents now published, the Czar and the Kaiser had secret 
understandings in which their mutual appeals reflect very 
clearly their common stand for autocracy. The Russian 
Revolution has drawn sharply the difference between auto- 
cratic and democratic policies, among others that democ* 
racies are not engaged in the business of looting their neigh- 
bors, and the prompt recognition of Russia's revolutionary 
government by the United States gave further evidence of that 
basic quality of democracy, sympathy with the oppressed of 
other nations and recognition of their rights. 

Someone has rightly said that it was not merely the break- 
down of an economic system, but moral enthusiasm for the 



America and the Great Democracies 103 

rights of man, which created modern democracy. The revolu- 
tions of Europe have shown that the deepest motives and im- 
pulses have been not so much political and economic as moral. 
"Liberty, equality, and fraternity," the watchwords of the 
French Revolution, are words of moral import, instinct with 
living forces opposed to the age-long abuse of the many by the 
privileged few w^ho have made the wars of the world. These 
forces are hostile to all unjust class distinctions, recognizing 
in all humanity capacities for the highest attainments, and 
extending equal opportunity and privilege to all mankind. 
When it shall be established universally that the great masses 
of struggling humanity may no longer be exploited selfishly 
for the benefit of privileged classes, the world will be near 
the dawn of that day when war shall be relegated to the limbo 
of absurdities whither have long since departed the ghosts of 
other barbarities of primitive ages. 



VIII 

American Democracy for Sane Internationalism 

The effect of democracy upon international relations is best 
illustrated for us in the history of the United States. Not 
that this history is entirely one of ^^sweetness and light.'' As 
in all human affairs, along with the enthusiasm for ideals 
and patriotic self-sacrifice have gone sordid personal ambitions 
and the blight of privileged interests. War is one of the hard 
realities of American history. Yet it is not needful nor whole- 
some to minimize the weak points in America's war record; 
attempts in the past to do so have resulted only in dangerous 
optimism and in a questionable sort of patriotism, here consist- 
ing largely of self-glorification and a failure to understand 
other nations. Any judgment of America that is worth while 
must result from examining honestly her record, and there need 
be no fear but that if it is examined in the spirit of her whole 
history it will be found in harmony with the permanent in- 
terests of the peoples of the world everywhere. 

The failure of Americans at the outbreak of the Great War 
to realize fully its meaning was due in large measure to a 
traditional, and for the present narrow, interpretation of our 
history. It was due to that feeling of isolation from Europe 
which has more or less consciously dominated the foreign 
policy of the United States since the days of Washington. It 
is this feeling and this policy which has prevented us from 
realizing that the whole history of the United States is but 
a chapter in the westward expansion of European peoples 
and European civilization. It is only now beginning to dawn 

(104) 



American Democracy for Sane Internationalism 105 

upon us that America has become a world power, and that, 
as such, a policy of isolation is for her no longer possible or 
desirable. 

In Washington's time there was reason for keeping free 
from "entangling alliances." The colonies had four times 
been drawn into war since 1689 as a result of European con- 
flicts. Before the new nation was the spectacle of the French 
Reign of Terror and the exhausting wars following the French 
Revolution. Washington saw clearly that as a young nation 
the United States must conserve its energies for developing 
its own resources. But when in 1916 President Wilson de- 
clared, ''This is the last war . . . that involves the world 
that the United States can keep out of," he measured for 
America the full distance between Washington's day and our 
own. Indeed, Washington found isolation easier to preach 
than to practice; and his successors, after maintaining for a 
time neutrality with England and Napoleon, went to war with 
one of them. It is significant that in the terms of the treaty 
of 1814 not one of the alleged causes of the war was alluded 
to; and Jefferson communicated to Congress that the treaty 
"terminates with peculiar felicity a campaign signalized by 
the most brilliant successes." More brilliant was his pur- 
chase from France, in 1803, of Louisiana. The purchase of 
Florida in 1819 from Spain further lessened the chances of 
America's embroilment with Europe. But autocracy on the 
Continent was wide awake to the new gains being made by 
Democracy. It had set in motion reactionary forces which 
were bitterly hostile to liberalism in the New World as well 
as the Old. Russia, Prussia, and Austria entered an agree- 
ment known as the "Holy Alliance," whose principal purpose 
was to maintain "the divine right of kings" and the privileges 



106 Democracy and the Great War 

of the aristocracy. An occasion for an expression of this 
service came in 1822 in helping Spain to crush out rebellion in 
her colonies in South America. Russia at that time was 
looking prospectively down the Pacific coast of North America 
with a view to extending her possessions southward from 
Alaska. European intervention and colonization in the New 
World was then imminent when President Monroe announced, 
that ^'The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as 
a principle in which the rights and interests of the United 
States are involved, that the American continents, by the free 
and independent condition which they have assumed and 
maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects 
for future colonization by any European powers." 

For that day this doctrine was a far-seeing pronouncement. 
It was not wholly unselfish. Yet there is little doubt that 
people so close to the struggles of the American Revolution 
rejoiced over the triumph of the principles of freedom and 
self-government in the revolted South American colonies 
which were seeking to pattern after the new republic in the 
North, and that along with concern for their own peace and 
prosperity there went something of generous enthusiasm for 
the welfare of these little states and the hope that for the 
future in both Americas there might be freedom to work out 
to their fullest capacity the principles of human liberty under 
free government. 

The Monroe Doctrine was one way of saying that America 
^'must be made safe for democracy," but such a message from 
such a source would hardly have been taken seriously by the 
powers of Europe except for one substantial fact, namely, the 
British navy. From that day to this England's recognition 
of her common interest with the United States in maintaining 



American Democracy for Sane Internationalism 107 

the Monroe Doctrine has been the chief bulwark of the New 
World against the designs of autocracy. 

In the present war America has announced the policy of the 
Monroe Doctrine for the world. President Wilson, in his 
Senate address, in commenting on the nations' replies to his 
request for their war aims, said: "I am proposing, as it 
were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the 
doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world ; 
that no nation should seek to extend its policy 
over any other nation or people, but that every people 
should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way 
of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little 
along with the great and powerful." As in the early day, so 
now, the British navy stands pledged to secure the extension 
of this doctrine to the world, and not only the British navy 
but the whole resources of the people of the British Empire 
and the allied resources of practically all civilized peoples 
outside of the Germanic powers and Turkey stand pledged 
to secure the freedom of the world from the aggressions of 
brutal and warlike nations. 

The course of the United States in the New World has been 
fairly consistent with the Monroe Doctrine. An apparent 
exception is the war with Mexico. The payment of |15,000,000 
to Mexico for lands acquired by the war, although such action 
was a radical departure from the previous usage of nations, 
does not excuse the war. The later spirit of the United States 
toward Mexico has in some measure atoned. In behalf of 
Mexico the United States thwarted the encroachments of 
Napoleon III after the Civil War. Kecently President Wilson 
refused to intervene in Mexican affairs, which has been a 
practical demonstration to all of the Latin states that German 



108 Democracy and the Great War 

propaganda there has misrepresented this nation, which 
has no policy but that of protecting them as part of its own 
self-protection. The effect of this demonstration is seen in 
the response to the President's appeal to neutrals. The people 
of most of these states are at heart with the United States in 
the war. The growing enthusiasm for Pan-Americanism has 
been newly illustrated by the Washington conference of states 
in 1915. Other such conferences to be held in the future hold 
promise of gradually overcoming the natural prejudices and 
jealousies arising out of diversity of race and customs. 

The relations of the United States with Cuba and the 
Philippines are further evidence of this nation's policy towards 
weaker peoples. The Spanish war, by which the Philippines 
were acquired, was to many unwelcome. They saw in it an 
expression of the imperialistic tendency of the age. In a 
sense they were right. In reality, however, our interference 
was an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Cuba. America 
went to war, in the general understanding of the people at 
that time, to free Cuba from oppression by Spain — the Spain 
against whose policy of exploitation the South American 
colonies had rebelled three-quarters of a century before. 
America's motive respecting Cuba holds deep meaning for her 
growth in international morality. How different in spirit 
from the Ostend Manifesto of 1854! And this spirit towards 
Cuba has characterized America's treatment of her sin^ce 
1898. Twice we have had Cuba, and each time we have re- 
garded possession as a public trust, and have restored Cuba 
to self-government at the earliest moment consistent with her 
welfare. The same is true of our treatment of the Philippines. 
Our Government has repeatedly protected the people of the 
islands from exploitation, and early in our rule we sent some 



American Democracy for Sane Internationalism 109 

five hundred American teachers to carry to them the principles 
of self-government and the best of our civilization. Mr. 
Koosevelt says: "I believe that I am speaking with historic 
accuracy and impartiality when I say that the American treat- 
ment of and attitude toward the Filipino people, in its com- 
bination of disinterested ethical purpose and sound sense, 
marks a new and long stride forward in advance of all steps 
that have hitherto been taken along the path of wise and 
proper treatment of weaker by stronger races." 

The Monroe Doctrine is working out in the New World a 
policy of international cooperation vital to the democracy 
of the world everywhere. To the north of us, between Canada 
and the United States, stretches a boundary line of three 
thousand miles, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, upon 
which there is not a single fortification, nor is there a battle- 
ship of either nation. upon the Great Lakes; the United States 
and Canada are fortified in the hearts of their people. In 
our Civil War the Canadian people sympathized with the 
North, as did also the people of England. The Civil War was 
not ours alone. It was a war in which the democracy of 
Europe was interested, to save for mankind the world's greatest 
experiment in self-government. It would of course have 
pleased the autocrats of England, as well as of the Continent 
of Europe, to have seen British intervention in behalf of the 
Confederacy. It would have been a capital victory for auto- 
cratic government everywhere if popular government might 
thus have been wrecked before it should become too strong to 
be discredited. But the letters of Lincoln to English working- 
men struck the responsive chord in the struggling masses of 
the English people, whose blind and often ignorant groping 
upward towards better things the American democracy was 



110 Democracy and the Great War 

trying to make good for them; and thus though cut off by 
the war from the cotton of the Southern States which fed 
their mills, they were willing to starve rather than give their 
voice in the counsels of their nation in favor of the autocrats 
who would intervene against the United States. 

Typical of America's treatment of weaker peoples is her 
policy respecting indemnities. The payment of |15,000,000 
to Mexico for lands at the close of the Mexican War has its 
counterpart in the payment to Spain of |20,000,000 for the 
Philippines after the Spanish War; the victor paid the in- 
demnity. Some fifty years ago when America became involved 
through European nations in a war with Japan, her share of 
the indemnity at the close was 1800,000 ; in 1883 she paid back 
the entire amount to Japan with interest. At the close of 
the Boxer Rebellion in China the United States received an 
indemnity of some |20,000,000, of which |19,000,000 (all but 
a million for actual damages to American property in China) 
was returned to China as an educational endowment, the in- 
come from which she might use to send Chinese youth to 
American schools. 

This policy is the exact reverse of that practiced by Ger- 
many. Germany makes war for what there is in it. Annexa- 
tions and indemnities have always been a fixed part of her 
program. The treatment accorded to France in 1871 was ex- 
pected to crush her, and in the present war, failing of world 
dominion, Germany will do the next best, and is proceeding 
now to do the preliminaries in Belgium, northern France, the 
Balkan states and Russia, preparatory to the demands she 
will make if she can force a peace by compromise. 

The United States has stood consistently for a sane inter- 
nationalism. Her wars have been on the whole not wars of 



American Democracy for Sane Internationalism 111 

aggression, but wars on behalf of some issue vital to the 
highest interests of popular government and world peace. She 
has been one of the foremost advocates of arbitration as a 
method of settling international disputes, diligently helping 
to seek some basis upon which the nations might live together 
with the least friction and the highest good for all. As a 
result of her leadership, supported by other civilized nations, 
a considerable body of international law has been made and 
codified. So firmly had the ideal of peace and orderly rela- 
tions taken hold upon the nations at the beginning of this 
century that willingness to abide by these international agree- 
ments had become the supreme test of the fitness of a govern- 
ment to exist in a civilized world. International law is, like 
all human law, the product of man's effort through the ages 
to devise some basis whereby men may dwell together with- 
out the sanction of force. In her obedience to international 
law the United States presents a striking contrast with Ger- 
many. Not only does Germany both in theory and practice 
assail the ethical nature of international law, she does not 
recognize any such law. She rejects arbitration on principle. 
For her, war alone is the arbiter between nations. The weak 
nation has no right to exist, much less has it a right to respect 
from a strong nation, for might makes right; in her view only 
weak states would invent arbitration, to hamper the strong. 
In striking contrast with the policy of the United States is 
Germany's conduct at the Hague conferences. By her action 
at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 Germany alone defeated the 
great humanitarian aims of those conferences, both as to com- 
pulsory arbitration and the limitation of armaments. She 
would not even discuss the latter. Great Britain, France and 
the United States, as leaders of the democracies of the world, 



112 Democracy and the Great War 

favored both propositions; Germany led the opposition, and 
both were defeated; for no nation would dare disarm unless 
all would do so. As to "freedom of the seas/' it was revealed 
in the Hague conferences that Germany's idea was to take 
away from England her principal weapon, namely, the power 
to blockade enemy commerce, while Germany wished to preserve 
for herself every possible means of doing harm to enemy and 
neutral ships alike. In her general program of action at these 
conferences Germany may justly be said to have made in- 
evitable the entrance of America into the Great War the 
moment there should arise with her a controversy which 
could not be solved by direct diplomatic notes. With Great 
Britain, and with nineteen other nations, the United States 
had a general arbitration treaty. During any war in which 
they might be concerned scarcely an issue could arise which 
might not honorably be deferred for settlement until after 
the war. But with Germany — a nation which rejects arbitra- 
tion, for which war is the sole arbiter between nations, which 
believes that might makes right — war was inevitable. Ger- 
many has always borne an insolent attitude in her relations 
with the United States; she has regarded America as a weak 
nation. Since the beginning of the war Germany's total dis- 
regard of international law in respect to all nations has con- 
demned her as an international desperado. The facts are 
there and speak for themselves. 



IX 

America For Humanity 

The United States, despite her policy of isolation, has al- 
ways felt the solidarity of democratic interests throughout the 
world. While this country has not actually intervened in 
European affairs, it has unofficially expressed its sympathy 
with all movements in Europe calculated to promote the 
cause of human freedom. In particular has it been in accord 
with the great nationalistic uprisings during the last century 
through which the people have expressed their longings for 
independence. President Monroe himself, in his message to 
Congress in 1823, expressed the sympathy of the United 
States for the Greeks in their war for independence. Similar 
expressions of sympathy were made unofficially for the revolu- 
tionists of 1848. The Austrian Government protested vigor- 
ously against the sympathy expressed by President Taylor for 
the Hungarians. Still closer became America's sympathy 
with all these peoples through their immigrations to the 
United States in the middle of the century, particularly from 
Germany, whence came Carl Schurz and other idealists, the 
ancestors of many of our present German Americans. 

When during the course of the Greek Kevolution the Kussian 
minister in behalf of the "Holy Alliance" undertook to make 
clear to the United States the beauties of the "European sys- 
tem," Monroe, Jefferson and Madison were much alarmed, and 
considered seriously a proposal, made by England, for a joint 
protest against the system, not only for America, but for all 
Europe as well. This would have meant the extension of the 
15 (113) 



114 Democracy and the Great War 

Monroe Doctrine to Europe even at that early day; but 
America was cautious. As events have shaped themselves 
since, the inner principle of the Monroe Doctrine, the protec- 
tion of the weak nation against the strong, has now gained 
a recognized place in the conscience of the world. It is the 
verdict of an international conscience that is felt today, in 
the declaration that such defiance of the principle of national- 
ity as has been committed against France and the Slavic 
peoples of Europe should not longer be tolerated by civilized 
nations, — and more, that these wrongs must be redressed. 

The "European system" was based upon the doctrine of the 
Balance of Power. By this principle, the distribution, divi- 
sion or annexation of territory was the concern oi kings in 
whom all government was vested. The people were only as 
herds of cattle. The royal solicitude was to keep an equili- 
brium of power among the states. When the great awakening 
came at the opening of the nineteenth century, the people be- 
gan to feel that a nation is a living organism, a thing of growth, 
of which the people themselves are the essential elements, 
whose government should be suited to their particular race, 
language, literature, customs, traditions and needs, and should 
be administered by their own elected officials. The French 
Revolution gave a sharp spur to this new national self-con- 
sciousness. The arbitrary policy of Napoleon greatly intensi- 
fied it ; it was largely the opposition he called forth that result- 
ed in the series of uprisings against which the Holy Alliance 
was formed. Despite all reactionary efforts, racial and 
political independence was attained in Greece and Belgium, 
and strong national movements in Italy and Germany made 
for Italian and German unity; in the Balkan peninsula six 
independent states came into being out of territory ruled by 
the Turks. 



America for Humanity 115 

The people's yearnings for national solidarity along racial 
lines have made them increasingly sensitive to the injustice 
of domination by a state foreign to them. In some cases 
religious differences have been involved, as with the Christian 
peoples under Turkish rule. Russia has absorbed various 
border peoples, including the Finns, lately in revolution. 
Poland long ago was effaced politically by absorption into 
Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The Germans of Austria are 
excluded from Germany. Italians are outside of Italy, — a 
population of several hundred thousand people at the head of 
the Adriatic are under Austrian rule; one of Italy's motives 
in the present war is the recovery of these lands and their 
people from xlustria. The very existence of Austria-Hungary 
is a defiance of the principle of nationality. Her entire politi- 
cal fabric is a mesh of different peoples more or less hostile 
to one another. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Slavic peoples, against the intense nationalistic spirit of the 
Slavs led by Serbia, had much directly to do with the outbreak 
of the present war. The wresting of the provinces of Alsace 
and Lorraine from France by Germany was distinctly a viola- 
tion of the principle of nationality and makes a vital factor 
in the war. If the principle of nationality had been thoroughly 
applied in Europe during the last century, a very large part 
of the friction among European states would have been re- 
moved and war postponed indefinitely, if not permanently. 

Not that the ideal of racial nationalism can ever be com- 
pletely realized. The complex mixture of peoples from all 
parts of Europe in any given state makes the ideal of a na- 
tional unit in each geographic unit impossible. The absence 
of natural boundaries, the intricate arrangement of territories, 
the demands of political and commercial interests, the changes 



116 Democracy and the Great War 

effected in the people themselves by residence under foreign 
government, make even an approach to the ideal difficult. 
Notwithstanding, there is imperative need that adjustment be 
made at the points of positive friction. How important this 
is to the world's peace is strikingly reflected in the peace 
terms proposed by President Wilson on January 8, 1918, fully 
half of which bear on this one issue : "The wrong done to France 
by Prussia in 1871, in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine should 
be righted." The Italian frontier should be readjusted "along 
clearly recognizable lines of nationality." The people of 
Austria-Hungary "should be accorded the freest opportunity 
of autonomous development." "International guaranties of 
the political and economic independence and territorial in- 
tegrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into." 
Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire should have "secure 
sovereignty;" but peoples under Turkish rule should have 
"unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." Poland 
should be reestablished to include territories "inhabited by 
indisputably Polish populations," and its independence and 
territorial integrity should be "guaranteed by international 
covenant." The nations must form an association for the pur- 
pose of "affording mutual guaranties of political independence 
and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." 

With these terms Great Britain is in accord, as evidenced 
by the address of her Prime Minister delivered at about the 
same time. France is deeply in sympathy with them. And 
it is more than a matter of sentiment. No nation that loves 
peace can fail to realize that deep under the sentiments of 
race, religion and language lies the pressure of material 
needs and interests, of which these nationalist movements are 
all expressions. The solicitude of democracy is not merely a 



America for Humanity 117 

sentimental care for humanity, but a recognition of the neces- 
sity of justice to all nationalities as a necessary pre-condition 
of any permanent peace. 

Even with this, it seems doubtful whether peace can be 
made permanently secure except through some permanent and 
powerful league to enforce peace after the war. It is no doubt 
true that during the war the world is acquiring a deeper con- 
sciousness of its unity, and that the moral conscience of the 
world has been quickened by the example and retribution of 
Germany's lawlessness. Yet human nature remaining what 
it is, collective groups of mankind, like citizens in civil life, 
will undoubtedly require the restraint of some overshadowing 
force which the rest of the world can threaten to bring into 
action if needed. The possibility of some such organized 
force after the war is more than a chimera. A "League to 
Enforce Peace" has already been organized, with the United 
States as leader, and has held several sessions attended by 
educators, capitalists, diplomats, mayors, governors, and con- 
gressmen from all parts of America addressed by such men 
as Mr. Taft, Mr. Hughes and President Wilson. In England 
Lord Bryce and Viscount Grey have publicly supported this 
effort to place humanity above national ambitions and to 
create the machinery necessary for the enforcement of inter- 
national justice. 

The central ideas of this League are derived from the 
American Union. Here on this continent a century ago 
thirteen sovereign states put aside narrow and bigoted pa- 
triotism and, profiting by the experience of a loose Confedera- 
tion, merged their fortunes in a greater state under a federal 
constitution. A supreme interstate court was erected, whose 
interpretations of the national law strengthened the federal 



118 Democracy and the Great War 

bond of unity, later to be preserved by the Civil War. The 
success of this Federal Union laid the foundations for The 
Hague Tribunal; an American capitalist of British descent 
financed the building of The Hague Peace Palace; and the 
Czar of Kussia, Nicholas II, called the first Hague Confer- 
ence. The entire movement was brought to naught by Ger- 
many. While Germany has wrecked the peace of the world, 
the constructive work already done at The Hague will live 
after the war and, indeed, is receiving great impetus during 
its course. If the world succeeds in organizing a permanent 
world court with power to call cases before it and to enforce 
its decisions, which shall recognize as equal before it all na- 
tions both great and small, it will owe this achievement largely 
to the spirit of democracy as embodied in the Governments 
of Great Britain, France, and the United States. 



X 

Democracy and the Industrial Revolution 

Among the powerful factors contributing to the adoption 
of democratic theories and the establishment of war-opposing 
governments in the last century was the influence of industrial- 
ism. With the dawn of the century came the beginnings of 
that series of great inventions in textile manufacturing which 
with the application of steam was destined to revolutionize 
industry and develop the seeds of great social and political 
upheavals. Spreading from England to the United States 
and to the continent of Europe these changes affected vitally 
every nation of the western world. Before the revolution, 
manufacturing was in accord with the original meaning of 
the word, "made by hand," which method had existed almost 
unchanged from primitive times. Steam and mechanical in- 
vention substituted great power machines for human labor, 
established great factories in place of domestic industries, 
and immensely increased the output of industrial products. 
The names of Hargreaves, Arkwright, Crompton, Cartwright, 
Whitney and Watt should be as familiar to the school boy 
as the names of the great generals of history. In the division 
of labor, the increase of production, the change of workmen 
from country to city and the growth of manufacturing towns, 
the creation of great fortunes for employers and the appear- 
ance of a capitalist class with dependent laborers, the entrance 
of women and children into the factories, the broadening 
effects of population upon the working classes of this mass of 
population, the rise of trade-unionism, and withal the expan- 

(119) 



120 Democracy and the Great War 

sion of international transportation and commerce and its 
effect upon national policies of free-trade and protection, — 
in all these ways the Industrial Kevolution has exerted as 
profound an influence upon human life as any war or series 
of wars in history. 

The special significance of industrialism for the expression 
of democracy against war is the advance of the people to 
political power. The Industrial Eevolution in many of its 
essential ramifications of influence was democratic. As well 
in the creation of a capitalist class as in the massing of work- 
men in great industrial centers, the movement tended to in- 
crease class consciousness and to define for each class a sense 
of its duties as well as rights. In city and factory the denser 
population of the industrial class gave opportunity for the 
rise and influence of leaders and paved the way directly to 
political expression. In almost every country the reconstruc- 
tion of economic and social arrangements in Europe was fol- 
lowed by a political revolution that looked towards democracy. 

Especially in England and France were the democratic 
effects noteworthy. In England the shifting of population 
from the rural south to the manufacturing north precipitated 
new problems of representation in Parliament. The north 
contained the greatest abundance of fuel, and there the great 
manufacturing towns grew up, drawing laborers from all 
parts of England but particularly from the south. The decay 
of the rural towns which still continued to send members 
to Parliament— from the so-called "rotten boroughs" controlled 
by the owners of the land — while the great new northern 
towns had no representation at all, led to the Reform Bill of 
1832, in which the new industrial class of laborers gained 
some measure of political recognition. In France as in Eng- 



Democracy and the Industrial Revolution 121 

land the evils of the new system, — the greed of employers, the 
excessive labor hours, the ill-treatment of women and children, 
and the unwholesome and dangerous labor conditions, — did 
much to increase that social unrest which came to political 
expression in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848. 

Austria and Germany lagged far behind both France and 
England in industrial development. In the Austrian Empire 
workmen drifted to Vienna, Prague, and Budapest, where 
they formed a social element bitterly opposed to autocratic 
government and ready to join in a political upheaval. In 
German}' industry and commerce silently but surely worked 
towards welding the German people into a nation. Steam 
transportation was inaugurated. In 1835 was built the first 
railroad. Telegraph lines, forming a network of new social 
bonds, laced the German states closer together. "With steam 
and electricity came machinery in the industries to further 
the development of mutual interdependence. Her statesmen 
as well as merchants began to feel more keenly the commer- 
cial disadvantages of the division of Germany into practically 
independent states. To overcome these, steps were initiated 
by Prussia's leaders to sweep away the customs lines and 
introduce uniform rates. Economic pressure was brought to 
bear and in 1834 the Zollverein, or tariff union was formed, 
composed of 17 states with a combined population of 23,000,000 
people. The marvelous effect of this union in welding to- 
gether German interests, stronger even than any political 
ties up to this time, was the forerunner of definite political 
union. But with her large agricultural interests and few 
large cities Germany did not then feel the pressure for change 
in manufacturing methods which came after the war with 
Austria and particularly after the war with France. Since 



122 Democracy and the Great War 

that time her industrial development has increased by leaps 
and bounds. 

A characteristic of the new industrialism has been the 
awakening of new moral judgments respecting war. For the 
masses in all civilized lands the great discoveries and inven- 
tions have altered fundamentally the conditions of life, and in 
such a complex manner that war has become a terrific instru- 
ment of inequity and oppression. Labor has always been the 
enemy of war. Labor is constructive, war destructive, but 
especially so in modern industrial life. The effect of war 
upon modern industry is chaos. To shape into an instrument 
of social justice and peace the new industrial life imposed by 
modern science upon labor is the great end of the labor move- 
ments of our day. 



XI 

Socialism and the War 

Out of this new industrialism have grown the ethical aspira- 
tions and enthusiasms of socialism. In its broader sense, as 
one expression of democracy, socialism is an attempt to extend 
the Christian principle of equality from the spiritual world 
to social and economic conditions. As Christianity makes 
all men equal before God, socialism would make them equitable 
sharers in the products of their toil. Socialism aims at the 
democratization of industry. The alliance of modern industry 
and science at first seemed to promise that with the increase 
of man's powers of production all people might be easily and 
adequately fed, clothed and sheltered, but it turned out that 
the poverty of the workers continued and in places even grew 
worse. The trouble was observed to be that the alliance of 
industry and science was accompanied by the divorce of in- 
dustry and ethics. It became clear to many that moral con- 
duct, the obligations of the strong to the weak, could not in 
a civilized society be dispensed with between the employer and 
the employed. Disregard of these obligations had resulted in 
the prevalence of strikes, riots, panics, and class hatred. It 
was but a step from the democratic theory of legal and political 
equality to the idea of socializing and moralizing the industrial 
processes by legislation and state control. With the program 
of the socialists to achieve these ends we are not here con- 
cerned, nor with the wild and mistaken notions that well- 
meaning people have evolved to carry on the "war on poverty." 
It is intended only to point out the essentially Christian 

(123) 



124 Democracy and the Great War 

foundation of the general movement, its natural correlation 
with democracy, and its inevitable influence in producing 
among the laborers of the world a repugnance to war. 

The relation of socialism to democracy is seen in the new 
interest in social reform which came in turn with the French 
Revolution and the Revolution of 1848. Mankind of course 
has dreamed of "a civilization without poverty, idleness or 
ugliness" from before the days of Plato's Republic, Following 
the French Revolution came those programs of reform asso- 
ciated with the names of Saint-Simon and Fourier. Saint- 
Simon, in his book The New Christianity is the founder of 
French socialism, the basis of which was the slogan of the 
Revolution, "the brotherhood of man." Fourier's program 
had many sympathizers in America, among them Horace 
Greeley and Nathaniel Hawthorne, the latter connected with 
the famous Brook Farm experiment in Massachusetts. Robert 
Owen, a successful English manufacturer and friend of the 
poor, was influenced by Fourier and became the founder of 
English socialism; it is probably to Owen that we owe the 
word "socialism." He came to the United States to defend 
his plan before the American Congress. "The New Harmony 
Colony" founded in the State of Indiana at about that time 
was based upon his teachings. These leaders are known as 
the "Utopian" socialists, who relied upon the intrinsic appeal 
of a beautiful theory of harmony and plenty without taking 
into account the complexity and inertia of human nature on 
the one hand and the positive opposition of the privileged 
classes on the other. 

With the Revolution of 1848 came a new movement, the 
attempt to organize the great mass of workingmen into a 
political party for the purpose of getting control of the gov- 



Socialism and the War 125 

eminent and forcing it to forward their plans. This move- 
ment began in Germany under the leadership of Karl Marx. 
On the eve of the Revolution he issued the Communist Mani- 
festo, a formulation of the principles of the new socialism, 
which became the platform of organized political socialism 
in every country and eventually the creed of a great inter- 
national political movement against autocracy, militarism, 
and war. Karl Marx, educated in the University of Bonn, in- 
tended to become a university professor, but his boldness and 
radical teachings barred him, and he went into journalism. 
The vigor of his attacks on the Prussian Government led to 
the suppression of his paper. Continued persecution drove 
him out of Germany and after many wanderings he settled 
in London where he studied and wrote during the remainder 
of his life. At one time he was a correspondent of the New 
York Tribune. His work on "Capital" is sometimes called 
''the workingman's Bible" and has been translated into all 
the continental languages. While from its program have been 
derived some of the worst elements of class hatred and class 
war, yet, on the whole, the so-called "social democratic parties" 
founded upon its teachings have powerfully voiced the long- 
ings of the people and tended towards a greater measure of 
political freedom. 

Socialism comparatively early became an international move- 
ment. In 1864 was organized the International Association 
of Workingmen in London with Karl Marx as leader. It 
gained such headway as to frighten thoroughly the European 
autocracies ; but extreme radicalism caused its collapse in 1876. 
Other radical international movements, such as the Industrial 
Workers of the World, have brought great discredit upon the 
whole movement by their appeals to class hatred and violence. 



126 Democracy and the Great War 

The international aspect, however, is significant of labor's 
growing consciousness of world unit3^ In the monarchies of 
Europe it was predicted that war could not be entered upon 
in the face of this opposition of labor. The loyalty of labor 
in America in the Great War against autocracy is inspired 
partly by the hope and belief that by a supreme effort demo- 
cracy may at last destroy autocracy, and with it the power of 
the ruling classes to involve nations in war. 

The political organization of socialism has been strongest 
in those countries where the industrial classes have least in- 
fluence, notably in Germany. In 1863 the German Working- 
men's Association was formed to work for universal male suf- 
frage. In 1869 was formed the Social Democratic Labor 
Party. The tremendous industrial development in Germany 
following the Franco-Prussian War massed the people and 
built up great industrial centers as in England, and the new 
industrial population voiced its demands through political 
channels in no uncertain terms. In the elections of 1875 for 
the Keichstag the German Socialists polled 340,000 votes. So 
powerful did the Socialists become that Bismarck in alarm 
sought by a combination of repressive legislation and relief 
measures to undermine the movement. By repressive meas- 
ures he temporarily disorganized their political power as a 
national party, but on the other hand he introduced a number 
of reforms upon the theory, as he said, of reviving the old 
paternal policy of the House of Hohenzollern "to care for 
its children." In 1884 he said, "Give the workingman the 
right to work as long as he is healthy, assure him care when 
he is sickj and maintenance when he is old," and then, "the 
Socialists will sing their siren song in vain." Laws were made 
granting insurance for accidents, sickness, and old age. But 
no substantial additions to these laws have been made in Ger- 



Socialism and the War 127 

many since 1889. The Socialists despise these laws as "fear- 
inspired poor-law legislation" and the socialist influence has 
grown steadily. At the outbreak of the war the Social Demo- 
crats were credited with 110 members out of the 397 members 
in the Reichstag. 

But as against the c itside world, the position of the Ger- 
man socialists during the present war may be taken as char- 
acteristic of an overwhelming majority of the Gcman people. 
They have been loyal to the Government. They had shown 
before the war what was to be expected. In June, 1913, they 
voted with the rest of the Reichstag the exorbitant military 
law of that j^ear. Their leading party paper, the Yorivaerts, 
pronounced the Kaiser "a sincere partisan of the peace of the 
peoples," and denounced "the imperialism of France, the greed 
of England, and the barbarism of Russia." In 1914 the Social- 
ists, with exception of Karl Liebknecht who was later im- 
prisoned for his opposition to the war, no protests were made 
by the Socialists against the atrocities in Belgium and north- 
ern France. What is further to be expected is indicated in 
these words of a prominent leader (Paul Hirsch) justifying 
the position of the party in voting the 1914 war measures : 

"It is certain that by voting these credits we have shown 
the Government a special mark of our confidence, which the 
party certainly could not have extended to it in normal times. 
But at such a moment as this, when national unity is at stake, 
it was quite impossible for anyone who is influenced by prac- 
tical rather than tactical considerations to com .lit himself, 
by rejecting their proposals, to a vote of no-confidence in the 
Government on the ground of their internal policy. By 
adopting such an attitude as this, the socialist group 
in the Prussian Chamber would not merely have dealt 
the severest blow to the interests of labor, but would 



128 Democracy and the Great War 

have weakened the Fatherland in the face of its enemies. 
High as we place the idea of international solidarity, we 
place still higher the good of our own country, the 
economic aggrandizement of our people. The greater our 
economic power as a nation, the stronger also will be the foun- 
dations of the modern labor movement. It is the guarantee 
of civilization in the future. The most dangerous of our 
adversaries, England, counts on the economic starvation of 
Germany. This calculation will be upset. It will beat and 
break against the solid common sense of the nation, which does 
not hesitate, when the country's salvation is at stake, to rise 
above party questions, nor to shrink from the bitterest sacri- 
fices." 

Again, in the speech of a socialist deputy (Wolfgang Heine) 
in 1915, which was applauded and quoted widely in Germany, 
we read: "Before peace can be seriously thought of, there 
should be further enlightenment on the situation of the war. 
We have every confidence in the German armies and the na- 
tion at war: its achievements command our respect and ad- 
miration. Out there, there is not one soldier who would not 
welcome peace as soon as possible, and yet each man does his 
duty with heroism and sacrifice. The Army and the People 
are one, and we, too, should follow the example set by our 
fighting heroes. 

"Then, too, our hopes of peace may confidently repose in 
the will for peace of our peace-loving Emperor. Everyone 
knows that twice in the last few years he has given proof of 
it at a critical time, twice his personal intervention has, so 
to speak, come to the rescue of Peace. 

"The working classes are attached to the nation in the 
closest possible way by their desire to share in the nation's 
spiritual culture and economic solidarity, unshakable despite 



Socialism and the War 129 

all the conflicts of class interests. If German industry were 
destroyed, the workers would suffer like their employers, even 
more indeed, than the latter. The workman is bound also 
to the state in spite of all its imperfections and conflicting in- 
terests. The workman is a part of the German people and at 
this time of war he feels more than ever that his country's 
destiny is his own." 

When, after the battles of the Marne, Verdun, and the 
Somme, it began to dawn upon Germany, or upon the German 
Socialists, that victory with annexations and indemnities had 
become impossible, the Socialists talked of peace on the basis 
of "no annexations, and no indemnities." This plea has had 
a notable effect upon Russia ; it has hardly aided the cause of 
democracy. It appears that the intense nationalism and the 
covert imperialistic spirit of the German Socialists would ac- 
cept "the economic aggrandizement of our people" at the ex- 
pense of other nations. England, the mother of democracies, 
is "the most dangerous of our adversaries." Thus, when it 
comes to an issue of the German laborer as against the labor- 
ers of other nations, the German Socialists stand solid with 
the Imperial German Government. Some degree of democra- 
tization of the Government may come after the war, but it 
seems fairly certain that the elements of any extensive revolu- 
tion during the war are absent. 
17 



XII 

The Prussianized Imperial German Government 

How small the political power of the German people really 
is becomes clear when we realize the character and overwhelm- 
ing power of Prussia. The whole imperial system is essential- 
ly ^ Prussian. The present constitution is the work of 
Bismarck who merely continued the constitution of the 
North German Confederation, slightly modified to suit the 
South German states. In the quasi-democratic Reichstag the 
people of the Empire have little more power than the people 
of Prussia have in the Prussian Landtag. In Berlin, in elec- 
tions to the Landtag, a rich man's vote counts for that of fifty 
poor men ; two-thirds of the representatives are elected by the 
wealthiest one-sixth of the voters. The constitution of Prus- 
sia, granted in 1850, embodies the reactionary spirit against 
the Revolution of 1848. It was intended to satisfy the popular 
demand for universal sufi'rage and to nullify it in practice. 
It practicaly excludes the poorer classes from representation. 
Almost the entire power in what we would call the House of 
Representatives stands for the interests of property. Above 
this house, and with power of veto on its action, the House of 
Lords represents the rights of blood, of property, and of official 
authoritJ^ The privilege of membership is conferred by the 
Crown. This upper house stands for loyalty to the King, who 
rules by "Divine right." Democracy is truly less than a 
shadow in Prussia. 

It is little less than a shadow in the Empire. Prussia is the 
dominating power in the Imperial Government. In drawing 

(130) 



The Prussianized Imperial German Government 131 

up the Imperial constitution the one idea that dominated 
Bismarck was to make Prussia supreme. Tlie King of Prussia 
is by hereditary right the Emperor of Germany, and as such 
can not be impeached. The entire executive power is in his 
hands through his appointment of the Imperial Chancellor 
who is responsible only to the Emperor, by whom alone he can 
be removed. The Emperor has almost absolute control over 
foreign relations. He may even declare war of his own will 
in case of alleged attack by a foreign country, as he did in 
ion, without consulting any other department of the Govern- 
ment. The popular branch, the Keichstag, is never consulted 
on the question of declaring war — the exact opposite of the 
American practice in which war is declared by Congress. The 
initiation of a German war therefore can never be made by the 
people, but only by the Emperor, that is, by the King of 
Prussia. Ver}^ few cases could arise in which the Emperor 
could not allege a threatened attack by the enemy and thus 
avoid the constitutional need of consulting the Bundesrath. 
In times of peace he has practically a controlling influence in 
the Bundesrath, which in turn has an absolute veto upon the 
Reichstag. Absolute monarch of Prussia, he is in practice an 
absolute monarch in the Empire. The sentiment of the present 
Kaiser is well known. ^'The will of the king is the supreme 
law," he once wrote in the Visitor's Book in the Town Hall 
of Munich. The French Revolution, he charged in an address 
to a body of history teachers, "was an unmitigated crime 
against God and man." To a group of soldiers in 1891 he 
said, "You are now my soldiers. You have given yourselves 
to me, body and soul. There is now but one enemy for you, 
and that is my enemy. In these times of socialistic intrigue, 
it may happen that I shall order you to fire upon your brothers 
or fathers. God save us from it ! But in such a case you are 



132 Democracy and the Great War 

bound to obey me without a murmur !'' Not long afterward, 
in a carefully prepared address to the people he set forth his 
position as "vice-regent of God" upon earth. 

From the viewpoint of "Who rules Germany" it is scarcely 
necessary to examine the other departments of the Imperial 
Government. Nominally, sovereignty is vested in the Bundes- 
rath, an administrative council of delegates appointed by the 
sovereigns of the 25 states of the Empire. In this body Prussia 
has about one-third of the votes. The Imperial Chancellor 
presides ex-ofiftcio at its meetings. It has practically the sole 
initiative in legislation, and its power of absolute veto upon 
the Reichstag makes it exceedingly improbable that any meas- 
ure not submitted to that body by the Bundesrath would re- 
ceive its approval. An amendment is made in the same way 
as an ordinary law. As only fourteen negative votes in the 
Bundesrath are sufficient to defeat an amendment to the con- 
stitution, Prussia's seventeen votes can always prevent a 
change. In the Reichstag Prussia has about two-thirds of the 
votes, no reapportionment having been made since the constitu- 
tion was adopted. In practice the powers of the Reichstag 
are limited to considering Bundesrath measures. Its control 
over taxation is further limited in that a tax once voted is 
not merely an appropriation but a standing law. It has no 
control over the ministry, which is not obliged to resign, on 
vote of lack of confidence. The Reichstag serves the Emperor 
as a sort of index of popular feeling, and is thus a sort of gov- 
ernmental safety valve. Its debates, constituting an expres- 
sion of the people's desire, may at times suggest caution, as 
in Bismarck's dealings with the Socialists. In relation to war 
the people's power is nil. The German General Staff is sub- 
ject alone to the Emperor and is practically an organ of gov- 
ernment. On this point an emiriat German publicist, Prof. 



The Prussianized Imperial German Government 133 

Delbrueck, has recently declared: "The essence of our mon- 
archy resides in its relations with the army. Whoever knows 
our officers must know that they would never tolerate the gov- 
ernment of a minister of war issuing from parliament." 

This superstructure of absolutism is faithfully reflected in 
the Empire's internal arrangements. Militarism, police rule 
and paternalism are met everywhere — a memorial of the fact 
that the German Empire was made by violence. The con- 
temptuous and often brutal treatment of civilians by army 
officers is well known, and it is difficult to get redress from the 
courts against this privileged order. Indeed the courts afford 
small security for any personal rights as against the Military 
and the Government. The courts have no power to declare 
an unconstitutional law void. Trial by jury is limited. The 
Government can appeal to special courts without juries any 
case in which it is interested. Freedom of speech and of the 
press is guarded. Criticism of the Emperor is Use-majeste, 
subject to fine or imprisonment or both. Freedom of public 
assembly is strictly limited. To hold a public meeting per- 
mission must first be obtained from the police; even a picnic 
gathering can not be held otherwise except at the risk of fine 
or imprisonment. Indeed the police are omnipresent in pri- 
vate as well as public affairs. A policeman may be expected 
at any time to stroll into a man's house or garden just as a 
teacher might enter a classroom to see how things are going. 
Living in Germany suggests to an American or an Englishman 
the control of the nursery, but it is deeper than this gentle 
paternalism. This police system, with its secret service at- 
tachment, is the ever watchful eye of the %)vernment, the Ger- 
man spy-system, for it is only so that in these enlightened days 
autocracy can live and become strong. 

One may well ask how the German people can tolerate such 



134 Democracy and the Great War 

a Governmejit. The answer is to be found partly in the lull- 
ing influence of paternalistic legislation, partly in the molding 
of opinion through a state-controlled press, but mainly in the 
German system of education, a system which from the Ger- 
man universities down to the smallest school house is central- 
ized in the Imperial Government. In this system German 
school books and reading are most carefully guarded against 
liberal ideas ; and officialdom, from the Minister of Instruction 
down to the pettiest policeman is ever watchful of any viola- 
tions. 

The story is told by Hjalmar Boyesen Avho issued thirty 
years ago a life of the German poet Goethe, that on its publi- 
cation in German he received an invitation to call on the Min- 
ister of Instruction in Prussia : 

''This," said the minister, 'Sve feel is the best life of Goethe 
that has been written, but there are two chapters in it which 
dwell upon the liberal views of Goethe, which we all regret, 
which he would never hold today, which have no real part in 
his life as a whole. If you will take this volume, leave out 
these chapters, or rewrite them so they are not a republican 
propaganda, I will put it into our schools wherever there is 
a course in literature. All the other units of the Empire will 
follow, and Austria will probably do the same." 

Boyesen says, ''I looked at him as he sat there in his undress 
uniform and I realized I was face to face with the military 
power of a great country stifling freedom, and I told him as 
politely as I could that nothing would induce me to change 
those chai^ters. As it was copyrighted in Germany and by 
other countries of ^e Geneva Convention, I knew that the 
minister could not alter it; but the dream of royalties which 
would have meant to me a competence for life, if this book were 



The Prussianized Imperial German Government 135 

once made a text-book, which came before me when I saw my 
volume in his hand, vanished." 

In relation to foreign nations, two generations of the boys 
and girls of Germany have been taught that the German social 
and political organization is the best in the world. As adults 
they have come to believe in the Divine right of the Emperor 
to rule, and that, at least in relation to other nations, the Ger- 
man Government can do no wrong. They have been taught 
that the German mind and character are the highest in the 
world, and that Germany is the center of God's plan for the 
human race. The logical conclusion is, that it is the duty of 
Germany, with God's aid, to impress these qualities upon the 
world, by war if necessary, or even by the extermination of 
inferior and obstinate peoples, to make room for Germans. 
This is the meaning of "Deutchland Ueber Alles," as against 
the ideals of the rest of the world. It is clear that the only 
way to break the logic of this position is to discredit the 
premise, namely, that God is with the German army. 

The military support of the masses has been assured by the 
thorough militarization of the German mind and the nation- 
alization of the army. The Prussian system has been extended 
throughout the Empire, involving compulsory military train- 
ing for all males. They are required to enter the army at the 
age of tweiitj^, serve for two years in active service and five 
years following in the active reserves, and then twelve years 
more in the territorial reserve, making 19 years of continuous 
focusing of the mind upon military affairs. Few exemptions 
are allowed. Germany is thus, even in peace, an armed camp. 
At the outbreak of the present war she could put into the field 
instantly 4,000,000 veterans. 



XIII 
German Colonization and Imperialism 

This national egotism and militaristic spirit of the German 
people has lent itself easily to the world designs of Ger- 
man imperialism. Since the Franco-Prussian War the impe- 
rialistic spirit has rapidly taken hold of all the western nations 
Its growth has been spurred by the Industrial Kevdlution. 
Science in providing the means of rapid transportation and 
communication has made the oceans no longer barriers but 
bridges to distant lands. In Germany industrial production 
and wealth soon outgrew the national area. New markets 
and new spheres of investment were demanded. The profits 
of industry were supplied to large banking concerns in South 
America and elsewhere, and stock companies were formed to 
develop railroads and mines in backward countries which 
might be brought under German influence. Added to the de- 
mand for new markets and new spheres of investment came 
new demands from a surplus of population. Emigration in- 
creased, especially to the United States and South America. 
But Germany thereby aided, at her own expense, the develop- 
ment and enrichment of foreign countries. All of these causes 
greatly stimulated the German Government to the policy of 
imperialism, which should add to the Empire new lands to 
which her people might go and still remain under the German 
flag, and where new markets might be created and new re- 
sources developed for the enrichment of Germany. 

In this policy Germany came late upon the scene. The war- 
like spirit of the petty German princes had perpetuated feudal- 

(136) 



German Colonization and Imperialism 1S7 

ism and prevented the German peoples from attaining 
national existence until the rise of the overwhelming military 
power of Prussia. But the best parts of the earth had then 
been taken. The expansion of Europe had gone steadily for- 
ward since the explorations and discoveries of the fifteenth 
century. England, France, Holland, Spain, and Portugal 
were great colonizing powers in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Kussia, Italy, Belgium, and Denmark had entered the race, and 
in the 19th century the Uuited States and Japan were caught 
up in the imperialistic program. When Germany came upon 
the scene, she found North America occupied by England and 
the United States, and the rest of the New World guarded 
under the Monroe Doctrine. In northern Eurasia, Kussia ex- 
tended across two continents to the doors of Japan. In India, 
Australia, and New Zealand was England, and in the East 
Indies the English and the Dutch. In China was met the 
"national integrity" and "open-door" policies of the United 
States. Most of the islands of the sea were taken. Japan 
had saved herself by adopting the civilization of Europe. 
Turkey and Persia were under the protection of European 
states. Only in Africa was there yet an opportunity for Ger- 
many to colonize. 

It is noteworthy that the partition of Africa among the 
great powers of Europe, completed about 1893, should have 
been accomplished without war or serious collision and with- 
out Germany's claims arousing noteworthy suspicion. Ger- 
many's entering wedge was a cession of land to a Bremen mer- 
chant by the Hottentots in 1883 which became the nucleus of 
German Southwest Africa. In 1884 were acquired the Cam- 
eroons and Togo Land and about the same time beginnings 
were made in German East Africa. Almost all of Germany's 
colonial possessions were acquired while Bismarck was still 



138 Democracy and the Great War 

at the helm of the German ship of state. Bismarck however 
was not interested in the idea of foreign colonies. He re- 
garded such ventures as likely to embroil Germany with power- 
ful neighbors. He sought rather, in England's friendship and 
in the colonial rivalries of England and France, security 
against a French war to recover Alsace-Lorraine. On the east 
he sought to cultivate the friendship of Russia — a friendship 
damaged somewhat by the Congress of Berlin over which he 
presided (1878) and which prevented Russia from reaping the 
fruits of her war with Turkey. His aim was to strengthen 
Germany in Central Europe and to this end to build up a 
strong alliance with Austria. A colonial policy he saw would 
be the more likely to estrange both Russia and England in that 
a German navy would be essential to its success. Bismarck's 
colonizing activity was a concession to the ^'Industrials/' and 
measures the growing strength of the new industrial order in 
Germany. 



XIV 
The Kaiser and the Pan-Germanists 

It was a solemn moment for all Europe and for the world 
when in 1890 the present Kaiser, iWilliam II, dismissed Bis- 
marck and himself undertook to direct the destinies of Ger- 
many. The Kaiser had come to the Prussian throne in 1888, 
which made him de facto Emperor of Germany. He was then 
twenty-nine years old. His personality was a curious com- 
pound of the dreamer and the man of affairs. His mind was 
well informed, versatile, tireless, but impulsive and erratic, 
and impatient of control. He was given to grandiloquent 
spread-eagleism in his speeches, to the despair of his conserva- 
tive friends, but his fatal weakness w^as his over-weening self- 
confidence and egotism and his poor judgment of men. Bis- 
marck was his best friend. The great Chancellor had practi- 
cally made the German Empire and had guided it clear of the 
rocks for a quarter of a century. It is a sufficient commentarj^ 
on the Kaiser's unfitness that as a mere boy, and entirely new 
to the affairs of state, he should at the very outset of his career 
have dismissed such an experienced, tried and trustworthy 
counsellor. 

While some may question whether from 1890 the Kaiser 
planned deliberately world dominion by a world war, we can 
see now that from that time on the policies adopted by Ger- 
many were such as to lead inevitably in the direction of a 
world war. Great economic temptations were then before 
Germany. Some have the charity to think that the Kaiser 
was unconscious of the pressure which when once under way 

(139) 



140 1)bmocracy and the (jrbat War 

would bear him along until affairs should force themselves 
from his personal control and make him virtually a tool in 
stronger hands. Bismarck^s course for Germany at the Con- 
gress of Berlin was along the line of the free and independent 
development of nations as then existing. In direct opposition, 
the course chosen by the Kaiser involved the exploitation of 
all lands and peoples that could be brought under German 
control. His colonial policy, as Bismarck had foreseen, led 
to the building up of a strong navy, which^ as Bismarck said it 
would do, alienated England; especially when England saw 
it growing out of all proportion to the possible field for peace- 
able German colonial expansion. The Kaiser's second policy 
was supremacy in southeastern Europe. This spurred the 
rapid increase of the German army, alienating Kussia and 
further alarming France. Within a few years Germany had 
driven France and Eussia into an alliance, England and 
France began to patch up their colonial differences, and the 
Kaiser was suddenly face to face with three powerful enemies. 
If, as is claimed by German apologists, Germany was ^^ringed 
in" by enemies, she herself welded the ring by her policies. 
We may grant her need of new markets and colonies, as we 
might grant a farmer's need of more acres for a growing 
family. But as in the case of the farmer a remedial course 
which surrounds him with enemies is not to be commended, 
so much less can a civilized world endorse in Germany the 
methods of the burglar and the pirate to secure by foul means 
what can not be gotten by fair. 

The Kaiser was both leader and tool in this demand of 
the "Junkers" and the "Industrials" for the forcible expan- 
sion of Germany. The Junkers, who constituted the original 
landed proprietors of Prussia and were the mainspring of the 
military caste, had common interests with the newer aristoc- 



The Kaiser and the Pan-Germanists 141 

racy throughout the Empire — the new "Vons" of the land. 
The Industrials, that is the manufacturing and commercial 
classes, were in the view of this class "plebeians," the "nouveau 
riche," over whom at first they affected a supreme superiority. 
But discordant social elements tend to draw together under 
the influence of common economic interests. Following the 
example of the Kaiser, the Junkers invested in Krupp stock, 
in railway and steamship lines, and in the growing industries. 
They thus gathered into their hands ever more firmly the reins 
of autocratic power. The educated sons of bankers and manu- 
facturers gradually gained admission to the hitherto exclu- 
sive social, military and political circles of "well-born" junker- 
dom, for which they were willing to pay the price. In the 
Kaiser's sunlight were fused into one powerful unit the forces 
of the new Germany in support of German autocracy, if need 
be, against the world. 

The intended extent of this German expansion is more than 
hinted in the plans of the Pan-German League. It is signi- 
ficant that this league was formed in the year in which the 
Kaiser dismissed Bismarck. "I hope," said the Kaiser, "that 
it will be granted to our German Fatherland to become in 
the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative 
as once the Roman Empire was, and that just as in old times 
they said Civis Rornanus sum, one may in the future need only 
to say / am a German citizen!'^ The original ideal of the 
League was the inclusion of all peoples of Teutonic stock under 
the German flag. Germany should absorb Holland, Belgium, 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Austria, and the German parts 
of Russia. As the League gathered power its ideal widened. 
It was extended to include a dominant influence in the affairs 
of the great states and the annexation of all such lands and 
peoples as might afford economic advantage. Professor Tan- 



142 Democracy and the Great War 

nenberg's Gross-Deutschland (1911) is an expression of the 
territorial ideals of the League and the spirit in which they 
were to be realized. "A politics of fine sentiments/' he says, 
"is stupidity; humanitarian dreams are mere silliness. Char- 
ity begins at home. Politics is business. Right and wrong 
are ideas that have a necessary place only in the life of the 
private citizen. The German people is always right, because 
it is German and because it numbers eighty-seven millions. 
Our fathers have left us much still to do." Another writer 
(Ludwig Woltmann) said the year before the war: "The Ger- 
man race is called to bind the earth under its control, to ex- 
ploit the natural resources and physical powers of man, to use 
the passive races, that is, the Christian races who turn the 
other cheek, in subordinate capacity for the development of 
its Kultur." Bernhardi said (1911) : "Our next war will 
be fought for the highest interests of our country and of man- 
kind. This will invest it with importance in the world's his- 
tory. 'World power or downfall' will be our rallying cry." 
So fantastic was this ambition, so abhorrent to everything 
in the character of the American Republic, that Americans 
could not at first believe it existed as a practical program. 
The Great War has forced some of the events of the last quar- 
ter of a century into a new light. 



XV 
The Kaiser's Naval Policy 

One phase of the policy of this group was summed up in the 
words of the Kaiser delivered in 1899 at Stettin when he said, 
^'Our future lies upon the water." As high-priest of this pro- 
gram the Kaiser selected Chief Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, 
destined later to become famous or infamous as the promoter 
of Germany's ruthless submarine campaign. He became Min- 
ister of Marine in 1897 and his efficiency is shown in the in- 
crease of naval appropriations from 130,000,000 in 1898 to- 
1116,000,000 in 1913. He aimed to introduce into the navy the 
standard of efficiency which prevailed in the army. He became 
the inspiration of the Navy League, which was organized to 
mobilize the forces of public opinion in favor of German sea- 
power, and under whose branches in all parts of the Empire 
there were carried on a vigorous press campaign, public lec- 
tures, and excursions of school children to visit units of the 
fleet in behalf of the ever increasing naval appropriations. 
Of the pacific intentions of Germany's naval policy at this time 
we may judge in the light of the preamble of the naval bill of 
1900, which states that "Germany must possess a battle fleet so 
strong that a war with her would even for the greatest naval 
power be accompanied with such dangers as would render that 
power's position doubtful." 

This policy did not seem pacific to England, France, and 
Russia. In 1894 Germany had opened the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Canal (Kiel Canal) connecting the Baltic Sea with the North 
Sea through Schleswig at Kiel, enabling the German fleet to 

(143) 



144 Democracy and the Great War 

be used interchangeably in either body of water. Later the 
canal was enlarged to admit Germany's larger war ships. 
By this canal Germany saved some two-hundred miles of water 
passage by the old route around the north of Denmark. 

The near collapse of Kussia in the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-5 which revealed an unsuspected degree of weakness in 
the Russian army, made Germany feel safe to divert expendi- 
tures from the army to the navy. A tremendous impulse was 
given to naval construction by the new navy bill of 1906, 
against which the leader of the Social Democrats, Herr Bebel, 
protested vigorously in the Reichstag: "I am unable to see," 
he said, "what other object this agitation could have than to 
arm for a war against England." He pointed out that a Ger- 
man navy was not required to fight Russia, as Russia would 
be paralyzed for many years by the war with Japan. This 
appropriation, which was to cover a period of twelve years, 
amounted to over |890,000,000, and in 1908, through the efforts 
of the Navy League which had passed the million mark in 
membership, another bill was voted to accelerate naval con- 
struction. 

Ostensibly these things were all done in the interests of 
German commerce. But if Germany valued the world's peace 
the inexpediency of such a policy should have given her pause. 
The size of the German navy could not fail of challenging com- 
parison with that of England, in view of relative commercial 
needs. Germany's colonial interests were insignificant com- 
pared with England's. Her foreign commerce was only 
about three-fourths of England's and was carried on almost 
entirely by land routes. On the other hand, almost the whole 
of British commerce depended on the protection of the British 
navy. On this basis, the proper ratio of naval strength should 
have been 3 : 8 instead of 5 ; 8. Again, the British homeland 



The Kaiser's Naval Policy 145 

was an island, for which imports and naval defense were in- 
dispensable, whereas Germany could in a crisis be almost self- 
supporting. 

On the theory that Germany was solicitous of the peace of 
Europe, why this great haste in German naval construction, 
in face of the certain alarm it would cause to neighboring 
powers and at the almost certain risk of endangering her best 
markets, namely, Great Britain, Russia and the United States? 
England would naturally regard Germany's action as a direct 
challenge to her naval supremacy. Why should Germany 
force England into a race in naval armament at a time when 
England was least inclined to increase her navy? England 
had long held aloof from alliance with the nations of the Con- 
tinent; indeed it was in this policy that the phrase "grand 
isolation" originated; why should Germany now drive her by 
direct antagonism into alliance with France and Russia? The 
answer is suggested in the words of Heinrich von Treitschke, 
who as Professor of history in the University of Berlin since 
1874, and who, as one of whom the Kaiser speaks as "our 
national historian," might well speak for the German Govern- 
ment : "If our Empire has the courage to follow an independ- 
ent colonial policy with determination, a collision of our in- 
terests with those of ^England is inevitable. It is natural and 
logical that the new Great Power in Central Europe should be 
compelled to settle affairs with all Great Powers. . . The last 
settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be the 
lengthiest and the most difficult." 

In the German navy a favorite toast was "Der Tag" (the 
day when war should come), and when w^ar did come, a leading 
German Socialist, Maximilian Harden, wrote: "Not as weak- 
willed blunderers have we undertaken the fearful risk of this 
war. We wanted it ; because we had to wish it and could wish 
19 



146 Democracy and the Great War 

it. May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose pleas 
for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty expe- 
rience. We do not stand, and shall not place ourselves, before 
the court of Europe . . . Germany strikes. If it conquers 
new realms for its genius, the priesthood of all the gods will 
sing songs of praise to the good war . . . We are waging 
this war not in order to punish those who have sinned, nor 
in order to free enslaved peoples, and thereafter to comfort 
ourselves with the unselfish and useless consciousness of our 
own righteousness. We wage it from the lofty point of view and 
with the conviction that Germany, as a result of her achieve- 
ments, and in proportion to them, is justified in asking, and 
must obtain wider room on earth for development and for work- 
ing out the possibilities that are in her. The powers from whom 
she forced her ascendancy, in spite of themselves, still live, and 
some of them have recovered from the weakening she gave them. 

. . Now strikes the hour of Germany's rising power . . 
To be unassailable — to exchange the soul of a Viking for that of 
a New Yorker, that of the quick pike for that of the lazy carp 
whose fat back grows moss-covered in a dangerless pond — that 
must never become the wish of a German !" 



XVI 
Germany in the Far East 

Germany's colonial policy in the Far East and her designs 
upon South America could not but have brought on ultimately 
a conflict with the United States independently of Europe. As 
far back as 1889 Germany began to test American feeling. An 
occasion arose in the Samoan Islands where the United States 
had been ceded a harbor in 1872. In that year a hostile Ger- 
man fleet of three vessels appeared off the islands ready for 
action if opportunity afforded. But the American press in- 
cluding the German-American press rang out a note of no un- 
certain tone, and Germany paused. 

In 1895 Germany's designs on China began. By cleverly 
manipulating the relations of Manchuria with Russia and 
Japan after the latter's war with China she prepared the 
ground for the Busso-Japanese War. In 1897 Germany ac- 
quired the long coveted ^'sphere of influence" in China, by 
seizing Kiao Chau in reprisal for the murder of two German 
missionaries. At the same time she secured other concessions, 
which amounted practically to a monopoly of the mining and 
railway privileges in the populous province of Shantung. The 
German method of intercourse with the Chinese was fpre- 
shadowed in the Kaiser's address to his troops in 1900 on the 
eve of the departure of a ^'punitive expedition" following the 
Boxer uprising, in which he said : — "As the Huns under their 
^ing, Attila, a thousand years ago, made a name for them- 
selves which is still mighty in tradition and story, so may the 
name of German in China be kept alive through you in such 

(147) 



148 Democracy and the Great War 

ivise that no Chinese will ever again attempt to look askance 
at a German." These troops were thus officially instructed 
to emulate and imitate the Huns, a policy which was faithfully 
carried out at Pau-ting-fu upon helpless women and children 
in a manner too horrible to tell, not exceeded by Germany even 
in Belgium. It has become clear that the recent attempt to 
restore the autocracy of the Manchu dynasty was financed by 
Germany. If the policy of the United States for "national 
integrity" and the "open door" for China is to mean anything, 
the land hunger of Germany must be curbed so effectually that 
she will not appear again undqr her present government in the 
Far East. 

The year 1898 seems to have appealed to Germany as a year 
of special opportunity. The democracy of the United States 
was threatening to loosen the foothold of autocracy in the 
Pacific. A German fleet was on the ground immediately after 
Dewey took Manilla. So were the fleets of several other 
nations, but the only fleet there that did not salute the Ameri- 
can flag was the German fleet. It consisted of five men-of-war, 
besides a transport with 1400 extra men. ,When Admiral 
Dewey mildly suggested that this force was disproportionate 
to the German interests in the Philippines the German com- 
mander replied, "I am here by order of the Kaiser, Sir." And 
he continued to pay little or no regard to international or 
naval etiquette such as distinguished the other nations thei^ 
represented. Admiral Dewey had established a blockade. The 
German commander, disregarding it, proceeded to land sup- 
plies. Thereupon Dewey sent his flag lieutenant with, his 
compliments to ask the meaning of "this extraordinary dis- 
regard of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse." Mean- 
time the English fleet under Admiral Chichester anchored 
between the two. The Germans sent to Dewey a notably co-r- 



Germany in the Far East 149 

dial reply. The German fleet undoubtedly was under instruc- 
tions from the Kaiser, but the time was seen to be not yet 
ripe. 

It is now believed that if America had not taken possession 
of the Philippines after the Spanish War the Germans would 
have tried to do so, in which case England and Japan would 
have intervened to prevent it. It is possible that America's 
action at that time prevented what might have developed into 
a world war. As it was, Germany kept the United States 
from getting too much of the group containing the island of 
Guam, and secured for herself the Caroline and Ladrone is- 
lands by purchase from Spain. 



XVII 
Germany's Menace to America 

German intrigue in South America first came actively to the 
surface during the administration of President Roosevelt. 
A German fleet threatened to take possession of a coveted 
Venezuelan port in satisfaction of alleged claims. President 
Roosevelt sent an ultimatum to the commander giving him 
forty-eight hours in which to submit his claims to arbitration. 
The American fleet was held in readiness to move. Trouble 
was averted. Commenting upon the superiority of the German 
colonies in South America over all other peoples on that con- 
tinent and the helplessness of the rest, Prof. Otto Tannenberg 
writes: "In these circumstances is it not wonderful that the 
German people have not long since decided to take possession 
of this territory ? For the people of the republics which have 
inherited the former domains of Spain and Portugal, it would 
be altogether a blessing to become subject to German power. 
They will soon be reconciled to our rule and be proud of the 
German name.'' Brazil realized this danger and her fleet 
acts with the Allies. Cuba, where German money recently 
fomented revolution, has taken a similar step. Hayti and San 
Domingo, where German money had done the same, have fol- 
lowed. The people of almost every South American state are 
with the Allies, and are prevented from active participation 
only by autocratic and pro-German influences in their govern- 
ments. 

In Mexican relations the "Zimmermann note" is still fresh 
in the minds of all. At the very moment in which Germany 

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Germany^s Menace to America 151 

was professing friendship with the United States this note was 
passed, dated Jan. 19, 1917, from the Grerman Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs (Zimmermann) to the German 
minister in Mexico : 

"On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine war- 
fare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to en- 
deavor to keep neutral the United States of America. 

"If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on 
the following basis with Mexico. 

"That we shall make war together and together make peace. 
We shall give general financial support and it is understood 
that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, 
Texas and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement. 

"You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of 
the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that 
there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and 
suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, 
should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once 
to this plan; at the same time, offer to mediate between Ger- 
many and Japan. 

"Pkase call to the attention of the President of Mexico that 
the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises 
to compel England to make peace in a few months." 

(Signed) "Zimmermann." 

Prussianized Germany, if she had the power, would attempt 
to strike a mortal blow at America at the earliest opportunity. 
The disposition to do so has long been there. "Der Tag," we 
now learn, was to have been about fifteen years after the 
Spanish-American War. Open avowal of this fact was made 
at the time of that war. Count von Goetzen communicated 
this to Major M. A. Bailey, a United States officer, in a conver- 
sation they had one day as they traveled together from Cuba 



152 Democracy and the Great War 

to America, which episode Major Bailey relates as follows: 
"Apropos of a discussion ... on the friction between 
Admiral Dewey and the German Admiral at Manila, von 
Goetzen said to me : 

" 'I will tell you something which you had better make a 
note of. I am not afraid to tell you this because if you do 
speak of it, no one would believe you and everybody will laugh 
at you. 

" 'About fifteen years from now my country will start her 
great war. She will be in Paris in about two months after 
the commencement of hostilities. Her move on Paris will be 
but a step to her real object — the crushing of England. Every- 
thing will move like clockwork. We will be prepared and 
others will not be prepared. I speak of this because of the 
connection which it will have with your own country. 

" 'Some months after we finish our work in Europe, we will 
take New York, and probably Washington, and hold them for 
some time. We av'II put your country in its place with 
reference to Germany. We do not purpose to take any of your 
territory, but w^e do intend to take a billion or more dollars 
from New York and other places. The Monroe Doctrine will 
be taken charge of by us, as we will then have put you in your 
place, and we will take charge of South America as far as we 
want to.' '^ 

In 1901 Baron von Edelsheim wrote in his book. Operations 
Upon the Sea : ''The fact that one or two of her provinces are 
occupied by invaders would not alone move the Americans to 
sue for peace. To accomplish this end, the invaders would 
have to inflict real material damage by injuring the whole 
country through the successful seizure of many of the Atlan- 
tic ports, in which the threads of the entire wealth of the 
nation meet. It should be so managed that a line of land 



Germany^s Menace to America 153 

operations Avould be in close juncture with the fleet, through 
which we would be in a position to seize in a short time many 
of these important and rich cities, to interrupt their means 
of supply, disorganize all governmental affairs, assume the 
control of all useful buildings, confiscate all war-and-transport- 
supplies, and lastly to impose heavy indemnities . . . A ^> a 
matter of fact, Germany is the only great Power which is in 
a position to conquer the United States." 

In 1903 Weilhelm Huebbe-Schleiden wrote in a prominent 
German periodical : ^'It is the duty of every one who loves 
languages to see that the future language spoken in America 
shall be German. It is of the highest importance to keep up 
the German language in America, to establish German univer- 
sities, improve the schools, introduce German newspapers, 
and to see that at American universities German professors 
are more capable than their English-speaking colleagues, and 
make their influence felt unmistakably on thought, science, 
art, and literature. If Germans bear this in mind and help 
accordingly, the goal will eventually be reached. At the pre- 
sent moment the center of German intellectual activity is in 
Germany; in the remote future it will be in America.'' 

The fate of Americans in such an event is foreshadowed by 
Klaus Wagner, in his book entitled, Krieg, published in 1906 : 
"By the right of war the right of strange races to migrate 
into Germanic settlements will be taken away. By right of 
war the non-Germanic population in America and Great Aus- 
tralia must be settled ifi Africa." 

The ominous attitude of the Kaiser towards America, be- 
fore our entrance into the war and even while we were using 
our best endeavor to keep out of the war, is seen in his words 
to the American Ambassador, Mr. James W. Gerard, reported 
in Mr. Gerard's book. My Four Years in Germany. Mr. Gerard 



154 Democracy and the Great War 

writes : ^'The Emperor was standing ; so naturally I stood 
also; and according to his habit, which is quite Kooseveltian, 
he stood very close to me, and talked very earnestly . 
He showed, however, great bitterness against the United States 
and repeatedly said, 'America had better look out after this 
war;' and, 'I shall stand no nonsense from America after the 
war' ... I was so fearful in reporting the dangerous 
part of this interview, on account of the many spies not only 
in my own embassy, but also in the State Department, that 1 
sent but a very few words in a round-about way by courier 
direct to the President." 



XVIII 

"Mittel-Europa" 

The progress of Germany towards realizing sufficient power 
to make such a stroke may be traced in her steps to gain 
economic and military supremacy in Middle Europe and Wes- 
tern Asia. Between the British all-sea route to India and the 
Russian Trans-Sibei'ian railroad to the Pacific, Germany 
planned to build a great German railway from the German 
North Sea and Baltic ports to the Persian Gulf. The strate- 
gic point on the line in Europe Avas to be Constantinople, where 
the road would cross into Asia. The pivot of the Asian link 
was to be Bagdad, the strategic center for the region between 
Constantinople and the Persian Gulf controlling the larger 
part of the trade of the Tigris-Euphrates valley and Arabia. A 
spur running down into Arabia was to connect Bagdad with 
the shores of the Red Sea. This would bring Germany within 
easy striking distance of British trade through the Suez Canal 
and would directly cross at Constantinople the Russian trade 
route through the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. For the 
consummation of this plan the co-operation of Turkey was 
needed, which was secured in 1902-03. 

The possibilities for Turkey of this great steel "corridor" 
from Berlin to the heart of Asia is stated by Karl Radek in the 
'Neue Zeit for June 2, 1911, as follows : ''The Bagdad Railway 
being a blow at the interests of English imperialism, Turkey 
could intrust its construction only to the German company, 
because she knew that Germany's army and navy stood be- 
hind her, which fact makes it appear to England and Russia 

(155) 



156 Democracy and the Great War - 

inadvisable to exert too sensitive a pressure upon Turkey.'^ 
A German professor (Prof. K, Mangelsdorf, 1911) points out 
the relation of the plan to England : *'To some extent indeed, 
Turkey's construction of a railway system is a threat to Eng- 
land, for it means that an attack on the most vulnerable part 
of the body of England's world empire, namely, Egypt, comes 
well within the bounds of possibility." Another professor 
(Dr. Paul Rohrbach) sums up Turkey's prospective gain in 
that "Egypt is a prize which for Turkey would be well worth 
the risk of taking sides with Germany in a war with England." 
So far as concerned the Slavic states of southeastern Europe, 
there was to be little ceremony. As the railway ran through 
Serbia, a perfect "corridor" involved the control of Serbia, 
and Germany entrusted this to Austria. If the Slav states 
were in the way, they must get out of the way. Says Profes- 
sor Tannenberg, in Gross-Deutschland (1911) : "Room! They 
must make room. The western and southern Slavs — or we ! 
Since we are the stronger, the choice will not be difl&cult." 
This scheme contemplated no regard whatever for the princi- 
ple of nationality. Racial feeling and the desire of the peoples 
involved were to have no consideration. A great imperial 
"Middle-Europe" was to be built up by German power much 
as the original states of the German Empire had been forced 
together by economic pressure and the Prussian army. The 
plan is set forth elaborately by Friedrich Naumann in his 
book entitled "Mittel-Europa," a brazen plan of violence to 
weld all of middle Europe, including the Balkan states and 
Turkey, Roumania, Greece, Holland, Belgium, and Norway and 
Sweden, with Germany and Austria at the center, into a vast 
economic unit to be exploited by Germany in the interests of 
German commerce and German militarism. The possession 
of Belgium and Holland was to make more easy the attack 



"MITTEL-EUROPA^^ 157 

on British supremacy in the English Channel and to sever 
England from France. Germany would thus seize England 
by vital parts both at the Channel and the Suez Canal. 

Germany's preparation for the prosecution of this design 
consisted essentially in the strengthening of the Triple 
Alliance, the extension of her economic control over Turkey, 
and the increase of her army and navy. 



XIX 
The Triple Alliance 

The Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria and Italy 
was begun in the days of Bismarck, and had reference not to 
"Mittel-Europa" but to safe-guarding Germany against an at- 
tempt by France to recover Alsace and Lorraine. It is said 
that Bismarck was opposed to taking these provinces from 
France in 1871, being far-sighted enough to see the danger of 
thus needlessly sowing the seeds of hatred between the German 
and French peoples. But if so, forces which he could not con- 
trol at that time prevented, and he certainly set about to 
guard against the consequences. A part of his plan was to 
secure the favor of Kussia. Had it not been for Russia's 
attitude it is well known that he would have attacked France 
again, in 1875, further to crush her. He also courted the 
friendship of Austria. But the chronic discord in the rela- 
tions between Russia and Austria compelled him finally to 
choose between them, which was the more easy after the Con- 
gress of Berlin (1878) in which Bismarck's position offended 
Russia. In 1879 he concluded a defensive treaty of alliance 
with Austria. In 1882 Italy, offended with France for an- 
nexing Tunis, in northern Africa (1881), joined Germany and 
Austria, making the Triple Alliance. 

On Italy, however, the Alliance had a weak hold. Italy 
harbored a traditional and bitter hatred against Austria for 
reasons similar to those for which France hated Germany. 
Against Austria Italy had been an ally of France in 1859, and 
of Prussia in the war with Austria in 1866. When the present 

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The Triple Alliance 159 

war broke out in 1914 it was therefore natural that Italy, re- 
garding the Triple Alliance as defensive only, and Germany 
and Austria as the attacking parties, refused to join them and 
became a firm adherent to the cause of the Allies. Germany 
and iVustria remained as one. There are at present indica- 
tions that the principle of nationality may assert itself in 
Austria and break up the Teutonic Alliance. 

The most powerful member of the Triple Alliance was Ger- 
many, whose army had been for fifty years the strongest in 
Europe. The German army has been literally consecrated by 
the German people who with unreasoning devotion have rallied 
to its support. ''The army, right or wrong" is the principle 
which has been inculcated in the German schools. This venera- 
tion has made the German people exceedingly sensitive to criti- 
cism directed against the army. They regard it as criticism 
of the German nation. They go quite to the extreme of hold- 
ing that the army is the nation. A character of sanctity is 
given to it as a result of the thorough nationalization of the 
a.rmj through long years of compulsory military service of 
every male citizen. Their spirit was shown in 1913, when at 
a cost of 1300,000,000 the army was suddenly put practically 
on a war footing. The reason given for this was the menace 
of Panslavism by the newly made victories of the Slav states 
in the Balkan wars just ending. The spirit of unity in which 
the Reichstag voted this staggering increase is a most ominous 
index of the militaristic spirit of the German people. Proba- 
bly in no constitutional nation of the world could such a 
measure have been passed with no more tangible danger in 
view than confronted Germany at that time. 



XX 

Germany in SoutheasternvEurope 

The immediate incentive which spurred the German Govern- 
ment in southeastern Europe was to relieve Turkey, which had 
recently received a severe blow as a result of the Slav victories 
in the Balkan wars. This blow menaced Germany's great 
scheme of "Mittel-Europa" and the Bagdad Railway. More- 
over the Slav movement was democratic and the great auto- 
cratic enemy of democracy and all}^ of Germany, the Ottoman 
Empire, must be helped to crush out any such movement. 
Again there was Russia, against which the Turks must be 
supported as an effective barrier at Constantinople. There 
was Austria to support in her claims against the Slavs. There 
were the economic interests of German capitalists at stake in 
Turkey. If adverse forces should gain headway, the dream 
of a conquered Britain and the world power of Germany would 
be in grave danger. 

The approximate starting point of Germany's influence and 
power in southeastern Europe was in 1880 when Germany dis- 
placed England as the friend of Turkey. Up to that time Eng- 
land had supported Turkey against Russia, fearing the latter's 
influence in the Mediterranean and her power in case she 
should get control of the Dardanelles. In 1880 Gladstone be- 
came prime minister of England as leader of the Liberals. 
He had been aroused to bitter protest against the Turks by the 
"Bulgarian atrocities" in 187G, in which whole villages of 
Christian peoples in the Ottoman Empire had been wiped 
out in cold blood. In impassioned appeals he had urged at 

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Germany in Southeastern Europe 161 

that time that England break her alliance with the "unspeak- 
able Turk." These atrocities had precipitated the Russo-Turk- 
ish War, in which Russia had driven Turkey out of Europe ; but 
England under Lord Beaconsfield at the Congress of Berlin 
had led in bolstering Turkey against Russia. Bismarck, who 
had presided at that Congress, had acted with Austria and 
England. Xow that the Gladstone ministry, out of pure 
humanitarian incentive, had reversed England's policy, Bis- 
marck stepped into England's place as Turkey's chief support. 

One of the first indications of German influence in Turkey 
was the reorganization of the Turkish army under German 
management. Under General von der Goltz (1883-1895) the 
Turks were trained in the military school of Prussia. The 
army was largely officered by Germans, and young Turkish 
officers were sent to Germany for their technical military 
education. 

Soon the German financial system began to take hold. In 
1888 the Kaiser on his accession to the throne visited Constan- 
tinople, preliminary to the investment of German capital. In 
that year the Deutsche Bank, one of the most powerful of the 
German financial houses, took over a Turkish railroad which 
ran from a point opi)Osite Constantinople out into Asia Minor, 
and presently an extension of privilege was secured, the prec- 
edent- for other concessions which followed. 

Ten years later the Kaiser visited Jerusalem and Damascus, 
where in two most absurd and romantic addresses he furnished 
a superb example of German duplicity that aroused wide- 
spread suspicion and criticism. The address at Jerusalem 
was concluded with these words : "From Jerusalem came the 
light, in the splendor of which the German nation has become 
great and glorious, and what the Germanic peoples have be- 
come, they become under the banner of the Cross, the emblem 

21 



162 Democracy and the Great War 

of self-sacrificing Christian charity. As nearly two thousand 
years ago, so there shall today ring out from Jerusalem the 
cry voicing the ardent hope of all, 'Peace on Earth !' " A few 
days later he declared at Damascus, "The Sultan and three 
hundred million Mohammedans who, scattered over all parts 
of the earth, venerate him as their Caliph, can ever rely upon 
the friendship of the German Emperor." This was only two 
years after Turkey had shocked the world by the Armenian 
massacres of 1896. The year before this had occured the vic- 
tory of the Turks over Greece of which country the queen was 
the Kaiser's sister. Of these Mohammendans who were to 
''rejy upon the friendship of the German Emperor," seventy- 
five million were subjects of Great Britain in India, and other 
millions were subjects of France. The main point in this 
oratory was that a convenient ''holy war" might be declared 
by England's Mohammedan subjects in India in case of a con- 
flict with England, and that the Mohammedans in the Otto- 
man Empire held the most strategic points in the world for 
international trade, desired by the Germans. 

It will be remembered it was in the year of the Kaiser's 
Damascus speech that the Germans seized Kiao Chau in China 
and passed the Navy Law of 1898 inaugurating a new era in 
German naval construction. 



XXI 

Germany in Western Asia 

Within a year from this time concessions were obtained 
from the Snltan for a railway extension to the Persian Gulf. 
This was to be the central section of the great trans-continen- 
tal line from the Baltic ports to India and the Orient. In 1903 
was chartered the Bagdad Eailway Company, and the follow- 
ing year there was opened for operation the first section of a 
line projected to extend 11:00 miles to the head of the Persian 
Gulf. Its completion was expected in 1917, and by 1911 at 
the outbreak of the war |60.000,000 of German capital had 
been invested therein. A feature especially favored by the Sul- 
tan was the extension of the Bagdad system into Arabia and 
toward Egypt, "to unite Mohammedanism." A branch line 
was to run down to the Mediterranean from Aleppo, to a point 
which would have been very convenient for a German naval 
station, only thirty-six hours steaming from the Suez Canal. 

Taken altogether this great railway system is a typical ex- 
pression of the new German ''Welt-politik." Not only did 
it afford for the extension of German commerce with the Orient 
a shorter route than that of either England or Russia, but 
with its continuous connections for the transportation of 
troops from Germany to within easy striking distance of both 
Egypt and Siberia, the German military machine was brought 
to the very doors of the two empires. 

England was early alive to this threatening danger. In 
1901 when the Turks tried to strengthen their control over the 
independent sheiks in the region of the Persian Gulf, England 

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164 Democracy and the Great War 

interfered, which the Kaiser resented as the declaration of a 
^'British sphere of influence in that region." In 1906 the 
Turks set out to push their frontier nearly up to the Suez 
Canal, but were defeated by British initative in Egypt. 
Alarmed at the formation of the Bagdad Railway Company, 
England sought and secured an agreement that the road from 
Constantinople into Western Asia should be under exclusive 
Turkish control. To this Germany could agree, because it 
would be easy enough for Germany to control Turkey. At 
that time Russia was handicapped with preparations for the 
war with Japan, but after that war, in 1907, Russia and Eng- 
land agreed upon the construction of a line between the Trans- 
Siberian Railroad and the present British system in India. 



XXII 

Triple Entente 

While in their economic and commercial interests England 
and Russia were thus given a common cause in rivalry with 
German expansion, the danger of its developing into a coali- 
tion for war was due almost entirely to Germany's ominous 
haste in military and naval preparations as obviously a threat 
to support that expansion by force if necessary. 

The first step in the drawing together of the nations against 
Germany had been taken by Russia and France in 1891. This 
was partly a reply to disturbance of the balance of power in 
the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy. It was a 
direct reply to the Kaiser's tacit announcement of an independ- 
ent policy, in the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890. In that year 
Germany refused to renew with Russia the so-called Re-insur- 
ance treaty, by which hitherto each had agreed to maintain a 
friendly neutrality in case the other were attacked (in Russia's 
mind, by Austria; in Germany's by France). The visit of 
the Czar to Paris in 1896 was probably intended to announce 
definitely the French-Russian alliance. 

England's feeling for Germany in 1890 was cordial, as evi- 
denced by her cession of Helgoland at the very doors of Ger- 
many, which, had she been contemplating hostilities, she would 
have fortified, or at least retained for prospective use. Her 
later attitude was entirely due to fundamental changes in 
Germany's foreign i)olicy. Her suspicions of Germany were 
first definitely aroused by the Kaiser's remark at Stettin in 
1895, that "our future lies on the water." In the same year 

(165) 



166 Democracy and the Great War 

the Kaiser created a furor of popular excitement in England 
by violating the London Convention of 1884 respecting Eng- 
land's relations to the Transvaal, a neighbor of German South- 
west Africa. If the Kaiser's motive was good, his action was 
short-sighted and meddlesome; if designed to extend German 
influence with the Boers, his subsequent action made it fruit- 
less. England's action had interfered with the dream of a 
Teutonic South Africa. She had aided in driving a wedge 
between the German spheres of control east and west. It is 
to be observed that the Kaiser did not rejoice over the gener- 
osity shown by England at the close of the Boer War in restor- 
ing the Boers to themselves and aiding in the formation of the 
South African Union, notwithstanding the Dutch and not 
the English were there the strongest elements. It is probable 
that the attitude of the German Government is fairly reflected 
in tke annoyance voiced at that time by the German press. 

England saw the trend of Germany's new foreign policy 
cropping out in various ways. She saw the economic and mili- 
tary grip of Germany tightening on Turkey, and through Tur- 
key on Western Asia. On the heels of the South African 
episode followed the Kaiser's Damascus speech. The same 
year came the seizure of Kiao Chau in China. Next came the 
German Naval Law of 1900. In 1901 Turkey under German 
influence attempted to extend her control over the region about 
the Persian Gulf, and later near the Suez Canal. In 1903 was 
chartered the Bagdad Railway Company. Then came the suc- 
cessive increases in the German navy, all of which cpnvinced 
England that Germany meant to challenge her naval suprem- 
acy. 

England replied by alliance with France and Russia, and 
by increasing her navy. In 1904 she settled her African dis- 
putes with France, in a manner which recognized England's 



Triple Entente 167 

preponderance in Egypt and France's control in Tunis, Al- 
geria and Morocco, and left Tripoli as a buffer province to 
fall to Italy. In 1907 England and Russia settled their dif- 
ferences in Asia, and from that time the Triple Entente be- 
tween England, Russia and France grew stronger. Germany 
claimed to regard this alliance as aggressively hostile to her 
"national evolution," and as disturbing the Balance of Power. 
But the continuance of England's pacific policy is obvious 
from the annual decrease in her naval construction from 1905 
to 1909. It was the German Naval Law of 1908 that gave 
the signal for a definite contest ; from this time forward mutual 
suspicion and antagonism between the two countries increased. 



XXIII 

Germany Tests the Triple Entente 

Germany did not wait long to test the strength of the Triple 
Entente, and the method of her test is a luminous commentary 
on the fatal weakness Germany has consistently shown in fail- 
ing to understand the psychology of other nations. In 1904- 
05 she approached France with a proposal for a secret alliance 
with her and Russia against England. The idea that France 
would ally with Germany in face of the crime of 1871 was of a 
piece with her later judgment that America was "a nation of 
traders and would kneel for peace at any price." 

Failing in an alliance against England, Germany sought to 
humiliate France, by demanding a re-opening of the Moroccan 
question which had been settled by England and France in 
1904. Seizing a convenient handle involved in certain inter- 
national agreem^ents, Germany alleged her trading interests 
in Morocco, which were extremely slight. The result was an 
international conference, held at Algeciras in Spain which left 
things as they were, only with international instead of merely 
English sanction. A significant feature of this conference, of 
which Germany took notice, was that Italy supported France. 
The cause of France in Morocco had been exhonorated at the 
bar of Europe, and Germany, instead of France was humili- 
ated. 

Nursing her wounded pride Germany awaited another 
chance. It came in 1911. Germany had sent the cruiser 
"Panther" to the vicinity of French territory on the coast of 
Africa, in protest against alleged infractions by France of the 

(168) 



Germany Tests the Triple Entente 169 

Algeciras agreement. France protested vigorously at this 
action, as being taken without cause. England warned Ger- 
many that in case of war she would support France. This 
was a definite intimation to Germany of England's relation to 
the Triple Entente. The Moroccan question was adjusted, 
Germany accepting compensation in Central Africa for 
recognition of the French protectorate over Morocco, and the 
crisis passed. But Germany felt deep humiliation. The Ger- 
man press was bitter against England. The determination 
strengthened in Germany to fight England. A book on Ger- 
man foreign policy by Albrecht Wirth, published in 1912, con- 
tains a suggestion as to the method by which the preparation 
and attack should be conducted: ^'Morocco/' he says, "is 
easily worth a big war, or even several. At best — and even 
prudent Germany is getting to be convinced of this — war is 
only postponed and not abandoned. Is such a postponement 
to our advantage? They say w^e must wait for a better 
moment. Wait for the deepening of the Kiel Canal, for our 
navy laws to take full effect. It is not exactly diplomatic to 
announce publicly to one's adversaries, 'To go to war now does 
not tempt us, but three years hence we shall let loose a world 
war' . . . No; if a war is really planned, not a word of 
it must be spoken; one's designs must be enveloped in pro- 
found mystery; then brusquely, all of a sudden, jump on the 
enemy like a robber in the darkness." 

England's desire to preserve peace is evidenced by the fact 
that in that same year she tried to come to some agreement 
with Germany respecting limitation of armaments. Failing 
this she proposed to sign the following declaration : "The two 
powers being naturally desirous of securing peace and friend- 
ship between them, England declares that she will neither 
make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. 



170 Democracy and the Great War 

Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no 
part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which 
England is now a party, nor will she become a party to any- 
thing that has such an object." But Germany would not sign 
a similar declaration unless England would agree to "stand 
aside and be neutral in any war which might break out on the 
Continent." This meant that England should abandon the 
Triple Entente, so that the Triple Alliance would be free to 
attack France and Russia without interference. 

How long war between England and Germany might have 
been delayed if left to develop independently is uncertain. It 
was destined to come about indirectly through relation to the 
conflict of the German "Mittel-Europa" designs with the 
Slav nationalistic spirit and the interests of Russia. 



XXIV 
The Slavs and the Turks 

In the Balkan peninsula Russia had racial, religious, and 
economic interests. Excepting Greece and Albania, the penin- 
sula had been early occupied by peoples of the same stock as 
Russia, out of which, with some intermixture of other races, 
have grown the modern Balkan states, — Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Roumania. Like 
the Russians, these people were early Christianized by mission- 
aries of the Greek Catholic Church, from Constantinople, and 
thus had both racial and religious affinity with the Russians. 
In the fifteenth century, with the fall of Constantinople to the 
Ottoman Turks, this population was inundated by a flood of 
Turkish Mohammedans, and it was only by the heroic efforts 
of Austria, Poland, Venice, and Russia that the intruders were 
prevented from overrunning all Europe. Since that time the 
Slavic area conquered by the Turks, which has become the 
Ottoman Empire in Europe with its capitol at Constantinople, 
has been the scene of a steady conflict between the Cross and 
the Crescent. 

Russia's motives in these wars in so far as they were econ- 
omic and political were of interest to all Europe. These 
motives are easy to understand. While Russia has a vast 
area, it lies mainly to the north, and her seaports are icebound 
in winter on the Baltic and the Arctic; for her commerce she 
needs at least one southern port, open all the year round, which 
is possible only on the Black Sea. The outlet from here into 
the Mediterranean through the straits at Constantinople is 

(171) 



172 Democracy and the Great War 

controlled bj the Turks. The removal of the Turkish hold 
at the straits would admit the Russian fleet, in case of war, 
into proximity to Italy, southern France, and the British 
trade route to the Orient and lead possibly to dangerous ex- 
pansion of Russia, and in this nations have seen a "Slav peril." 
In 1736-39 France supported Turkey in a war against Russia. 
In the Crimean War (1853-56) England, France, and Italy 
joined with Turkey against her. Again, in the Russo-Turk- 
ish War (1877-78) the nations united to prevent Russia from 
realizing the fruits of a complete victory over the Turks. We 
shall presently see that circumstances growing out of the 
latter war are connected in an unbroken chain of historical 
sequence with the assassination of the Archduke of Austria 
at the capital of Bosnia in 1914. 

The unfitness of Turkey to exist among modern civilized 
nations needs scarcely a comment. The word "autocracy" 
is too mild to apply to this venal military despotism, which 
has been ruled almost from the beginning by the worst blood- 
stained tyrants of history. The massacres of Christian Arme- 
nians, Syrians, Arabs, Greeks, and the Slavs of the Balkans, 
have made her name accursed on the earth. This political 
derelict has fattened its putrid bulk for some centuries on one 
of the most fertile areas of Europe, now the prey of the Ger- 
man autocracy. Its fertile soils, rich ores of iron and copper, 
its coal fields, its commanding positions on two seas, made it 
no small temptation, a fair field for the predatory instincts of 
Austria and Germany. 

Russia's interests, while in a measure economic and politi- 
cal, were at bottom racial and religious. They were the inter- 
ests which the Russian people had in common with the Slavic 
peoples of the Balkans; the bitterness of the Russians against 
the Turks lies largely in the treatment accorded to these 



The Slavs and the Turks 173 

Slavs. Mohammedanism was in its nature a religion of the 
sword, and propagandism by violence was a virtue. Jesus 
commanded his followers to put up the sword; Mohammed 
made it a chief duty of the faithful to extend the true faith 
by the sword. The faithful were taught to believe that those 
of their number who fell in battle were admitted at once to the 
joys of Paradise. A religious sanction was thus given to war 
and the way was prepared for "Holy Wars." The eleventh 
and twelfth centuries are bloody testimony to the virtues of 
"national evolution" by war. Wherever the Turks have come 
into contact with other peoples this warring spirit has tended 
to make them like the Turks, exercising a baneful influence 
upon Christianity itself. 



XXV 
Russo-Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin 

The inveterate character of Slavo-Turkish hostility is shown 
in a continuous series of wars from the time of Peter the Great 
to the present day. The determining factor in the Russo- 
Turkish War was the old grievance of the cruelty which the 
Turks inflicted upon the Slavic peoples of the Balkan penin- 
sula. Something of the nature of these cruelties may be 
gathered from an English traveler, Mr. Arthur Evans, who 
passed through Turkey at this time and writes : ''In the heat 
of summer men are stripped naked and tied to a tree, smeared 
over with honey or other sweet stuff and left to the tender 
mercies of the insect world. For winter extortion it is found 
convenient to bind people to stakes and leave them barefooted 
to be frost-bitten; or at other times they are shoved into a 
pigsty and cold water poured on them. A favorite plan is 
to drive a party of rayahs (peasants) up a tree or into a 
chamber and then smoke them with green wood. Instances 
are recorded of Bosnian peasants being buried up to their 
heads in earth and left to repent at leisure." Intolerable con- 
ditions in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria led to a revolt, 
whereupon the blood-thirsty Moslem soldiery and looters were 
poured out by the Turks upon the defenseless Christians. 
Whole villages were destroyed. In one of them 5,000 men, 
women and children after being most horribly maltreated were 
butchered outright. 

The effect upon the Russian people was immediate. Reli- 
gious impulse and emotional enthusiasm for the final libera- 

(174) 



Russo-TuRKiSH War and the Congress of Berlin 175 

tion of the Slavs swelled into a tremendous popular wave to 
wipe out the Turks from Europe. Serbia declared war, was 
joined by Montenegro, but was defeated; Russia, despite the 
warnings of the Powers, came to the rescue, was joined by 
Roumania and turned the tide completely, defeating the Turks 
and forcing them to sign the treaty of San Stefano (1877). 
Had this treaty been left undisturbed by the nations it 
would have removed one of the standing causes of dissension, 
international antagonism and bloodshed in Europe that has 
followed since; but instead, they demanded that it be sub- 
mitted for revision to a congress of the European Powers. 
Austria mobilized her army as a threat to Russia. Russia, 
reluctant, worn from the war and suffering from internal 
troubles, consented, and the treaty of Berlin was arranged 
(1878). 

A provision of the treaty relating to Serbia and Austria 
was of momentous consequences. The Serbians had been con- 
quered by the Turks in 1458, against whom in blood, language 
and religion they had a common cause with the Russians. 
Russian religious societies had from early times animated 
their hopes of freedom by helping to foster the Serbian 
churches and schools and stirring the spirit of liberty. In 
the movement for Panslavism, which was early started, the 
Serbians were zealous workers, uniting in the aim to mass 
against the Turks all the Slavic race. Stimulated by this 
sense of Slav unity the nationalistic aspiration of the Ser- 
bians urged them on to the idea of a "Greater Serbia." The 
Kingdom of Serbia at that time included only about a third 
of their particular branch of the Slav race, the rest being 
mainly in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and the Austro- 
Hungarian provinces of Croatia, Slavonia, and Carinthia. 
The insurgents in Herzegovina in 1875 had announced 



176 Democracy and the Great War 

solemnly their determination to fight for liberty and union 
with Serbia and die in a last stand rather than submit longer 
to the unspeakable misery inflicted by the Turks. In this idea 
of a "Greater Serbia" Austria perceived a new form of the 
"Slav peril;" and the Congress of Berlin, despite bitter pro- 
tests from the Slavs, transferred the administration of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina into the hands of Austria, to "occupy" tem- 
porarily until the quieting of disturbances should enable them 
to manage their own affairs. This was a cruel disappointment 
to Serbia who from this time forward bent every energy to 
free her kindred from the autocracy of the Hapsburgs, of which 
struggle a by-product was "the crime of Serajevo." 



XXVI 
"Drang Nach Osten" 

The extension of Teutonic influence in the Balkans was a 
practical expression of the policy of "Drang nach Osten'^ 
(push toward the east) long pursued by Austria. Originally 
this policy expressed the eastward movement of the Germans 
from the 11th to the 15th centuries by which the Slavs were 
dispossessed of their lands in the region of the Baltic. A 
continuation of the policy was the formation of Austria-Hun- 
gary itself, whose very existence is a flagrant violation of the 
principle of race-nationalism — a mere agglomeration of peoples 
forced together by conquest and matrimonial alliances. Some 
thirty distinct dialects are spoken in the Empire, and the poli- 
tical system rests upon a sort of equilibrium of racial jeal- 
ousies, maintained by opposing the interests of one nationality 
to the other. The popular aspirations of the Hungarians which 
broke out in the Kevolution of 1848 were crushed by Teutonic 
Austria in 1849, their leader, Louis Kossuth, finding sympathy 
and protection in the United States. The Hungarian constitu- 
tion was done away and Hungary was treated as conquered 
territory. But her spirit did not yield; her people adopted 
a policy of passive protest. The exclusion of Austria from 
German affairs by the Prussian war of 1866 led Austria to 
adopt a conciliatory policy, and since then Hungary has gained 
a degree of internal independence under the compromise con- 
stitution of 1867. Hungary was a historic kingdom with its 
boundaries, traditions, and ideals, and was practically subju- 
gated by Germans. Its population, the Magyars, have sought in 
23 (177) 



178 Democracy and the Great War 

turn to dominate over the Slav peoples within their borders. 
Fraud and intimidation in elections have praci.ically deprived 
the Slavs of the franchise. Their language is suppressed, their 
schools are controlled, and their economic development so 
hampered that their ambition has long been towards escape 
from the Hungarian yoke and union with the Serbs in a 
Greater Serbia. 

Against this aspiration stands the Teutonic "Drang nach 
Osten." In the Dual Monarchy it looked politically to the con- 
trol of the Balkan states, especially in their foreign affairs, 
and economically to the control of the Danube Valley and the 
Vardar Valley to Saloniki for trade outlets on the Black and 
Aegean seas. For this purpose Austria has tried to block 
the progress of Serbia by keeping her from incorporating polit- 
ically the kindred and neighboring Slavs and by keeping her 
economically dependent through lack of an independent outlet 
to the sea. Austria in this program has become the implacable 
enemy of Russia, and the pliant tool of Germany, whose own 
"Drang nach Osten" into European and Asiatic Turkey is 
of one piece with the policy of Austria-Hungary. 



XXVII 
Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

In 1908 a most significant step was taken "eastward" when 
Austria, violating the Treaty of Berlin, annexed Bosnia and 
Herzegovina outright. In this she was aided by Germany. 
The occasion was afforded by certain troubles of the Turkish 
Sultan. The Young Turks, a secret liberal party, who sought 
to inject new life into the Ottoman Empire had started a revo- 
lution; their chief principle was Turkish nationalism as 
opposed to nationalism applied to parts of the Empire. This 
tendency to strengthen the Ottoman Empire was in accord with 
German interests hence Germany supported the revolution, and 
the ensuing political chaos presented Austria's chance to annex 
the coveted Turkish provinces. No moral justification could be 
given, nor was any attempted. The action was typically Teu- 
tonic. The provinces were taken with utter disregard for the 
sentiment of the people, either Turks or Christians. Austria was 
now further on the way to the coveted Aegean ports, likewise 
further intrenched against a Greater Serbia. 

Austria's annexations of these provinces rankled deep in the 
hearts of the Serbians, as an action which threatened to per- 
petuate for all time the political division of the Serbian peo- 
ple. It was in direct violation of the Treaty of Berlin, in accord- 
ance with which only the signatory nations jointly might 
change the political status of the provinces. The Serbians 
in their distress appealed to Kussia; but on this Austria had 
counted. Russia was not yet recovered from the war with 
Japan and from the political effects of the accompanying 

(179) 



180 Democracy and the Great War 

revolution, and Austria well knew that Kussia would fear to 
take a step which might result in a general European war. 

Here was Germany's chance to score a diplomatic victory, 
strengthen the Triple Alliance, and gain prestige with the 
great Powers. A conference of the Powers was held at St. 
Petersburg. The Kaiser "rattled his saber," and Russia 
yielded. The insolent concession was made that Serbia's 
^^rights'' regarding Bosnia had not been affected by Austria's 
action but, nevertheless, Serbia should renounce any attitude 
of protest and opposition and should henceforth live on "good 
and neighborly terms" with Austria. The popular rejoicing 
in Austria and the prompt official display of loyalty by this 
tool of German intrigue was evidence that the bond of the 
Austro-German alliance was strengthened mightily. 

The seriousness of what they had done was fully realized 
by Germany and Austria. "The Serbian demands are a peril- 
ous adventure," said Chancellor von Buelow in his report 
to the German Reichstag. But Germany's economic and polit- 
ical plans in "Mittel-Europa," particularly the Berlin-to-Bag- 
dad railroad, required that Serbia should be controlled, be- 
cause that road crossed Serbia. 

It scarcely looks as if the Kaiser was solicitous for the peace 
of Europe when he would venture to take such action as this 
the very year after the Anglo-Russian understanding which 
completed the cordial relations of three powerful and poten- 
tial enemies. Only a supreme egotist and irresponsible mili- 
tarist, who believes that he can frighten his neighbors into 
submission to his will, could have been so blind to the dangers 
into which his policy was running the German Empire. This, 
it will be remembered, was the year 1908. 



xxvin 

Serbia and the Balkan Wars 

Serbia bided her time. Her revolutionary societies vehe- 
mently denounced the "dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious 
and greedy enemy in the north" who "robs millions of Serbian 
brothers of their liberty and rights, and holds them in bondage 
and chains." With Turkey also Serbia sought a day of reckon- 
ing. It came in 1912, when in alliance with Greece, Bulgaria, 
and Montenegro she took advantage of Turkey's weakened 
condition from a war she had just closed with Italy. The 
blow the allies struck surprised the world, and all but expelled 
Turkey from Europe. Serbia came out of the struggle with 
greatly enlarged territories, increased military prestige and 
intensified national feeling. The Slavs of the whole peninsula 
were jubilant. They had succeded in doing over again what 
Kussia had done in 1877. Austria and Germany were alarmed. 
As in 1877, so now, both had supported Turkey. Germany 
saw in the defeat of Turkey the eclipse of her plans for a Turk- 
ish protectorate and expansion into Asia. Both Austria and 
Germany feared the predominance of Russia's influence in the 
Balkans through the strengthening of these Slav kinsmen. 

Unfortunately Bulgaria was not satisfied with terms of 
peace. In 1913 she treacherously attacked Serbia; but 
Roumania, in her rear, entered the struggle against her and 
she was compelled to accept conditions even less satisfactory 
to her than at first. As in the struggle of Serbia and her 
allies against Turkey, so in her struggle against Bulgaria, 
Austria and Germany took the opposing side. In each case 

(181) 



182 Democracy and the Great War 

their course was consistent, — protection of their interests in 
the Balkans and defeat of Slav interests, — but in each they 
had taken the side of the losers. This was a hard blow to 
German prestige, and to German pride. It came at a moment 
when the German military party was furious over what they 
considered the humiliation of the Empire in the diplomatic 
victory of England and France in the Moroccan question. 
Along with Austro-German domination in the Balkans was 
threatened the whole "Mittel-Europa" plans and the control 
of Western Asia, and instead had risen the prestige of the 
Slavs. The German resolve hardened. 



XXIX 

Germany's War Measures of 1913 

Serbia's success in the Balkan wars spelled her destruc- 
tion. Austria had succeeded in keeping her from getting the 
coveted outlet on the Adriatic, but the Serbian gains in terri- 
tory and prestige were substantial. So serious was the situa- 
tion that a general European war seemed impending, when the 
British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, led 
the way to a settlement. Austria wanted immediate war with 
Serbia, but Germany was not quite ready ; there was probably 
a complete understanding between Austria and Germany, and 
such a settlement was likely to be temporary. 

The mind of Germany seems reflected in a series of extraor- 
dinary military preparations begun in the spring of 1913. 
The German army was suddenly enlarged by a fifth. There 
was provided a corresponding increase of |45,000,000 in the 
annually recurring expenditures for military purposes, with 
a non-recurring expenditure of |252,000,000. To the aviation 
branch of the service over 1500 men were to be attached. The 
unity and alacrity with which this new and heavy burden was 
voted in the Reichstag was ominous. In addition to these 
preparations an enormous stock of munitions was prepared. 
The importation of chemicals for making explosives was great- 
ly increased, also the importation of horses, food, and fats. 
Beds and hospital supplies were purchased in great 
number. Reservists were called in from various foreign 
countries. A half million of soldiers were massed on the 
Rhine. The construction of strategic railways to the Belgian, 

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184 Democracy and the Great War 

French, and Russian frontiers was hastened. Fortifications 
at Helgoland and elsewhere were improved. The enlarge- 
ment of the Kiel Canal was pushed to completion. Coaling 
arrangements were made for German naval vessels. Prepara- 
tions were made to stir up revolt in the British Empire, espe- 
cially ip India among British Mohammedan subjects who might 
act in concert with Turkey. These activ ties were extended 
to northern Africa, to Russia, to France, and the German 
spy system was perfected at foreign capitals. 

It began to be clear that Germany considered war inevi- 
table. From German diplomatic documents fallen into the 
hands of the Allies it is revealed that the smaller states in case 
of war were to be either coerced or subdued. In no circum- 
stances would Germany offer Belgium a guarantee for the 
security of her neutrality. Her aim was to take the offen- 
sive with a large superiority from the first days. A short- 
term ultimatum was to be issued. "The arrangements made 
with this end in view," reads the document, "allow us to hope 
that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after 
the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. 
An ultimatum with a short time limit, to be followed immedi- 
ately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for 
our action in international law." Care was taken to prepare 
the minds of the German people: "We must allow the idea to 
sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an 
answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We 
must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part 
is a necessity in order to combat the provocations of our ad- 
versaries." 

German apologists say that Germany's war measures of 
1913-14 were taken in view of the hostile ring of enemies 
encircling her. The apology does not appear strong in the 



Germany^s War Measures op 1913 185 

light of conditions just at that time. All of those "enemy 
countries'' were absorbed with serious internal problems. 
France was involved in labor troubles and in a serious political 
scandal, and French statesmen as well as the French press 
were deploring the inefficiency of the army. Russia, only 
partially recovered from the war with Japan, was known to 
be honeycombed with official corruption and revolutionary 
plots; the Russian army was not properly equipped, and her 
transportation facilities were anything but organized for 
attack. England was involved with the Irish ; the disturbance 
had almost reached the stage of civil war in the northern part 
of Ireland. Had Germany been sincere in the "ring of 
enemies" theory she could easily have forestalled attack by 
entrenching her army along her frontiers, and, as the war has 
proved, without a single act of aggression she could easily 
have blocked any projected invasion of Germany. Is it 
reasonable to believe that the war would have taken place if 
she had done so? No attack upon Germany was imminent 
from any of these countries. On the contrary, their troubles 
were favorable to the plans of Germany, and such convenient 
afflictions to her three most powerful "enemies" might never 
be so happily conjoined again. 

Thus far it seems clear that to achieve their aims against 
Serbia in behalf of the general "Mittel-Europa" policy Ger- 
many and Austria were willing to risk and actually prepared 
for a general European war. All of these preparations of 
course were made without reference to the assassination of an 
Austrian archduke because it had not yet occurred. In August 
1913, Austria proposed to Italy, as a member of the Triple 
Alliance, an attack on Serbia. Italy refused, on the ground 
that the Alliance was defensive, whereas the proposed attack 
meant a war of aggression. Whether Austria had consulted 



186 Democracy and the Great War 

Germany is not definitely known, but it seems improbable 
that she would embark on such a perilous adventure without 
consulting her strongest ally. She knew that an attack on 
Serbia would be tantamount to an attack on Kussia. It may 
well be believed that she did consult Germany, and that Ger- 
many counseled delay until her own preparations should be 
more nearly completed. In a general European war such prep- 
arations would partially offset Italy, w^hich might at least 
be counted on to remain neutral. Switzerland, Holland, Den- 
mark, Norway and Sweden would be likely to remain neutral. 
Turkey could be counted on as an ally, also Bulgaria, which 
had recently been foiled by Serbia. France would join Russia 
for a certainty, hence in any plan to strike Serbia the Austro- 
German forces must immediately strike Russia and France. 
A quick thrust through Belgium to Paris and east to Petro- 
grad would leave the way open to crush these two states in 
detail. Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria could cope with the 
Balkan states. The "Mittel-Europa" plans could then be com- 
pleted by the absorption of the smaller neutral states. Eng- 
land was expected to be neutral, at least for a time. 

If such a plan could have been carried out, even supposing 
a halt to consolidate their gains, is it to be thought, from what 
we know of Germany today, that the Central Powers would 
have stopped there? Considering the temper of German 
militarism, the immense impulse to the greed of the Pan-Ger- 
manists, the avaricious dreams. of world dominion indulged 
by the romantic Kaiser bulwarked by power and urged on to 
lead the "chosen people" to their ultimate destiny, would Ger- 
many have let England escape? This hated rival, England, 
the champion of democracy, the scorner of "Divine Right" 
monarchies, which had profited by early putting aside feudal- 
ism, developing a true nationality and extending her con- 



Germany^s War Measures of 1913 187 

trol over distant and immense areas inhabited by ^'inferior 
peoples" to whom the German desired to carry the gospel of 
KultuVj — this England, would she not be made to know that 
God is a German? With the combined navies of France and 
Russia added to her own we may well believe that Germany 
would scarcely have hesitated to challenge the British navy, 
and with the British navy out of the way, the seas would have 
been clear to America. In the light of Germany's prepara- 
tions it seems reasonable to believe that previous to the assas- 
sination of the Austrian archduke Germany and Austria had 
determined upon a course of action which they knew would 
lead to a European war, from which they should emerge vic- 
tors, and possibly the conquerors of the world. In the words 
of Senator Elihu Root : "It now appears beyond the possibility 
of a doubt that this war was made by Germany pursuing a 
long and settled purpose. For many years she had been pre- 
paring to do exactly what she has done, with a thoroughness, 
a perfection of plans, and a vastness of provision in men, muni- 
tions and supplies never before equaled or approached in 
human history. She brought the war on when she chose, in 
the belief that she could conquer the earth nation by nation.'' 



XXX 

The Pretext for War 

The only thing lacking was a pretext. The policy of Ger- 
many had always been to initiate her aggressions in such man- 
ner that the party to be attacked would seem the aggressor. 
Bismarck had held that, "A war to be a success must be popu- 
lar, and to be popular you must make your people believe that 
they have been or are about to be attacked." Germany was 
not insensible to the possibility of moral revulsion among 
even her own people. She was also conscious that interna- 
tional morality had reached a high point among certain 
nations, whose active hostility it would be inexpedient im- 
mediately to arouse, and discretion might be the better part 
of valor. 

The desired excuse soon came to hand in the murder on June 
28, 1914, of the heir to the Austrian throne at Serajevo, the 
capital of Bosnia, by an Austrian subject of Serbian race. The 
crime had no political significance. While Bosnia since 1908 
had been a province of Austria and the assassin was a Bosnian, 
he was an anarchist. Serbia as a state was in no way re- 
sponsible for his action. B}^ the outside world it was presently 
forgotten ; even the statesmen of Russia, France, and England 
had ceased to give it attention. Meantime a secret investiga- 
tion was instituted by Austria at Serajevo, while sending out 
to the world quieting reports and hastening preparations for 
speedily carrying out against Serbia plans long cherished. 
Nothing more auspicious could have happened to prepare the 
popular mind. The people of Austria were deeply shocked at 

(188) 



The Pretext for War 189 

the brutal murder of a beloved prince and his family, and ready 
for vengeance. Suddenly, without the slightest warning, 
Austria on July 23, 1914, presented to Serbia an amazing 
ultimatum. 

Germany has denied that she had anything to do with the 
contents of this note, but in the light of certain well ascer- 
tained facts this can not be believed. It is now believed that 
at an Austro-German conference held at Potsdam, near Berlin, 
July 5, 1914, it was officially and jointly determined to use 
the murder of the Archduke as a pretext for war on Serbia. 
This was reported at the time by a Dutch journalist. The Ger- 
man ambassador to Constantinople who attended the confer- 
ence told it to the Italian ambassador at Constantinople, and 
also to Mr. Henry Morgenthau, the American ambassador 
to Turkey. The Italian ambassador told it to an American 
diplomat who recorded it in his diary. It has been since 
openly referred to in the German Reichstag. From what 
we have learned of German intrigue in America, it is 
entirely reasonable to believe that Germany, the mas- 
ter mind of the " Mittel - Europa '' plans and closely 
allied to Austria, with common interests against Serbia 
and in the Balkans, w^as at once consulted by Austria 
and became the guiding hand in shaping the ultimatum that 
was to be sent in the common interest to Serbia. 

The note was of such a character as to make war inevitable. 
It was in accord with Germany's idea of a "short term ultima- 
tum," and demanded unconditional acceptance within forty- 
eight hours. Says the German Socialist newspaper Vorwaerts 
of July 25: "The demands of the Austrian Government are 
more brutal than any ever made upon any civilized state in 
the history of the world, and they can be regarded only as 
intended to provoke war." 



190 Democracy and the Great War 

Though extremely humiliated, Serbia at the instigation of 
Russia accepted all of the demands except two, which affected 
her sovereignty as a nation. She even offered to submit these 
to the Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers in case her reply 
was not deemed satisfactory. 

Austria's reply immediately made clear to the Powers that 
her object was to find a ground for quarrel. She found Ser- 
bia's answer "dishonest and evasive." England, France, and 
Bussia earnestly endeavored to mediate, and at the last 
moment Austria consented, but Germany refused, demanding 
that as the affair was Austria's none of the Powers should in- 
tervene. This apparently meant that Germany was deter- 
mined not to let slip the chance to begin war on Serbia. On 
July 29 Austria bombarded the Serbian capital, and war had 
begun. Maximilian Harden wrote in Die Zukunft August 1 : 
"The question has been asked: Where was the plan of cam- 
paign elaborated — in Vienna or Berlin?' And some hasten 
to reply: 'In Vienna.' Why do people tolerate the propaga- 
tion of such dangerous fables ? Why not say the thing that is 
(because it must be), namely, that a complete understanding 
in all matters existed between Berlin and Vienna." 



XXXI 

Germany Defeats Peace Efforts of the Nations 

That Harden's statement is not an exaggeration will appear 
from examination, in brief detail, of the diplomatic efforts 
made by England, France, Kussia, and Italy to avert a Euro- 
pean war. On July 27 shortly after Serbia's concession to 
Austria the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward 
Grey, proposed an international conference to consist of the 
German and Italian ambassadors to England as friends of 
Austria, and the French ambassador and himself as friends 
of Kussia. Had such a conference come about, is there ques- 
tion as to a speedy and rational conclusion? There could be 
little question ; for, observes the author of J' Accuse : "It it is 
borne in mind how problems incomparably more difficult had 
been successfully solved by the conference of ambasadors at 
London during the Balkan crisis, it must be a<lmitted that 
settlement between the Austrian demands and the Serbian 
concessions in July, 1914, was child's play compared with the 
previous achievements of the London conference." Russia, 
France, and Italy accepted the proposal. Austria and Ger- 
many refused. Germany desired that France bring pressure 
to bear on Russia, to which France replied that Germany 
might do the same with Austria, especially in view of the con- 
ciliatory spirit of Serbia. 

Germany, as she did firmly throughout, maintained that she 
could not intervene in the dispute between her ally and Ser- 
bia — which would have meant peace. It is true Austria later 
refused Germany's proposal of direct negotiations between 

(191) 



192 Democracy and the Great War 

Russia and Austria, but, in the light of what we now know 
of German intrigue, it is more than likely that this was a sub- 
terfuge arranged between the German and Austrian govern- 
ments. The Kaiser's personal influence extended to urging 
Russia "to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war with- 
out drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever 
seen" — which would have given Austro-German movements a 
good headway. There is no evidence that the Kaiser or his 
Government addressed a single communication to Austria in 
the interests of peace, except the one noted, but definitely re- 
fused to assist in bringing about a conference of nations. On the 
other hand, the Czar of Russia sent a personal telegram to the 
Kaiser "to give over the Austro- Serbian problem to the Hague 
Tribunal," which undoubtedly would have led to peace. This 
telegram was omitted from documents which the German Gov- 
ernment published later as its official defense to the German 
people and the world. The conclusion is, that the German 
Government knew the Czar's proposal would lead to peace, 
hence it was ignored; also it knew this would be obvious to 
the German people, hence the proposal was suppressed from 
the people. 

Germany's cry of "wolf" from the direction of Russia and 
England does not prove, in the light of the fact that Russia 
and England were the leaders in these strenuous efforts to 
preserve peace. England urged that Austria express her- 
self as satisfied with the occupation of the Serbian capital 
and neighboring territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settle- 
ment, which would allow the Powers time to mediate between 
Austria and Russia, and in support of this the King of England 
sent a personal telegram to the Kaiser's brother saying: "I 
rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce 
Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove 



Germany Defeats Peace Efforts 193 

that Germany and England are working together to prevent 
what would be an international catastrophe." It was clear, 
as Sir Edward Grey said, that "mediation was ready to come 
into operation by any method that Germany thought possi- 
ble if only Germany would ^press the button' in the interests 
of peace." 

Kussia stated to Germany that if Austria, recognizing that 
the Austro- Serbian question had assumed the character of a 
question of European interest, would declare herself ready to 
eliminate from her ultimatum points which violated the sov- 
ereign rights of Serbia, Russia would engage to stop her 
military preparations. On receiving reply from Germany 
that it was "impossible for Austria to accept this proposal," 
Russia proposed that, "If Austria consents to stay the march 
of her troops on Serbian territory; and if, recognizing that 
the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a 
question of European interest, she admits that the Great 
Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord 
to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her 
rights as a sovereign state or her independence, Russia under- 
takes to maintain her waiting attitude." To this proposal 
Germany made no answer. But Austria declared that she 
was then "ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances 
against Serbia with the other Powers;" upon which Sir Ed- 
ward Grey commented that "things ought not be hopeless so 
long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse." But Ger- 
many refused. 

The Austro-German action was a direct challenge to the 
security of Russia. Russia had been the first to act, as most 
immediately concerned. Her economic life was directly at 
stake, and the racial sympathies of the Russian people had 
been lacerated. Austria's initial movements had in a need- 
25 



194 Democracy and the Great War 

lessly wanton and ostentatious manner ignored Kussia's right 
to speak in a matter concerning a vital Balkan question. This 
was not only insolence, it was a danger. It was clear that 
Austria's purpose was to reduce Serbia to a state of vassal- 
age, as a result of which it was certain that German suprem- 
acy in the Balkans would follow and Kussia's interests at 
the straits, vital to her life, would be undermined. 

The mobilization of the Eussian army was based on the 
measures Austria was taking, and on secret measures known 
to have been taken by Germany for mobilization against 
Russia. The author of J^ Accuse has shown conclusively that 
Russian mobilization was brought about by Germany's refusal 
to transmit to Austria the conciliatory proposals made by 
Russia ; that Germany had actually been mobilizing for a num- 
ber of days previous to Russia's mobilization ; and that in view 
of Austria's resumption of negotiations with Russia on August 
1, Austria did not consider Russia's mobilization a cause of 
war. Negotiations had actually begun between Austria 
and Russia when suddenly came Germany's ultimatum to 
Russia and the declaration of war on August 1. It was not 
until five days afterwards (Aug. 6) that Russia and Austria 
were at war. 

The evidence indicates that for some weeks before the war, 
Germany had secretly gathered and located troops in such a 
way that mobilization was actually long under way before the 
formal order was given to mobilize. When that order came 
the work was done with unbelievable rapidity and precision. 
In the words of Hermann Bahr, who was an eyewitness: 
"When we saw the miracle of this mobilization — all Germany's 
military manhood packed in railway trains rolling through 
the land, day by day and night after night, never a minute 
late and never a question for which the right answer was not 



Germany Defeats Peace Efforts 195 

ready and waiting — when we saw all this, we were not aston- 
ished, because it was no miracle, it was nothing other than 
a natural result of a thousand years of work and preparation ; 
it was the net profit of the whole of German history." In this 
secret preparation and extreme readiness to bring the entire 
military strength of the nation to bear at a moment's notice 
lurks the ever present danger of autocracy to democracy. 

The moral bankruptcy of those in control of the German 
Government clearly appears in the whole process by which 
Germany began war. Their whole course shows that they had 
early and definitely decided to make out of the Austro- Serbian 
trouble a pretext for war, their only solicitude being to maneu- 
ver Kussia and France into mobilization that they might use 
that mobilization as a cause for declaring war ; in which case 
the Kaiser alone had power to declare war as a defense mea- 
sure, without consulting any department of the Government, 
and to make the cry of "attack upon the Fatherland" the basis 
of an appeal for popular support. They had deliberately 
blocked a conference of the nations, refused Russia's overtures 
for an understanding with Austria, and finally abruptly in- 
terrupted negotiations actually begun by Russia and Austria. 
They had presented to Russia an ultimatum, to be answered in 
twelve hours — imposible under the circumstances to accept — 
namely, that Russia make "complete, immediate and uncon- 
ditional demobilization," in the face of Germany's known 
covert preparations to strike, and notwithstanding the Czar 
had personally telegraphed the Kaiser that, "It is far from us 
to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria 
and Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provoca- 
tive action. I give you my solemn word thereon." Their 
apology for war to the German people not only suppressed the 
Czar's telegram, which sought peace, but brazenly falsified 



196 Democracy and the Great War 

the truth in the declaration that France had violated German 
territory. The announcement that French airplanes had drop- 
ped bombs on the railway tracks near Kuremburg was denied 
by the German military commander of that district. Quite 
to the contrary, in order to avoid possible friction on her 
frontiers, France had withdrawn her troops about six miles 
within her own boundaries. On the other hand, German troops 
had repeatedly crossed into France and had killed a French 
soldier before the declaration of war.- The effrontery and hypoc- 
risy of denials in the program of deception practiced by these 
autocrats upon the German people is one of the most amazing 
chapters in modern history. 



xxxn 

The Crime Against Belgium 

Of a piece with this conduct is the violation of Belgium's 
neutrality. On Aug. 2, 1914, Germany presented to the Bel- 
gium Government a most insulting ultimatum, demanding 
unimpeded passage for German troops to operate against 
France from Belgian territory. Belgium was given twelve 
hours in which to reply, but she did not require that time; 
almost immediately reply was returned, as the unanimous 
protest of the Belgian cabinet, that "the Belgian Government, 
if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would 
sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duties toward 
Europe." Belgium's liberty and honor were not for sale ! She 
had given Germany no pretext whatever for claiming that Bel- 
gium had violated her neutral obligations in favor of Ger- 
many's enemies. She made no request of the Powers for mili- 
tary support until Germany had actually committed the crime 
of sending troops onto Belgian soil. On Aug 4, the blood of 
her citizens flowed on her frontiers, a few miles from Aix-la- 
Ohapelle. Though the Belgians faced destruction, they re- 
fused to sacrifice honor, and laid down their lives for liberty. 
Their country was ravaged with fire and sword. Old men, 
women and children were deliberately and ruthlessly massa- 
cred. Their crops were seized, their factories destroyed, their 
machinery stolen, their workmen torn from their homes and 
sent into slavery. The famished remnant of the people lan- 
guished under the heel of brutal tyranny, but their courage 
remained unbroken and unbreakable. In the pastoral letter 
of the heroic Cardinal Mercier issued to his people on Christ- 

(197) 



198 Democracy and the Great War 

mas Day, 1914, we read : "And there where lives were not taken 
and there where the stones of buildings were not thrown down, 
what anguish unrevealed! Families hitherto living at ease, 
now in bitter want ; all commerce at an end, all careers ruined ; 
industry at a standstill; thousands upon thousands of work- 
ingmen without employment; working women, shop girls, 
humble servant girls without the means of earning their bread ; 
and poor souls forlorn on the bed of sickness and fever crying, 
^O Lord, how long, how long?' . . God will save Belgium, 
my brethren; you can not doubt it. Nay rather, He is saving 
her . . . Which of us would have the heart to cancel this 
page of our national history? Which of us does not exult in 
the brightness of the glory of this shattered nation? When 
in her throes she brings forth heroes, our mother country 
gives her own energy to the blood of those sons of hers. Let 
us acknowledge that we needed a lesson in patriotism . . . 
For down within us all is something deeper than personal 
interests, than personal kinships, than party feeling, and this 
is the need and the will to devote ourselves to that more general 
interest which Rome termed the public thing. Res Publica. 
And this profound will within us is patriotism." 

No scruples disturbed the German Government. Prussia 
had bound herself by special treaty to respect Belgium's neu- 
trality, pledging her honor to the treaty of London (1839), by 
which Belgium became "an independent and perpetually neu- 
tral state." Likewise Austria, France, England, and Russia be- 
came by that treaty "guarantors" of Belgium's neutrality. 
Another treaty by Prussia confirmed this in 1870. Despite 
these guarantees Germany laid her plans to attack France 
through Belgium. Why? Because, France, trusting in the 
sacredness of a treaty, had fortified herself least strongly on 
her Belgian frontier. Germany's defense of this violation of 



The Crime Against Belgium 199 

Belgian neutrality is noteworthy. First she claimed that 
France "stood ready for an invasion" of Belgium; again, that 
France had actually invaded Belgium; and still again, that 
Belgium had violated her own neutrality. These claims are 
based on a gross distortion of facts. On the contrary, Ger- 
many had been building strategic railways to the Belgian 
frontier since 1906. The German Chancellor later admitted 
that Germany had wronged Belgium, but maintained that "the 
breach of international law" was justified on the grounds that 
"military necessity knows no law." This is the same argument 
that was used by Chancellor von Buelow in justification of the 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and urging further annexa- 
tions from France. "That which appears to the French," 
says von Buelow, "to be the brutal harshness of the conqueror 
was really nothing but national necessity to the Germans." 
This is but another way of stating the Prussian maxim that 
"Might makes Right." This is the basis of the German inter- 
national code, and it is in this fact that the invasion of Bel- 
gium had its deep significance for the world. As Walter 
Lippman has said : "Had Belgium been merely a small neutral 
nation the crime of her violation would still have been one 
of the worst in the history of the modern world. The fact that 
Belgium was an international state has made the invasion the 
master tragedy of the war. For Belgium represented what 
progress the world had made towards cooperation. If it 
could not survive, then no internationalism was possible. That 
is why, through three years of horror upon horror, the Belgian 
horror is the fiercest of all. The burning, the shooting, the 
starving, and the robbing of small and inoffensive nations is 
tragic enough. But the German crime in Belgium is greater 
than the sum of Belgium's misery. It is a crime against the 
basis of faith on which the world must build or perish." 



XXXIII 
England Forced Into the War 

Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality brought Great 
Britain into the war. On the eve of the German invasion King 
Albert of Belgium telegraphed to King George of England: 
"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friend- 
ship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of 
England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just 
given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic 
intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the 
integrity of Belgium." Immediately England asked as- 
surance from Germany that "the demand made upon Belgium 
will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be re- 
spected by Germany." No such assurance was given and Eng- 
land declared war the day Belgium was invaded. Whether 
England would have entered the war later regardless of the 
violations of Belgium's neutrality can not now be known. To 
be sure there was the additional incentive of England's re- 
lations to France growing out of the understanding of 1904; 
these however did not amount to obligations. There was the 
forceful realization that Germany's hostility was implacable, 
that England must ultimately fight Germany to save her 
national life, and that she might as weU do it now with allies 
as later alone. Certainly the general European situation 
which Germany and Austria had been gradually developing 
through many years was too serious a menace for England to 
have allowed Germany to crush Russia and France. England 
was conscious that Germany's Welt-politik made a war with 

(200) 



England Forced Into the War 201 

England logically inevitable, and that with Kussia and France 
out of the way Germany probably would not wait longer than 
to consolidate her gains. The whole situation so far as Eng- 
land is concerned is summed up in a speech by Sir Edwar'^d 
Grey made on March 22, 1915, in which he said in part : 

"We had assured Belgium that never would we violate her 
neutrality so long as it was respected by others. I had given 
this pledge to Belgium long before the war. On the eve of 
the war we asked France and Germany to give it. When, 
after that, Germany invaded Belgium, we were bound to op- 
pose Germany with all our strength ; and, if we had not done so, 
at the first moment, is there anyone now who believes that, 
when Germany attacked the Belgians, shot combatants and 
noncombatants, and ravaged the country in a way that vio- 
lated all rules of war of recent times, and all rules of humanity 
for all time — is there anyone who thinks it possible that we 
could have sat still and looked on without eternal disgrace? 

"Now, what are the issues for which we are fighting? 

"In due time, the terms of peace will be put forward by our 
Allies in common with us, in accordance with the Alliances 
that now exists between us and are public to the world. But 
one essential condition must be the restoration of Belgium to 
her independent national life and the free possession of her 
territory; and reparation to her, as far as reparation is possi- 
ble, for the cruel wrong done to her. 

"That is part of the great issue for which we with our Allies 
are contending, and which is this : 

"We wish the nations of Europe to be free to live their inde- 
pendent lives working out their own forms of government for 
themselves and their own national development, whether they 
be great states or small states, in full liberty. That is our 
ideal. The German ideal — we have had it poured out by Ger- 



202 Democracy and the Great War 

man professors and publicists since the war began — is that of 
the Germans as a superior people ; to whom aU. things are law- 
ful in the securing of their own power; against whom resis- 
tance of every sort is unlawful and to be savagely put down ; a 
people establishing a domination over the nations of the Con- 
tinent; imposing a peace that is not to be a liberty for other 
nations, but subservience to Germany. I would rather perish or 
leave this Continent altogether than live in it under such condi- 
tions. After the war, we and the other nations of Europe 
must be free to live, not menaced by talk of Supreme War- 
Lords and shining armor and the sword continually rattled in 
the scabbard and Heaven continually invoked as an accomplice 
to German arms, and not having our policy dictated and our 
national destinies and activities controlled by the military 
caste of Prussia. We claim for ourselves, and our Allies claim 
for themselves, and together we will secure for Europe, the 
right of independent sovereignty for the different nations ; the 
right to pursue national existence, not in the shadow of Prus- 
sian hegemony or supremacy but in the light of equal liberty." 
The conflagration which followed the invasion of Belgium 
was transmitted world-wide by international friendships and 
alliances built up through a century of anxious diplomacy. 
From the moment England entered the war Germany realized 
what she had on hand. "Gott strafe England!" became the 
popular cry, echoing the Government, and songs of hate became 
in order. Germany was balked of her easy prey, and she must 
now fight the united strength of the enemies she herself had 
so wantonly raised up by her ambitious policies. Her problem 
now, as she saw it, was to beat England to her knees, by any 
means whatever. Germany began to see that she had precipi- 
tated for herself a life and death struggle, and to accomplish 
her ends she threw off whatever vestige of a mask was left 



England Forced Into the War 203 

that entitled her to the name of a civilized Government. She 
engaged in a Saturnalia of "frightfulness/' assassination, 
massacre, poisoning, torturing, intriguing, burning, pillaging, 
committing every crime in the calendar, violating every law 
of nations and of humanity, and calling it war. She was yet 
to realize her surpassing ignorance of the real spirit of free 
peoples. 



XXXIV 

America Awakens 

If America was confused at first as to the merits of the 
issues between the belligerents, her citizens could at least 
understand the meaning of German "frightfulness." These 
atrocities were first brought home to the soul of America by 
the official report of the Commission headed by Mr. James 
Bryce, author of The American Commonwealth and formerly 
British Ambassador to the United States, in whom Americans 
had learned to have confidence. The report was accom- 
panied by the supporting documents. The Belgian horrors 
settled the sympathies of America ; they settled the sympathies 
of every nation which had not lost its humanity. Germany's 
bungling attempts to justify her conduct only affronted the 
intellect and increased the growing distrust and aversion for 
her. When Americans began to study into the European 
situation, it began then to dawn upon them with what consum- 
mate Machiavellian art the whole thing had been planned and 
sprung "at the psychological moment." The accumulating 
evidence brought conviction that Germany had deliberately 
planned world dominion, to be achieved piecemeal as fast 
as her gains could be made good. But America's policy of 
"Isolation," and the consequent mental habit of thinking of 
European affairs as distant and of only general human con- 
cern for Americans, made her unready to enter into the war 
on either side. Again it was felt that the warring nations 
might have need of the United States as the one great people 
holding aloof from the conflict and ready to play the part of 
mediator. President Wilson counseled "the spirit of impar- 
tiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned." 

(204) 



XXXV 

Germany Flouts America's Sovereignty 

In reality, America did not finally "enter into" the war; 
war was thrust upon her. It was Germany's flouting of the 
sovereignty of the United States that brought America in. 
Germany had killed some 250 American citizens who were 
traveling on the high seas under the presumed protection of 
their Government, exercising rights unquestioned under the 
law of nations. Probably never in the course of history has 
a greater degree of Christian forbearance been shown by any 
nation toward another than was> shown by the United States 
toward Germany, and this was done even while suffering 
under an accumulation of injuries that might well have precipi- 
tated war two years before a state of war was officially de- 
clared to exist. 

England's fleet had driven the German fleet off the seas and 
blockaded German ports, and when the German Government 
took official charge of all the food in the Empire for war pur- 
poses England listed food for Germany as contraband. Ger- 
many declared this to be a plan to starve her into submission, 
and in retaliation established a war zone about the British 
Isles within which she proceeded to destroy all vessels by sub- 
marines; no exception was made respecting neutrals. This 
was a direct "violation of international law. Such vessels 
were by the law of the seas subject only to search and to 
seizure in case they carried contraband of war, in which case 
they might be taken before a prize court at the port of the 
capturing vessel. According to international law no merchant 

(205) 



206 Democracy and the Great War 

vessel, not even an enemy vessel, could be destroyed at sea 
without provision first being made for the safety of the crew 
and passengers. 

The reluctance of the United States to become involved in 
the war is clear from her whole course during the diplomatic 
controversies which followed Germany's violations of inter- 
national law and direct attacks upon the lives of American 
citizens. This course was in keeping with the truth that a 
democracy is by principle opposed to war, and hence is not 
easily provoked to war; the great masses of the people desire 
peace, for upon them fall the burdens of war. The American 
Government is controlled by public opinion, and public opinion 
requires time to crystallize. Germany made capital of this fea- 
ture of democracy, and for two years in her lawless prosecution 
of the blockade against England continued to kill American 
citizens upon the high seas. 

President Wilson sent warning after warning to Germany, 
until in the light of Germany's insolence and repeated in- 
juries the sending of "another note" became a subject of jest 
even among the American people. At the very beginning of 
Germany's talk about using the submarine against all vessels 
found in the war zone, the United States sent a solemn warn- 
ing (Feb. 10, 1915) that such a course was "an indefensible 
violation of neutral rights," that she would hold Germany to 
"strict accountability," and that she would take "any steps 
necessary to safeguard American lives and to secure to Ameri- 
can citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights 
on the high seas." The reply to this warning was the sink- 
ing of the Lusitania, a harmless unarmed passenger vessel, 
carrying among others over 200 peaceable men, women and 
children who were citizens of a nation with which Germany 
was not at war. This wanton murder of these and other pas- 



Germany Flouts Americans Sovereignty 207 

sengers was not only a violation of international law, but of 
the most cherished principles of civilized humanity. Again 
President Wilson protested and warned Germany that the 
United States could not recognize any right of the Imperial 
German Government to kill American citizens bound on peace- 
ful errands, whether or not in a war zone. "The Government 
of the United States," he said, "desires to call the attention of 
the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness 
to the fact that the objection to their present method of attack 
against the trade of their enemies lies in the pratical impossi- 
bility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce 
without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice 
and humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative. 
It is practically impossible for the officers of a submarine to 
visit a merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo. 
It is practically impossible for them to make prize of her; 
and, if they cannot put a prize crew on board of her, they can- 
not sink her without leaving her crew and all on board of her 
to the mercy of the sea in her small boats. These facts it 
is understood the Imperial German Government frankly ad- 
mits. We are informed that in the instances of which we 
have spoken time enough for even that poor measure of safety 
was not given, and in at least two of the cases cited not so 
much as a warning was received. Manifestly submarines 
cannot be used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks 
have shown, without an inevitable violation of many sacred 
principles of justice and humanity." 

The President further pointed out that "ho warning that an 
unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be 
accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as an abate- 
ment of the responsibility for its commission." 

At the same time a most solemn warning was conveyed in 



208 Democracy and the Great War 

these words: "The Imperial German Government will not 
expect the Government of the United States to omit any word 
or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of 
maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens 
and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment." 

These words were unmistakable. But Germany gave little 
heed. On Aug. 9, 1915, near the scene of the Lusitania tragedy 
the passenger vessel Arabic was torpedoed and sunk with loss 
of three American lives. On March 24, 1916, the unarmed 
steamer Sussex was sunk in the English Channel, on which 
eighty persons were killed or injured, among which were two 
Americans. Following the sinking of the Sussex the United 
States sent to Germany an ultimatum declaring that, "If it 
is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute 
relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels oi com- 
merce by the use of submarines without regard to what the 
Government of the United States must consider the sacred 
and indisputable rules of international law and tlie universally 
recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United 
States is at last forced to the conclusion that there Is but one 
course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should 
now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its 
present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and 
freight carrying vessels, the Government of the United States 
can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the 
German Empire altogether. This action the Government of 
the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance 
but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the 
rights of neutral nations." To this, as to preceding demands, 
Germany made conditional reply. Germany agreed to suspend 
the unrestricted use of the submarine against merchant vessels, 
contingent upon England's discontinuance of her blockade 



Germany Flouts Americans Sovereignty 209 

policy; to which, the United States replied that it could not 
accept this condition; and to this Germany made no reply. 

It soon became clear that Germany's whole diplomatic dally- 
ing with America was simply to gain time, until she should be 
able to make enough submarines to launch a campaign of ruth- 
less destruction in spite of our warnings. On Jan. 31, 1917, 
Germany served formal notice on the United States that on 
the next day she would resume unlimited submarine warfare 
upon all vessels which her submarines could reach within a 
vast area of the sea circumscribing the British Isles, and the 
announcement was accompanied with a concession the nature 
of which amounted to little less than an insult. 

This attitude of Germany towards the sovereignty of the 
United States is well illustrated by the newspaper notice issued 
by the German Embassy at Washington on the morning of 
the sailing of the Lusitania. The German Government 
through this official agency undertook to warn the American 
people that persons who sailed on the Lusitania would do so at 
their own peril; this was after the President of the United 
States had given them to understand they might sail on ves- 
sels of this kind. There were at that time among American 
citizens those who maintained that Americans ought not to 
jeopardize the peace of the United States by crossing the war 
zone. Ought American citizens to have kept off these boats? 
Upon this point President Wilson said in his letter to Sena- 
tor Stone (Feb. 24, 1916) : 

"For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgment of 
the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor 
and self-respect of the nation are involved. We covet peace 
and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To 
forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might 
be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation 
27 



210 Democracy and the Great War 

indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquies- 
cence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere, 
and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliber- 
ate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen, 
even amidst the turmoil of war, for the law and the right. 
It would make everything this Government has attempted, 
and everything that it has achieved during this terrible strug- 
gle of nations, meaningless and futile." 

Whether for weal or for woe the urge of events has brought 
America into world relations where she does not and cannot 
live alone. As a member of a group of nations, America must 
bear her part honorably in the international questions in- 
volved in that relation. Submission to Germany's denial of 
American rights upon the high seas would not have 
ended there. It would have meant that the American Ee- 
public would have become to all nations a legitimate object 
of contempt. It would have been an unmistakable proof that 
the most solemn declarations of the United States were mere 
empty words. America's ability in the future to serve those 
ideals for which she stands would have been incalculably 
weakened, for thereafter the United States would neither have 
received nor deserved consideration in the councils of the 
nations. 



XXXVI 

America's Neutrality- 
It was claimed by Germany, and by some in the UnitecJ 
States, that America's neutrality had not been real; that 
America had favored the Allies. No doubt after the news 
of Germany's conduct in Belgium and France the sympathies 
of the great majority of the people of the United States were 
with the Allies, and that sympathy has continued to grow as the 
nature and causes of the conflict have come to be understood. 
But these sympathies are not germane to the question of the 
neutrality of the American Government. It is true we had 
cause for diplomatic controversy with England, over questions 
of blockade, contraband and interference with United States 
mails, but between the United States and England there 
existed a general arbitration treaty, which permitted all ques- 
tions of dispute between the two Governments to be referred 
to an impartial tribunal for settlement after the war. Eng- 
land had destroyed no American lives. England's defense 
of her course was courteous and based largely upon the acts 
of the north during the Civil War, and American experts in in- 
ternational law admit that it is by no means certain an impar- 
tial court would have decided the questions at issue in favor 
of the United States. 

The German autocracy's perverted moral sense is shown in 
another grievance, that the United States would not lay an 
embargo on the shipment of arms and munitions to the Allies. 
In the first years of the war the German Government stirred 
up much bitterness of feeling among the German people on 

(211) 



212 Democracy and the Great War 

this subject. Germany could not buy because she could not 
get through the British fleet, and hence she did not want any- 
one else to buy. The fact that Germany was not in position 
to buy certainly could not alter the legality of the sale; on 
the other hand, is it to be imagined that if Germany had been 
in England's place she would have considered it "neutral" 
for the United States to have cut off these supplies from Ger- 
many? The sale of munitions to belligerents by neutrals 
was permitted by international law. Both Germany and Aus- 
tra had practiced the same as late as the Balkan wars of 1911- 
13. In fact what Germany asked of us was to become her ally, 
and such we would have become had we yielded to her demands, 
for in doing so we would have acted upon no principle or 
recognized agreement governing the relations of nations. On 
the other hand, we would have denied to the Allies an interna- 
tional right recognized even by Germany's own practice. To 
have refused to sell munitions to the Allies would have been, 
under the circumstances, essentially an act hostile to the 
Allies, and would have worked powerfully toward the end of 
securing a German victory. Even supposing Germany to lose, 
it would not have ended there. If such a principle were 
written into international law, that neutrals should not sell 
munitions to warring nations, America could not consistently 
in a war of her own obtain munitions from neutrals. That 
nation which in time of peace had accumulated the largest 
war supplies would be assured of victory. In other words, 
the militarist state, the autocratic state like Germany that 
invested its money in reserves of munitions, would be at a 
fatal advantage over a free people who invested their wealth 
in schools. It would mean, ultimately, to hand over the world 
to that nation which should maintain the largest armament 
factories. , ' ] 



XXXVII 

German Intrigues Among the Neutrals 

While Germany was thus playing with the United States, 
seeking to trick her into becoming an accomplice in her pro- 
gram, she was illustrating further her moral breakdown by 
her officially promoted intrigues and conspiracies in neutral 
countries. Throughout 1915 and 1916 Germany carried on 
in the United States, in our very midst, a secret campaign ta 
cripple us so thoroughly that even when public opinion should^ 
be aroused we would not be able to retaliate. Something of 
the nature, extent, and villainy of these crimes is expressed 
in brief summary by the national Committee on Public In- 
formation, as follows : 

"Koenig, the head of the Hamburg- American secret service^, 
who was active in passport frauds, who induced Gustave 
Stahl to perjure himself and declare the Lusitania armed, and 
who plotted the destruction of the Welland Canal, has, in his 
work as a spy, passed under 13 aliases in this country and 
Canada. Capts. Boy-Ed, von Papen, von Rintelen, Tauscher, 
and von Igel were all directly connected with the German 
Government itself. There is now in the possession of the 
United States Government a check made out to Koenig and 
signed by von Papen, identified by number in a secret report 
of the German bureau of investigation as being used to pro- 
cure |150 for the payment of a bomb maker, who was to plant 
explosives disguised as coal in the bunkers of the merchant 
vessels clearing from the port of New York. Boy-Ed, Dr. 
Bunz, the German ex-minister to Mexico, the German consul 

(213) 



214 Democracy and the Great War 

at San Francisco, and officials of the Hamburg- American and 
North German Lloyd steamship lines evaded customs regula- 
tions and coaled and victualed German raiders at sea; von 
Papen and von Igel supervised the making of the incendiary 
bombs OKI the Friedrich der Grosse, then in New York Harbor, 
and stowed them away on outgoing ships; von Rintelen 
^financed Labor's National Peace Council, which tried to cor- 
Mpt legislatures and labor leaders. A lesser light of this 
igaiaxy was Robert Fay, who invented an explosive contri- 
vance which he tied to the rudder posts of vessels. By his 
^confession, and that of his partner in murder, the money came 
from the German secret police." 

On the same authority we have the following, respecting the 
operations of the Imperial German Embassy at Washington, 
through an agent named Wolf von Igel : 

^'In April, 1916, secret-service men raided the ^advertising 
office' of Wolf von Igel in New York. He claimed to be on Ger- 
man territory, because of connection with the German embassy, 
and defied the officers to shoot him, saying war would result. 
They did not shoot, but they seized his papers — damning evi- 
dences of a direct chain between the German embassy and 
plotters who would bomb munition ships, who would upset 
Ireland; checks that showed embassy payments to Teuton 
helpers, such as foreign-language newspaper editors; docu- 
ments that convicted the Teutons of fomenting the Sir Eoger 
Casement Irish rebellion; along with offers from Americans 
to do dastardly work, such as blasting munitions plants. 
From the von Igel papers, in the possession of the Government 
for a year and a half, can be pieced together a story stranger 
and more startling than fiction, showing that Germany 
through her embassy in America was concerned with : destruc- 
tion of lives and property in merchant vessels on the high 



German Intrigue Among the Neutrals 215 

seas ; violation of the laws of the United States ; Irish revolu- 
tionary plots against Great Britain; fomenting ill feeling 
against the United States in Mexico ; subornation of American 
writers and lecturers; financing of propaganda; maintenance 
of a spy system under the guise of a commercial investigation 
bureau ; subsidizing a bureau to stir up labor troubles in muni- 
tions plants; the bomb industry and other related activities." 

In the words of President Wilson to Congress : ''One of the 
things that have served to convince us that the Prussian autoc- 
racy was not and could never be our friend is that from the 
very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting 
■communities, and even our offices of government, with spies 
-and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our 
national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our 
industries, and our commerce. Indeed, it is now evident that 
its spies were here even before the war began^ and it is un- 
happily not a matter of conjecture, but a fact proved in our 
courts of justice, that the intrigues which have more than 
once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dis- 
locating the industries of the country have been carried on 
at the instigation, with the support, and even under the per- 
sonal directions of official agents of the Imperial Government 
accredited to the Government of the United States." 

It became clear that even if we should give up our right to 
i;ravel on the sea, and surrender to Germany's threats, Ger- 
-many's activities right in our midst and among our neighbors 
were becoming too serious to be ignored. Hardly a year had 
passed since the German admiral attempted to coerce Admiral 
Dewey in Manila Bay in 1908 that Germany had not tried to 
embroil us with South America or Japan. The "Zimmermann 
note" is a document which Americans will not soon forget. 
'They will remember that this note was written at a time when 



216 Democracy and the Great War 

Germany was officially professing cordial friendship for the 
United States and only three days before President Wilson 
addressed the United States Senate upon the subject of a 
league of peace to secure safety and justice to the world. It 
proposed that, in case the United States should not remain 
neutral, an alliance should be formed between Germany and 
Mexico for operation against the United States, in which the 
money should be furnished by Germany, and that Mexico 
should be compensated by the conquest of her "lost territory 
in New Mexico, Texas and Arizona.'' The President of Mexico 
was to seek the cooperation of Japan. This note, which came 
into the hands of the Department of State in February, 1917, 
and was exposed to the people soon afterward, settled for a 
number of Americans any remaining doubts. Citizens. of Ger- 
man descent who mindful of the advances made in the world 
by German enterprise, German ingenuity, German discipline, 
and German efficiency had sympathized with the land of their 
birth, now came to see that Germany was making war not 
upon nations only but upon civilization, and that she meant 
to triumph by any means whatsoever. 



XXXVIII 
America Recognizes State of War 

Continued loss of American lives on the high seas convinced 
the President and Congress that the only honorable course was 
to meet the challenge which Germany had made. On Feb- 
ruary 3, the President handed to Count von Bernstorff his 
passports and recalled Ambassador Gerard from Berlin. On 
April 4 in the Senate by a vote of 32 to 6, and on April 6 in the 
House by a vote of 373 to 50, the following declaration was 
adopted : 

''Whereas, The Imperial German Government has com- 
mitted repeatedly acts of war against the Government and the 
people of the United States of America: Therefore be it 
Resolved hij the Seriate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled^ That the state 
of war between the United States and the Imperial German 
Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States 
is hereby formally declared ; and that the President be, and he 
is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval 
and military forces of the United States and the resources of 
the Government to carry on war against the Imperial Ger- 
man Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful 
termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged 
by the Congress of the United States." 



(217) 



XXXIX 

Why America Must Fight to the End 

We are at war with Germany, then, in the first place, be- 
cause Germany made war upon us. But there are deeper 
reasons for our being at war with the German Government. 
They lie in the spirit and character of that Government. And 
these deeper reasons are why we must continue to bear our 
part in the struggle until the essential objects are accom- 
plished. 

Entirely apart from Germany's direct attack upon us, if we 
had to choose war there could be no question of where that 
choice would lie, for our own safety and for the safety of de- 
mocracy in the world. The ideals for which America stands 
the German Government despises. To her they are negative 
and weak, being inspired by Christianity, which the German 
Government regards as unfit for the guidance of a nation that 
would be strong. She would build her state "with stones 
from the Roman Capitol.'^ Her conception of the state is 
essentially pagan. It is the apotheosis of brute force, recogniz- 
ing in international relations no moral bonds, no justice, 
mercy or humanity. It is the survival of a brutal barbaric 
spirit bodied forth upon the model of the Empire of Rome. 
Germany compelled us to choose whether we would tacitly 
and cravenly support this monster of brutal force, or whether 
we would listen to the voice of justice crying from the un- 
marked graves of the sea and the nameless dead of stricken 
Belgium and France. Our choice of the latter was in accord 
with every consideration of loyalty to our national ideals and 
of prudence in safeguarding our national security. 

(218) 



Why America Must Fight to the End 219 

For a full realization of the deadly seriousness of this crisis 
we have but to consider what even a partial victory for Ger- 
many would mean. It would mean, in the first place, that the 
Oerman method of war would be vindicated by success. In 
the minds of the German people thereafter, this would be the 
model to be followed in future wars. Its success would com- 
mend it to other ambitious nations which might be tempted 
to seek national aggrandizement by war. The world would 
be at the mercy of the ruthless principle that ^^military neces- 
sity knows no law.'' This principle would be glorified by a Ger- 
man victory. Thereafter all laws and compacts between 
nations would have little or no force. No nation after such 
a shining example of the futility of such agreements could, 
for its own safety, afford to place reliance in them. All inter- 
national obligations would be reduced to "scraps of paper" 
and the world become an armed camp. It must be made clear 
by this war, that any Government that adopts the principles 
and employs the methods now being espoused by the German 
Government, and that any people that can knowingly tolerate 
' ]ch a Government, will bring upon itself not merely the con- 
demnation but the effectual opposition of all peaceful peoples 
who desire that among nations as among individuals respect 
for humanity shall be enforced and a reign of law prevail. 



XL 

What Germany Means by Peace 

The character of the German autocracy is strikingly revealed 
in its "peace offensives." The dominant note struck in these 
maneuvers is in keeping with the general policy of ''terrorism.'' 
At the close of the year 1916, before the United States had 
accepted the challenge, Germany began sounding out the 
Allies through the neutrals. Boasts of "the glorious deeds of 
our armies" accompanied a thinly veiled threat that unless 
the neutrals brought pressure to bear on the Allies they need 
not expect Germany any longer to respect their rights. "Be 
ware of the consequences of further stirring the wrath of the 
Imperial German Government!" rang out at every neutral 
capital. One purpose of this stroke was to harden the hearts 
of the German people, by throwing upon the Allies the burden 
of responsibility for continuing the war. Germany made no 
mention of specific terms of peace. Not so with the Allies. When 
President Wilson undertook to get from both sides a state- 
ment of war aims as a possible basis for peace negotiations, 
the Allies replied jointly and fully that there must be com- 
plete restoration of territory, full reparation for damages, 
and effective guarantees of security against Prussian mili- 
tarism. But Germany would name no specific terms. Presi- 
dent Wilson then outlined terms which the United States could 
join in guaranteeing. His concluding words are memorable: 

"I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with 
one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doc- 
trine of the world: That no nation should seek to extend its 

(220) 



What Germany Means by Peace 221 

policy over any other nation or people, but that every people 
should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way 
of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little 
along with the great and powerful. 

"I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling 
alliances which would draw them into competition of power, 
catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and dis- 
turb their own affairs with influences intruded from with- 
out. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of 
power. When all unite to act in the same sense and 
with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and 
are free to live their own lives under a common protection. 

^^I am proposing government by the consent of the governed ; 
that freedom of the seas which in international conference 
after conference representatives of the United States have 
urged with the eloquence of those w^ho are the convinced dis- 
ciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which 
makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an 
instrument of aggression or of selfish violence. 

"These are American principles, American policies. We 
can stand for no others. And they are also the principles and 
policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of 
every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They 
are the principles of mankind and must prevail." 

These terms were hailed with joy by the Allies. Germany 
made no response. This was January 22, 1917. The Zim- 
mermann note was dated* January 16. On January 31 Ger- 
many announced to the United States that "from February 
1, 1917, sea traffic will be stopped with every available weapon 
and without further notice." Germany's reply to the voice of 
civilization was "frightfulness." This is the German method 
of arriving at peace terms. This was enlightening. It laid 



222 Democracy and the Great War 

Germany open in all justice to the charge, that the world must 
give up hope of acting in friendliness or cooperation with a 
Government whose ways are not amenable to the ordinary 
rules of decent conduct. 

Germany showed a similar spirit of noncommittal evasion 
when in August 1917 the question of peace terms was opened 
by his Holiness Benedictus XV, who thought "to expedite the 
end of these calamities by endeavoring to bring the peoples^ 
and their rulers to more moderate resolutions." America was^ 
then in the War, and President Wilson, while expressing ap- 
preciation of the generous motives of the Pope's appeal, stated 
the case thus, for America : 

"To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan 
proposed by His Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can 
see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of it& 
policy; would make it necessary to create a permanent hos- 
tile combination of nations against the German people, who- 
are its instruments ; and would result in abandoning the new- 
born Kussia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference,, 
and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted 
by all the malign influences to which the German Government 
has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon 
a restitution of its power or upon any word of honor it could 
pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation ? 

"Kesponsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if thej 
nev^r saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon 
political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some 
nations and cripple or embarrass others, upon vindictive action 
of any sort, or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. The 
American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands 
of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no repri- 
sal upon the German people, who have themselves suffered all 



What Germany Means by Peace 223 

things in this War, which they did not choose. They believe that 
peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of 
Governments — the rights of peoples great or small, weak or 
powerful — their equal right to freedom and security and self- 
government and to a participation upon fair terms in the eco- 
nomic opportunities of the world, the German people of course 
included if they will accept equality and not seek domination." 

It is instructive to read in this connection the words of Presi- 
dent Lincoln, in his annual message to Congress in December 
1864, bearing upon his view of how to initiate terms of peace, 
in which he says : 

"The manner of continuing the effort remains to choose. On 
careful consideration of all the evidence accessible, it seems 
to me that no attempt at negotiation with the insurgent leader 
could result in any good. He would accept nothing short of 
severance of the Union, precisely what we will not and can 
not give. . . . Between him and us the issue is distinct, 
simple, and inflexible. It is an issue which can only be tried 
by war and decided by victory. If we yield we are beaten ; if 
the Southern people fail him he is beaten. Either way it 
would be the victory and defeat following war. . . . They 
can at any moment have peace simply by laying down their 
arms and submitting to the national authority. . . . The 
war will cease on the part of the Government whenever it shall 
have ceased on the part of those who began it." 

When the war began to look dark for Germany in the days 
following the Battle of the Somme, the cry began to be heard 
in some quarters, especially among the German Socialists, of 
peace with "no annexations, no indemnities." Since then the 
Kussians have learned that the "o's" in the "no's" were the 
mouths of cannon. Under false leadership they have fallen an 
easy prey to this German masked battery. 



224 Democracy and the Great War 

But even assuming the restoration by Germany of all con- 
quered areas, the damage which Germany has done to them 
has crippled them for generations of the future. Moreover, 
what reason have we to suppose that Germany would honor 
her plighted word, and keep the peace? As President Wilson 
said in reply to the Pope : 

^'We can not take the word of the present rulers of Germany 
as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly 
supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and 
purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples 
of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such 
guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, 
covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territo- 
rial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with 
the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend 
on. We must await some new evidence of the purposes of 
the great peoples of the Central Powers. God grant it may be 
given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples 
everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of a cove- 
nanted peace." 

Until that time when Germany shall be stripped of her 
power for harm, no lasting peace for the world is possible. It 
must be realized that "Mittel-Europa'' is in 1918 an accom- 
plished fact, so far as Germany's military operations are con- 
cerned. If peace were made today, Germany would emerge 
from this war the political and economic master over terri- 
tory extending from the Baltic and North seas well into Russia 
and Western Asia. Her conquered territory alone on all 
sides of her makes an area equal to Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Michigan and Wisconsin. In this area she has scientifically 
enslaved over fifty million people, a population sixteen times 
as great as that of Michigan. In this area she has taken 



What Germany Means by Peace 225 

possession not only of the public utilities, improvements and 
resources, but the personal property of the inhabitants, even 
to their tapestries, rugs, pictures, jewels, and clothing. Her 
system of loans to her allies Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey 
has brought them absolutely under control of Germany. This 
control if peace could be secured would mean for her bankers, 
manufacturers and land-owners a monopoly of the exploita- 
tion of all these resources. No war in history has ever brought 
to one people such boundless material gain as this war has 
brought to Germany if she can secure a peace which will per- 
mit her to retain her conquests. Even peace without indem- 
nities and annexations would secure to her the economic con- 
trol of Middle Europe and Western Asia. 

Germany in her efforts to gain peace may be regarded as 
much in the position of a bandit who has attacked our home, 
robbed our vault, outraged our women, murdered our children, 
set fire to the house, and retreated. Suppose now the sheriff, 
who has organized a posse, with us as members, and chased 
the robber to his den, should receive from him a message, say- 
ing: "You see the power I have. You had better come to 
my terms, or I may do it again. I am a man of peace, but 
I have not room to expand, as I want to. All I ask is that you 
give me what I want. You should do so, because I am con- 
vinced, despite your protests, that I am more fit than you are. 
Now I am tired of being chased by you, and you had better 
return home before I am provoked to do my worst. If you will 
agree not to molest me further, I will even give you back some 
of the goods." Would a man of honor talk peace terms with 
a desperado? Yet this is not far from what Germany has 
asked the Allies to do. And the Allies have declared for no 
peace without reparation, restoration, and security. Germany 
must be punished, then the world can talk peace with honor. 
29 



226 Democracy and the Great War 

A peace without either such a defeat of Germany as will 
weaken the German power and influence over Central Europe, 
or else work a radical transformation of the temper as well 
as the form of the German Government, would mean that all 
Europe must continue to be menaced by the most formidable 
and heartless political and military combination the world 
has seen. The German people, expanding in the national 
pride of success, would be confirmed in the belief in the prof- 
itableness of aggression, and bitter would be their hostility 
to the democracies which had recently opposed them. It 
would be impossible that the world should be "safe for democ- 
racy," or that there should be any lasting peace. 

A victorious German autocracy, wielding such an increase 
of power, prestige, and influence, with ambitions unsatiated, 
and with a special grievance against the United States as op- 
posed to her ideals and aggressions, would make this country 
a special object of her intrigue and ultimate attack. These 
many years the British navy and the French army have stood 
between German aggression and the New World. With these 
bulwarks removed or impaired by a German victory, the Mon- 
roe Doctrine would be in grave danger. If Germany should 
only partially destroy the power of England and France, tliis 
would be but a first step, to be followed by consolidation of 
gains and further attack, with their ultimate defeat as a goal, 
and with America always "within the scope of the CJerman 
policy." If England and France were decisi\ely beaten and 
compelled to accept terms dictated by Germany, that Germany 
would demand concessions of land to the north of us in Canaan 
and to the south of us in South America, where she would be 
within easy striking distance of the United States. How then 
could we escape the burden of military preparation to meet 



What Germany Means by Peace 227 

this attack such as Germany has forced upon France for gen- 
erations? 

The object of this war should be, if possible, to end war. 
But the success of Germany would cause the shadow of war 
to rest for generations upon mankind. Unless that power is 
put down, the affairs of the entire globe will be dominated 
by a vast Power contemptuous of other peoples, without re- 
gard for its plighted word, alien to the spirit of kindliness 
and fraternity, looking upon force and sinister intrigue as the 
only means for the adjustment of relations between states, 
and hostile to the ideals of free government. 
30 



XLI 
Our German American Friends 

In behalf of the German people as distinguished from the 
German Government, let us recall these words of President 
Wilson in the war message to Congress : "We have no quarrel 
with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but 
one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse 
that their Government acted in entering the War. It was 
not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war 
determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the 
old unhappy days, when peoples were nowhere consulted by 
their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest 
of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were ac- 
customed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools." 

And for emphasis, again he says in the same message : "We 
are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people 
and shall desire nothing so much as the early reestablishment 
of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us, how- 
ever hard it may be for them for the time being to believe that 
this is spoken from our hearts." 

In July, 1914, when war threatened, there was a strong peace 
party in Germany. Earnest protests were made against war. 
In Berlin on one day, 28 mass meetings were held to denounce 
the war, and one of them is said to have been attended by 
70,000 people. That was before war began ; but how is it now ? 
The German press, German speakers, every source of knowl- 
edge for the people has been absolutely controlled by the Ger- 
man Government since the beginning of the war. It has sys- 

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Our German American Friends 229 

tematically molded public opinion, and the public will. It 
has falsified the aims of the Allies, and glorified the "achieve- 
ments" of the armies of the Fatherland. It can say, with near 
truth, No enemy has yet set foot on German soil, — and it can 
point to substantial conquests of enemy lands, still in their 
hands. Not only have they filled the German mind with pride 
of conquest, but they have fired the ambition of the German 
people to believe that "with God's aid" the German nation is 
to conquer the world and to rule supreme as God's chosen 
people. The German people have tolerated a Government 
which stands for such doctrine, and for the ideals that make 
possible the atrocities of the German army; the most physi- 
cally fit of the German people are now in the German army; 
the German army is the weapon of the German Government; 
is there doubt in the mind of any true American about his own 
duty or the duty of the American soldier? 

Otto Kahn, one of the most prominent of German Americans,, 
speaking June 1, 1917, said: 

"Speaking as one born of German parents, I do not hesitate 
to state it as my deep conviction that the greatest service which 
men of German birth or antecedents can render to the country 
of their origin is to proclaim and to stand up for those great 
and fine ideals and national qualities and traditions which 
they inherited from their ancestors, and to set their faces like 
flint against the monstrous doctrines and acts of a rulership 
which have robbed them of the Germany which they loved and 
in which they took just pride, the Germany which had the good 
will, respect and admiration of the world. 

"I do not hesitate to state it as my solemn conviction that 
the more unmistakably and whole-heartedly Americans of Ger- 
man origin throw themselves into the struggle which this 
country has entered in order to rescue Germany, no less than 



230 Democracy and the Great War 

America and the rest of the world, from those sinister forces 
that are, in President Wilson's language, the enemy of all 
mankind, the better they protect and serve the repute of the 
old German name and the true advantage of the German 
people.'' 



XLII 

The People's War to End War 

What then is being settled on the battle fields of Europe? 
Is it not the character of the coming world order? Shall it 
be established in the spirit of the Imperial German autocracy, 
or in the spirit of the immortal Declaration, "that all men 
are created equal ; that they are endowed by their creator with 
certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights, 
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any 
form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is 
the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a 
new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and 
organizing its powers in such form^ as to them shall seem most 
likely to effect their safety and happiness.'^ 

Why is America in the war? "We are in the war,'' says 
Secretary Lane, "because we -could not keep out. The world 
of Christ — a neglected, but not rejected, Christ — has come 
again face to face with the world of Mohammed, who willed 
to win by force. We are fighting Germany because she sought 
to terrorize us and then to fool us. We could not believe that 
Germany would do what she said she would do upon the seas. 
We believed Germany's promise that she would respect the neu- 
tral flag and the rights of neutrals, and we held our anger 
in check. But now we see that she was holding us off with 
fair promises until she could build her huge fleet of submarines. 
We are fighting Germany because she violated our confidence. 

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232 Democracy and the Great War 

Paid German spies filled our cities. Officials of her govern- 
ment received as the guests of this nation lived with us to bribe 
and to terrorize, defying our law and the law of nations. We 
are fighting Germany because while we were yet her friends, 
the only great power that still held hands off — she sent the 
Zimmermann note calling to her aid Mexico, our southern 
neighbor, and hoping to lure Japan, our western neighbor, 
into war against this nation of peace. The nation that would 
do these things proclaims the gospel that Government has no 
conscience. And this doctrine can not live, or else democracy 
must die." 

This is America's war, the people's war. Every citizen of 
America, which includes every boy and girl in the schools, must 
pledge undying devotion to the cause upon which America 
has entered. He who is not with America today, heart and 
soul, is against her — there is no middle ground. And unity 
of purpose means solidarity of service. Truly the President 
has said, "It is not an army that we must shape and train 
for war. It is a whole nation. The whole nation must be 
a team in which each must play the part for which he is best 
fitted." 



XLin 

"Carry On!" 

We have now reached a crisis in the Great War. With Kus- 
sia in the throes of revolution and helpless, with Italy in ex- 
tremities of need, with France hard driven in her almost super- 
human endurance, with England crippled by the submarine, 
and with Germany and her allies in military possession of all 
central Europe and large areas of Western Asia, if the danger 
of this situation does not appeal to the intelligence, the heart 
and the will of a united America, the cause of government of 
the people, by the people and for the people, may perish from 
the earth. Behind our troops, behind our battle fleet, behind our 
great industrial army must stand the mighty army of the 
American people. Will they make unflinchingly the personal 
sacrifices involved in their decision! For the boys and girls 
of Michigan's schools, into whose hands is to come the future 
keeping of this State and of this Nation, there can be but one 
answer. 

In the words of an eloquent pleader in this great cause for 
America and humanity: "If you love the women of your 
family, there can be but one answer. If you respect woman- 
hood, there can be but one answer. If you honor the country 
which has cherished you and given you an independence un- 
paralleled, there is but one answer. If you believe that the 
United States should not bend its neck to any yoke, there is 
but one answer. If you hold that the peoples of the world 
are entitled to work out their destinies as freemen, there is 
but one answer. Unless you believe that there is no aspira- 

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234 Democracy and the Great War 

tion of man so noble as to justify him in risking his life for 
its attainment, unless you believe that it matters not how a 
man lives so long as he holds on to life, there is but one answer. 
Twenty-four hundred years ago at the end of a desolating war 
Greece at Plataea won a decisive victory over her Persian in- 
vaders and drove them finally and forever from her land. To 
her soldiers who fell in battle she erected a monument. For 
that monument her great poet, Simonides, wrote the epitaph. 
In that epitaph he made the dead heroes speak, and this is 
what they said : 'If to die nobly is the chief part of excellence, 
to us out of all men Fortune gave this lot: For hastening to 
set a crown of freedom on Hellas, we lie possessed of praise 
that grows not old.' By so much as the freedom of the world 
today is of greater moment than the freedom of Greece of old, 
in that large measure does this epitaph in all its truth, sim- 
plicity, and grandeur befit and belong to those of whom may 
be demanded the supreme sacrifice, for you will lie possessed 
of 'praise that grows not old.' " 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




